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I INTRODUCTION
Much I owe to the Lands that grew— 
More to the Lives that fed—
But most to Allah Who gave me two 
Separate sides to my head.
Much I reflect on the Good and the True 
In the Faiths beneath the sun.
But most to Allah Who gave me two 
Sides to my head, not one.
1 would go without shirt or shoe.
Friend, tobacco or bread.
Sooner than lose for a minute the two 
Separate sides o f  my head!
Rudyard Kipling, "The Two-Sided Man"
Researchers Roger Sperry and Ronald Meyers first noted split-brain phenomena in 
the late 1950s. Initially they conducted experiments with cats, a staple o f  neurological 
research, and continued later with monkeys. In 1961 split-brain surgery was used on a 
human patient in an attempt to halt severe epilepsy that had not responded to standard 
pharmaceutical treatment. Other patients also w ere given the procedure.
Somewhat later than one might expect, given what was already known about the 
brain, researchers noted that such patients exhibited intriguing behaviors under certain 
experimental conditions. They were unable to share information from one hemisphere to 
the other, giving the appearance, at least under experimental conditions, o f  having two, 
separately functioning brains. Sperry and his student Michael Gazzaniga conducted further 
experiments in order to determine more precisely the relationship between the right and 
left hemispheres o f the brain, hoping to gain insight into how the mind o f  the split-brain 
patient operated.
Controversy arose when the results o f  these investigations filtered out. Some 
thinkers argued that there were two minds in one patient, and but for the artificial 
experimental conditions, these minds worked in tandem. Others argued that there was still 
only one mind. Some even placed that mind in the left hemisphere and denied that the 
right hemisphere was a mind.
In this work, I look at only one component o f the patient's life—namely, as that 
patient operates under the conditions of a Sperry-type experiment. A Sperry-type 
experiment is any controlled condition in which the hemispheres are given information but 
not allowed to relay that information to one another.
My ultimate position is that a duality o f concurrent persons exist under such 
conditions. In particular, 1 argue that however many minds are operating in the patient 
before and after a Sperry-type experiment, there are two independent streams o f conscious 
mental states, and ultimately two independent persons, while such an experiment is in 
progress The project has three essential parts.
In part one. Cognition, I survey empirical investigations o f  split-brain phenomena.
1 first address some of the issues regarding brain anatomy and function, and some o f the 
biological developments regarding asymmetry in animals, and then 1 move on to give a 
short history o f the investigation o f  hemisphere specialization in human beings. Second, 1 
give an outline o f the essentials o f brain information processing that bear on split-brain 
phenomena. 1 will argue that the right hemisphere has functionally distinct modules o f  
cognition which support the sentience o f  the two isolated hemispheres. Third, 1 address 
neurological dysfunctions and note that some o f them resemble various aspects o f what 
occurs in split-brain experiments. Finally, I review and analyze the empirical side o f 
various Sperry-type experiments. At the end of part one, I argue that the empirical 
evidence straightforwardly warrants the position that each hemisphere is legitimately 
reckoned to have the necessary cognitive structure to support consciousness and even 
personhood.
In part two. Consciousness, I lay out a position on just what is meant by calling the 
individual hemispheres conscious. I am concerned especially with defending the right 
hemisphere’s status as conscious, since this often is at issue in debates about split-brain 
patients. Initially, 1 consider several alternatives for what might count as a fruitful
definition o f  consciousness, since this is somewhat a term o f art in the literature. Next, I 
consider two versions of Higher-Order Theories o f consciousness. Next, 1 consider two 
key challenges to reckoning the right hemisphere as being conscious, one from Dennett 
(1978) and another from worries about “Zombies.” Finding these surmountable, 1 discuss 
the essentials o f consciousness, as they would apply to the right hemisphere. 1 address 
such issues as phenomenal vs. access consciousness, introspection, and the configuration 
of brain module function. Finally, 1 develop a criterion for detecting consciousness which 
is based on a modified version o f  the Turing Test. At the end o f  part two, I argue that if  it 
is granted there is such a thing as consciousness at all, then the right hemispheres would 
qualify in virtually all respects.
In part three. Continuity o f  Identity, I re-affirm that not only are both hemispheres 
conscious, but they also are persons, even if short-lived persons. To this end, I first give a 
tentative definition o f ‘person’, and sketch the main issues for establishing a coherence o f 
identity o f a person. Second, I discuss individuation, developing a theory about how 
minds are encarnalized by human brains. Finally, 1 analyze the unity o f  consciousness as a 
subject o f mentality, specifically as it relates to the right hemisphere’s being a person 
under the conditions of a Sperry-type Experiment.
I close out the project with a summary of the argument and conclusions.
2 COGNITION
2.1 Introduction
The latéralisation o f the brain was noted early on under clinical conditions. In some 
instances physicians noted certain lateral injuries produced specific deficits in mental skills 
In other instances, psychologists noted that the origin o f  certain emotive behaviors seemed 
lateralized in the brain. Eventually, neuroscientists, linguistic theorists, brain surgeons, and 
a host o f people in other science-based disciplines came to appreciate the significance of 
latéralisation o f  the human brain. One could begin a legitimate approach to the study o f 
split-brain patients from any one o f the scientific disciplines that concern themselves with 
brain (unction. Or, one could begin from all o f them, which is just what I do.
As a synthesis concerned with the kinds o f knowledge that underlie human 
cognition, the details o f human cognitive processing, and the computational modeling of 
those processes, cognitive science offers a good empirical starting point for unraveling the 
very surprising results coming from studies on split-brain patients. Bechtel and Graham 
( 1998) define cognitive science as “the multidisciplinary scientific study o f cognition and 
its role in intelligent agency. It examines what cognition is, what it does, and how it 
works”(3). Bechtel and Graham note that this definition is premature without further 
discussion o f the history of cognitive science and that it comes across as far more 
definitive than it actually is. People differ on what creatures count as intelligent agents, or 
which scientific disciplines should be included in the study o f  cognition. Also, there are 
worries over what “cognition is, what it does, and how it works” (3). Among other 
strands in its history, cognitive science grew  out o f developments in computer science.
Information-processing models were applied to psychology. The object o f  this application 
was to specify the internal processing involved in perception, memory, and thought, which 
is precisely what is required for investigating split-brain phenomena.
In this part, I first outline some o f  the more essential issues regarding brain 
anatomy and function that will figure in a discussion o f the cognitive activities o f split- 
brain patients. Next, I give a sketch o f  the biological bases o f  asymmetry in the animal 
kingdom. After this sketch, I give a short chronological survey o f  early speculation about 
and recognition o f  hemisphere specialization I also discuss some key neurological 
dysfunctions that share some resemblance to Sperry-type experiments, the latter of which 
experiments I explore in some detail.
2.2 Essential Issues in Brain Anatomy and Function
2 .2 .1 Anatomical Features 
The brain is the part o f the central nervous system that coordinates and controls a 
host o f bodily activities. In humans, this includes not just control o f  movement, sensory 
input, and other physiological processes, but also responsibility for maintaining 
consciousness and personal identity.
The evolutionary biologist holds that the brain’s primary function is to make 
decisions about how to enhance reproductive success. It is driven by rules that help it 
achieve this end But the brain can do other things, such as store experiences and change 
its own structure to accommodate new experiences (Gazzaniga 1998, 35). These “other 
things” are what make the brain o f  such interest for study, for with an appropriate amount
o f neural complexity and under the right structural conditions, brains can give rise to 
minds. The ambiguity o f  that last clause about brains and minds might mean that any single
Figure 1: Gross Brain Structure (Restak 1995, 12)
brain could give rise to only a single mind or that any single brain could give rise to at 
least one single mind.
2.2.1.1 Cerebral Hemispheres
Even a cursory examination o f the brain's gross structure reveals it is split into two 
halves. These, the two cerebral hemispheres, represent not only the largest portion o f  the
brain, but make up 70 percent o f  the entire nervous system. Somewhat along 
morphological features, somewhat along arbitrarily divided points, the two hemispheres 
taken together (the cerebrum) are further divided into parts, called lobes. It is known that 
the lobes have different functions, but their structures have not been rigorously mapped 
(relative to the number o f substructures that could be identified, in principle) nor their 
functions fully understood. The frontal lobes are concerned with the most complex 
abilities o f  the mind: judgment, reason, and emotional processing. The parietal lobes 
process taste and other sensations, “such as the ability to Judge weight, shape, and 
textures,” and allow one to identify what an object is by feeling rather than seeing. The 
temporal lobes are at the rear o f the skull and house processing for visual modalities—size, 
color, form, movement, and distance judgment. Object identification occurs here by means 
of such modalities, and judgment o f  differences between similar objects is also discerned in 
this area—e.g., “bird” versus “airplane.” Finally, the temporal lobes receive fibers 
concerned with speech, hearing, smell, and balance (Considine 1994, 2150).
2.2.1.2 Corpus Callosum
Corpus callosum actually means “thick-skinned body” (Restak 1995, 97). This 
white-matter connecting tract o f  more than 200 million individual neurons (in humans) is 
the major apparatus o f communication between the two hemispheres in higher mammals. 
Other minor structures connect the hemispheres, including the anterior commissure. From 
a neurological standpoint, the corpus callosum’s function is unclear. Some speculate it 
could synchronize oscillatory activity, as, for instance, when various objects pass through 
the different receptive fields o f processing for vision. Others have speculated that the
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corpus callosum inhibits control o f  current processing for one or the other hemisphere 
(Gazzaniga, Ivry, and Mangun 1998, 328).
This would mean that the corpus callosum might not be a mechanism of 
information exchange, but a switch that inhibits one o r the other hemisphere from being
C o r p u s
Ca l l o s u m
Figure 2: Sketch for locating Corpus Callosum (Restak, 1995, 15) 
dominant. The signals traveling along the corpus callosum are not information signals, but
signals that would inhibit control structures in one or the other o f  the hemispheres. Studies
o f neural nets modeled after the speeds o f callosal fibers in humans, using both the limited
human data and more accurate single-cell studies in primates, seem to show that “the
delays associated with trans-callosa! communication not only limit the degree o f 
cooperation between the hemispheres, but may have provided the impetus for the 
development o f hemispheric specialization.” In networks trained with slower inter- 
hemispheric-like connections, such as the brain, the hemispheres operate most efficiently 
as independent processing systems. Under these conditions, it is thought that such slower 
processing systems are more likely to evolve non-identical computation capabilities 
(Gazzaniga, Ivry, and Mangun 1998, 341). The corpus callosum is sometimes partially 
or fully cut during surgery on severe epilepsy patients in order to  isolate the hemispheres— 
thus, the origin o f  the phrase "split-hemisphere” or “split-brain” patients. This procedure 
limits the overly active electrical activity from spreading via the corpus callosum 
throughout the brain, thus keeping the patient from being fully incapacitated.
2.2.1.3 Medulla Oblongata
Underneath the brain and running into its central base, at a length o f about an inch, 
the medulla oblongata appears at the top o f  the spinal cord. It looks like a somewhat 
widened, more nerve-packed part o f  the spinal cord, but it actually is far more complex in 
its structure. Its control centers are concerned with a wide range o f  brain activities, such 
as the basic biological functions o f swallowing, breathing, digestion, and vomiting, and 
with some o f the more advanced motor functions of speech. Apart from its involvement in 
these tasks, it is especially important to note regarding studies o f  split-brain patients that 
“in the medulla oblongata, the large bundles o f  fibers, which originated in the two halves 
o f the cerebrum and which transmit the impulses o f voluntary movement, cross to the 
opposite sides” (Considine 1994, 2149). This is where the crossover from the left side of
1 0
the body is tied to the right hemisphere o f  the brain and vice versa. Thus, for example, 
when a split-brain patient points to items with the right hand in a Sperry-type experiment, 
the medulla oblongata has routed motor control and feedback information to the left 
hemisphere. Naturally, the right-hemisphere's left hand routing is controlled in the same 
manner.
2.2.1.4 Thalamus
The thalamus is often called “the gateway to the cortexes” because all sensory 
modalities except olfactory inputs are relayed through the thalamus before continuing into 
other sensory receiving areas. Like the brain, the thalamus is a bilateral structure separated 
along a midline by a ventricle, although some people do have both halves o f  their thalamus 
connected by what is called massa intermedia (Gazzaniga, Ivry, and Mangun 1998, 59).
2.2.1.5 Hippocampus and Amygdala
The hippocampus and amygdala are both structures located within the core 
temporal lobe. Studies by means o f  PET and MRI scanning, along with human and animal 
lesion data, find as a “reasonable conclusion that the hippocampus encodes new 
information and retrieves recent information when explicit (as opposed to implicit) 
recollection is involved” (Gazzaniga, Ivry, and Mangun 1998, 282).
The hippocampus also is involved in spatial processing. While the “hippocampus is 
a general purpose device for forming associations between stimuli—a red traffic light is 
linked to cars stopping—[the amygdala] has a narrower memory function. [It] provides an 
emotional tag to go with the association” (Gazzaniga, Ivry, and Mangun 1998, 450). 
Stimulation o f  the amygdala, whether by artificial means, such as electrodes, or by natural
means, such as during an epileptic seizure, results in fear, fearful hallucinations, or 
memory episodes o f  some previous frightening experience (Kazdin 2000, 451).
It also should be noted that pyramidal neurons are a part o f the hippocampal structure 
that project out o f  the hippocampus by means o f  the fornix, which is a large white-matter
C iN C U L A rc  G f w s
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Figure 3 Sketch o f basic brain anatomy
tract. Some o f the fibers o f  the fornix cross to the opposite hemisphere (Gazzaniga, Ivry, 
and Mangun 1998, 59).
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I have been reviewing the basic anatomical features o f  the brain, for all o f these 
structures will eventually come into the discussion when the specific activity and 
information exchange between the two hemispheres is considered. Moreover, a general 
feeling for the type o f  neural activity o f the brain will also allow one to better cash-out a 
workable definition o f  consciousness.
2.2.2 Modularization
2.2.2.1 Introduction
Regarding the modularization o f brain function, 1 first suggest that chronometric 
evidence leads one to think that there are discrete modules in the brain dedicated to 
specific tasks. I next show how the brain can be artificially modularized by Wada 
procedures and partial callosal surgery. Finally, I give what appears to be an example o f a 
brain module for a specific task, facial recognition, and I close with some remarks about 
the brain as a society o f  modules.
Showing that the brain is a neural network with discrete processing modules is 
essential for arguing that a large collection o f  such modules can form an independent mind 
over time. Obviously this would directly support my main goal o f  showing that the right 
hemisphere is an independent mind within the context o f a Sperry-type experiment.
2.2.2.2 Chronometric Evidence for Modularitv
A first reason for thinking that the brain is made up separate modules is that when 
given separate paths one can make chronomelric measnremenls—that is, one can discuss 
the time it takes the brain to perform various tasks. For example, one might identify the 
relationship between two letters where they are physically identical; where they are
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identical in case; or, where they are both vowels or consonants. Taking these different 
categories and measuring response times for subjects instructed to differentiate letters into 
their proper categories, one notes that the response times are not all the same. This 
indicates that different neural processes are operant for different types o f  thinking tasks. 
One can further vary the inter-stimulus interval between presentations and watch how 
there is a correlation among the various thinking tasks (Gazzaniga, Ivry, and Mangun 
1998, 95). Since matching chronometric measurements taken from the subjects are 
constant for like differentiation tasks, this is evidence for the modularity o f  brain 
processing.
2.2 2.3 Wada Procedure on Normal Brains
Second, one can take a normal functioning human who has not had a severing of 
the corpus callosum and apply what is called a WaJa Procedure. Here one half of a 
patient’s brain is put to sleep through chemical injection. If during this time, for example, 
the left hemisphere is put to sleep, and an object is placed into the patient’s left hand 
during this left-sleep time, the patient, upon the reawakening of the left hemisphere, will 
deny that anything was put in the left hand. However, when the patient is shown a group 
of objects, he or she will decisively point to  the correct object. Only after this will the left 
hemisphere indicate verbally that it remembers the object.
Gazzaniga (1985) takes this as strong evidence that the mind is made up of 
multiple modules and that information can be stored in particular modules without other 
modules having access to the information. In this case the language-producing module of 
the left hemisphere did not have access to the memories in the right hemisphere. He
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theorizes that the left hemisphere “remembers” the object only by observing bodily 
behavior and interpreting a consistent story for the now reunified brain’s control o f  bodily 
motions (83-84).
One also might theorize that the access memory circuitry o f the left hemisphere 
was unavailable at the time o f left-sleep, and only when this circuitry comes back into 
operation does the left hemisphere gain the memories available within the right 
hemisphere. Gazzaniga, Ivry, and Mangun (1998) note that “encoding and retrieval 
process are lateralized in the left and right hemispheres, respectively” (283). This means 
that the memory retrieval for deeper, or what is sometimes understood as “longer-term,” 
memory is done in the right hemisphere while the encoding o f deeper memories is done in 
the left hemisphere. ‘
It is worth noting that the cortical areas and not the hippocampus are active during 
longer-term memories. So unless one can offer empirical procedures for differentiating 
confabulation* from cross-hemisphere memory access in these cases, one is unsure how to 
interpret the reports o f patients after a Wada procedure. This worry surfaces again when 
the attempt is made to interpret reports o f patients concerning what they remember about 
Sperry-type experiments.
2.2.2.4 Partial Callosal Surgeries and Selective Module Disconnection
‘ This harkens the common notion o f ‘memory’ as being our faculty o f retaining and 
recalling past experience
 ^ ‘Confabulation’ is falsification o f  memory wherein a patient's gaps in recall are “filled by 
fabrications that the patient believes to be facts, often with made-up details that are 
believable.” Confabulation often occurs in patients with head injuries, senile dementia, 
partial paralysis, and KarsakofFs syndrome (Corsini 1999, 204).
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Third, modularity can be noted in certain subjects who do not have the corpus 
callosum fully severed. (Sometimes the severing o f  the callosum is accomplished in a two- 
step process, i.e., with separate surgeries.) Under this condition subjects can be presented 
with a word, say “knight,” and asked to identify what they have seen. If, for instance, the 
word is flashed to the right hemisphere, the left hemisphere will be able to name only 
certain aspects o f the stimulus. In one experiment, a patient reports having a picture in his 
mind and responds with such phrases as “ancient,” “wearing uniforms,” “on horses,” “two 
fighters in the ring,” but does not directly identify the word “knight.” Eventually, the 
patient will ask, or offer, the word “knights.” The left brain acquires fragments o f 
information from reporting modules that are still connected through the partially severed 
corpus callosum. The left hemisphere then interprets the data and makes a guess based on 
inference (Gazzaniga 1985, 127). Not all patients, however, exhibit this same ability. The 
locations o f various modules are not constant from person to person. Some patients will 
give no response even in partial callosal surgeries. Ultimately, it was patients who had the 
best right hemisphere language capabilities that gave the most interesting responses under 
the conditions o f partial callosal surgery (128).
2.2.2.5 Brain Modularization and Face Recognition
Fourth, facial recognition, or more accurately, the lack o f it in some persons, 
serves as a useful example o f  brain modularization. The inability to recognize faces is 
called prosopagnosia. People with prosopagnosia can indeed recognize that they are 
seeing a face, but they are unable to identify whose face it is. They are able to recognize 
normal objects, even the very details o f a face. Also they are able to recognize very
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complicated objects, such as tools, vehicles, vegetables, and eyeglasses. Likewise, some 
patients have quite the opposite problem. After a head injury, they are able to identify 
faces quite easily but have extreme trouble recognizing everyday objects. Both the positive 
and negative aspects o f  facial recognition show there is an argument to be made for a 
facial recognition module.
It has sometimes been argued that prosopagnostics are unable to process the kinds 
o f geometric features that are most useful in identifying faces (as opposed to the face 
itself taken as a unit). Pinker, however, thinks that the distinction between recognizing 
faces and recognizing objects with a particular geom etry is a meaningless distinction. He 
notes that the recognition o f  a face is more a holistic matter, the module being optimized 
for geometric features that distinguish faces (Pinker 1997, 273-274).
2.2.2.6 Modularitv and the Social Brain
In The Social Brain, Gazzaniga argues that the brain is made up o f many modules 
carrying out independent activities. This “confederation o f  mental systems” means we are 
best viewed as having a social brain (Gazzaniga 1985). This is essentially the view I 
advocate.
When one considers that the brain is a neural net, and that neural nets can be 
modularized to perform separate specialized tasks, it is not surprising that the brain 
operates in this way. Neural nets can function under degraded conditions, and split-brain 
patients just happen to be the most surprising instances o f  an artificially degraded neural 
net yet found. In acknowledging such specialization, I am, therefore, advocating in this 
work some version o f a modularity theory o f  mind. Human minds are composed o f  various
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independent or functionally independent units (i.e., modules) that can be made to operate 
in various ways. Over time, these modules relate to one another in different ways to 
achieve an integrative synthesis. I acknowledge that there are other arguments to be made 
about how the human mind is related to the human brain, and, o f course, talking about 
“human” minds is domain specific. 1 do not seek to take any expansive position on a 
universal solution to the mind-body problem—at least no position beyond that which is 
necessary for giving some reasonable account o f  how this occurs in humans.
2.2.3 Analysis o f  Particular Brain Substructure Functions
2.2.3.1 Introduction
Up to now, 1 have reviewed the anatomical features o f  the brain that are essential 
for understanding split-brain patients and have discussed modularization. I next provide 
some analysis o f the roles o f  particular brain substructures for split-brain patients. I 
discuss the hippocampus, non-corpus callosum linkages, and the recurrent, 40 Hz 
pathways modulated from and by the thalamus. Although my discussion continually refers 
to brain structure and function throughout this work, it is helpful here to address some 
specific functions o f a few key substructures before moving into a more general discussion 
of asymmetry
2.2.3 2 Role o f the Hippocampus and Some Hypothetical Experiments
The hippocampus is the part of the brain most employed in spatial processing 
(Gazzaniga 1998, 65). In split-brain patients, both hemispheres share the same 
hippocampus, which is not divided during the surgical procedure. On this basis, one might 
speculate that both hemispheres would have the same spatial processing capabilities. O f
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course, one must consider experiments to see if the spatial awareness remains the same for 
both. The hippocampus and associated substructures play an important role in providing 
information to the hemispheres; this information is drawn upon by the respective, isolated 
hemispheres and would be a component in maintaining personal identity, such as when a 
respective mind determines the boundaries o f its body
Two types o f  experiments would prove informative. The first would be a set of 
experiments that concern proprioception (the sense o f  body movement and position). The 
second would concern spatial ability.
The researcher might tell the patient (during the time when the hemispheres are 
working in parallel) that he or she will be flashed pictures o f body parts and is to touch the 
body part shown. The researcher would separate the hemispheres, flash the pictures, and 
then observe what gets pointed to and what does not. Would the left arm point to the right 
leg, for example, when a right leg was flashed to the right hemisphere? Perhaps the right 
hemisphere would not know where the right leg was or that it even had a right leg. (This 
latter view would be comparable to a full bodily agnosia or to alien hand syndrome 
extended to the full contralateral side of the patient's body, which is again discussed below 
under the guise o f neurological dysfunctions). Naturally, this procedure could be applied 
to the left hemisphere as well. If  an individual hemisphere does not identify both legs or 
arms o f  the patient, it would be some evidence that the right hemisphere identifies the 
boundaries o f  its own body, apart from the fact that Us body is connected to another.
What would occur if a split-brain patient were asked the following question under 
the condition o f the experiment: “Do you have two hands?” Under the conditions o f  the
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experiment, the patient has control o f only one side; for example, the left hemisphere can 
control only the right arm. But it would be interesting to know how the left hemisphere 
understands its proprioceptive space. Hemineglect patients will normally give various 
answers to why parts o f  their bodies are actually not theirs. It might be possible to 
correlate some of the standard responses with split-brain patient responses. Presumably 
the split-brain patient would indicate that he or she has two hands; or, at least, the 
respective hemisphere would do so, since it probably maintains a memory o f an otherwise 
jointly controlled body. I am unaware o f any studies that have asked this question o f  the 
left hemisphere. Speaking by presumption once again, since the right hemisphere seems to 
have proprioceptive awareness o f  the left hand, it would likewise answer — i.e., indicate 
(nonverbally, of course) the question affirmatively, most likely also having a memory o f 
Jointly controlling two hands.
Another question worth asking would be, “What is your right (or left) hand doing 
now?” If  the split-brain patient thinks he or she does have two hands, what would the 
patient report about proprioceptive monitoring? Persons generally can give accurate 
locations o f their own body and its position. If one o f  the hemispheres could not do this, 
this might be construed as an argument, although an inadequate one, that the hemisphere 
is not actually a person, but something very much like a person, since it does not have ftill 
awareness o f the location or limits o f its body. This “full awareness” position would be too 
strong, however, for one can artificially induce paralysis and numbness into a normal 
human's body. Under this condition, the patient would be unable to give accurate 
proprioceptive monitoring, but this would not mean the patient was not a conscious self
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over time, i.e., not a person.(In both part two and part three o f  this project, I shall return 
to the issue o f  proprioception, as it has further implications for consciousness and 
personhood.)
Split-brain patients are aware when any part o f the body is touched. That is, both 
hemispheres can respond that someone has touched the body. However, the touch seems 
to be limited to simple awareness, for under Sperry-type conditions when a split-brain 
patient holds an object in one hand, he or she is unable to find an identical object with the 
opposite hand (Gazzaniga, Ivry, and Mangun 1998, 337). However, no formal studies o f  
isolated hemisphere proprioception have been performed on humans, though there have 
been some studies o f mice and cats with full hemispherectomies (Burgess and Villablanca 
1986; Whishaw and Kolb 1989). These have both shown that an intact neocortical 
hemisphere is not essential for contralateral limb use in reaching, but (not surprisingly) it 
does contribute to successful use o f  the limb. Furthermore, cats can be trained not to favor 
the contralateral fore-limb. Note, however, that proprioception in humans has subtle 
differences from mice and cats: “interestingly in humans, there appears to be 
comparatively strong gender differences in the perception o f  gravity. Females in tilted 
chairs with tilted visual environments will align themselves more with visual stimuli 
whereas males will align themselves more with gravitational stimuli” (NAN 2002). Thus 
any studies levied on split-brain patients concerning their proprioceptive abilities would 
have to carefully screen such gender differences.
Another experiment one might run concerns spatial ability. A single hemisphere 
could also be asked the location in a room of objects which it cannot immediately observe
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(because o f  having information from only one side o f the visual field). Would it perhaps 
indicate its answer by pointing to where objects outside o f  its immediate perception lie 
(such as a table the patient would be required to walk around when entering the room)? If 
so, this would show a continuity o f identity through spatial memory and would be 
evidence toward a view o f unity o f personhood. But if the right hemisphere could not 
identify such objects, then this would be evidence against a view o f the unity of 
personhood under the conditions o f  hemisphere isolation. The results o f studies by 
Lessard, Mariotti, and Wessinger (discussed below) show that when the right hemisphere 
is under Sperry-type conditions, it almost certainly would maintain such spatial 
relationship abilities.
Hemispherectomized patients can locate stationary and moving sounds. Persons 
with but a single hemisphere retain memory information o f sounds and are able to indicate 
this by pointing to a location within sense perceptual range (whether within an anechoic 
chamber (Poirier et al. 1994) or along a horizon diagram (Lessard, Lepore, and Poirier 
1999). This is a sure sign o f continuity o f memory.
Further, there is similar and better evidence regarding visual modality. Mariotti 
( 1998) summarizes as follows the abilities o f patients whose left hemisphere has been 
removed:
Visuospatial abilities are clearly worse than in normal subjects and the most 
preserved visuospatial abilities seemed to be the less sophisticated ones. . . . The 
same pattern, that is, preservation o f  language and impairment o f visuospatial 
abilities, also seems to occur in subjects who had undergone surgical removal o f  
the right hemisphere; in other words, the cognitive pattern seems the same 
regardless o f which hemisphere is removed. These observations suggest that no 
matter which hemisphere is removed, functional reorganization follows a
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hierarchical criterion that privileges the linguistic function, and the visuospatial 
functions most essential for independent survival. ( )
That either hemisphere retains such visuospatial ability seems to implicate substructures
within the brain for processing spatial information.
Slightly earlier studies also had hinted that the hemispheres could remember
information provided by such substructures. Wessinger et al. (1996) describe a study in
which two patients with unilateral disconnection or removal o f the entire occipital lobe
were tested for residual vision in their blind field. Using image stabilization to eliminate
eye motion artifacts, the central portion o f  each subject's visual field was tested, beginning
1 degree from fixation and extending outward to 13.5 degrees. It turned out that a narrow
zone o f residual vision was identified for each patient. When they did retain vision, each
patient was able to detect stimuli and perform simple shape discriminations, but could not
name complex line drawings. Most important, “the patients were aware o f  their vision
within this zone.” Moreover, “no residual vision, with or without awareness, was found in
areas tested outside these zones.” Wessinger et al. conclude that “given the complete
absence o f visual cortex contralateral to the observed residual vision, alternate structures
must be mediating these abilities” (1 emphasis added). The studies o f  Lessard,
Mariotti and Wessinger suggest there is memory o f spatial events to which the isolated
hemispheres have access over time.
2.2.3 3 Hemisphere Subcommunication and Emotional Awareness
As was noted earlier, pyramidal neurons that are a part o f  the hippocampal- 
amygdala structure project out o f the hippocampus by means o f  the fornix to both
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hemispheres. Further, both hemispheres will exhibit behaviors commonly associated with 
emotional dispositions under experimental conditions. As a first example, the left 
hemisphere seemingly becomes irritated — verbal complaints are uttered— when it is 
unclear about what the right hemisphere is doing with objects, or when the right 
hemisphere is identifying objects that the right hemisphere previously perceived in a 
Sperry-type experimental situation but which the left hemisphere did not see. The right 
hemisphere shows no sign o f such irritation.
As a second example, the right hemisphere seemingly becomes embarrassed when 
seeing risqué pictures, for the patient “will grin broadly and perhaps blush” (Nagel 1991, 
434). The left hemisphere is (happily enough) vaguely aware o f what apparently are the 
emotive responses o f  the right hemisphere, even though the left hemisphere cannot report 
why such apparent states occur. The left hemisphere (again, which controls speech) may 
say, “‘Wow, that’s quite a machine you’ve got there. ” (434).
In the latter case, perhaps the left hemisphere can feel the blush or detect the 
tautening of facial muscles which it normally associates with the kinesthetic feedback o f 
otherwise commonly felt emotive states. But what is more important to consider is that 
although some reasoning and memory functions are operating independently in isolated 
hemispheres, mutual processing for emotion might not be operating/if//y independently, 
for there is at least crossover from emotive states o f the right hemisphere to the left 
hemisphere in the hippocampal-amygdala substructure. What this means for developing a 
criterion for counting consciousness and personhood is a question that warrants further 
examination.
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2.2.3.4 Hemisphere Linkages Other than Corpus Callosum
Because o f the pathway linkages between the hemispheres other than the corpus 
callosum, the split between the hemispheres is not complete. The question becomes, ‘What 
type of, and how much, information passes between the hemispheres along these other 
minor tracks’ and Is that information sufficient to unify consciousness and support a 
unified identity for a person?’^
Substructures such as the thalamus, hippocampus, amygdala, and perhaps the 
medulla oblongata (which as a group 1 shall label, ‘TH AM ’) cannot themselves support 
personhood — that is, no other animals that have these structures minus the greater mass 
are themselves persons. O f course it would be too quick to argue from the premise that 
these structures are not sufficient by themselves to instantiate a person’ to the conclusion 
that they cannot transfer to the greater cerebellar hemispheres whatever information that 
is necessary to maintain a (unified) person.’
But that these structures are not found to themselves instantiate personhood is at 
least some evidence that they cannot transfer the necessary information for personhood, 
for all structures that are known to support a concept o f  self have considerably more 
neural mass than what is given in the THAM substructures. A given organic, neural mass 
can transfer only so much information per unit o f time among its cellular elements— 
whether by intracellular electrical activity or by intercellular ionized molecular activity.
The difference in mass between THAM and the neural masses o f  animals with a concept o f
^Although I shall specifically discuss this term ‘person’ later, for now I merely mean a 
being that both has conscious states and recognizes that it has conscious states over time.
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self is substantial. Hence, the warrant for thinking that the THAM cannot transfer enough 
information to maintain a unified person is likewise substantial.
2.2.3.5 Recurrent Pathways. 40 Hz Waves, and Consciousness
Up to this point, it occasionally has been noted that the human brain is a neural 
network; in fact, it is a very special kind o f network. To be sure, it is probably a collection 
of many different types o f networks, all interacting in and by an as yet inscrutable process. 
But some properties o f the brain's networked configuration are identifiable For example, 
it looks like the brain is a recurrent network: When neurons exchange information, there is 
a feedback loop.
Information may come into a set o f neurons and then go out o f that set o f neurons 
into other neural pathways. But when some o f the output is fed back into the input side o f 
the neuron set, a loop or “recurrent pathway” exists. That recurrent pathway, some 
speculate, might serve for information storage. If so, then a set o f  neurons can be said to 
have a device that effectively functions as a type o f memory. The human brain has such 
pathways, particularly in the intralaminar nucleus (located in the layer o f fibers within the 
thalamus.) Signals move from the thalamus into the cerebral cortex, and then a feedback 
loop returns to the thalamus. The signals that rotate around this loop move at 
approximately 40 Hz (Churchland 1995, 215).
This loop is important in split-brain patients, for if one wants to argue that there 
are two centers o f consciousness, one can ask, “Are these 40 Hz signals in phase in these 
patients?” That is, do the 40 Hz waves parallel one another moment by moment in both
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halves o f  the patient’s brain? If so, the argument could be made, then there is only one 
person. However, it turns out that such an argument would not settle the issue.
To see why this is so, first consider cases where there clearly are two different people. 
Although both o f  their brains may be operating with a 40 Hz, recurrent feedback loop, 
both loops will not be running simultaneously (in phase). Hence, this would stand as 
evidence that there are indeed two persons, in the normal case, since there are two 
nonparallel firings o f  the 40 Hz waves.
Next note that in the case o f  split-brain patients, there would be a single 40 Hz 
wave, because this wave originates from the thalamus, which is not actually separated in 
surgery. Yet one cannot thereby conclude that there is but one center o f consciousness. 
Why not?
It is conceivable, even if extraordinarily unlikely, that two different bodies, two 
different persons, in the otherwise common use o f the word person, could have exactly 
timed 40 Hz waves, but this would not mean they were two tokens o f the same person. 
One might simply point out that the neural structures that are traversed by the 40 Hz 
waves are quite different in configuration. One may conclude, therefore, that the presence 
o f the 40 Hz wave is not sufficient for there being a single consciousness. Likewise, the 
presence o f recurring, hemispheric, phased-match 40 Hz waves in the same patient is not 
sufficient for a particular patient's body housing but a single consciousness during a 
Sperry-type experiment, for these waves traverse paths o f a quite different configuration.
These 40 Hz waves also figure in a more direct discussion o f  consciousness proper 
in part two o f  this work.
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I have thus far been giving various forms o f evidence in order to support that there 
are discrete modules in the brain. Showing that there are discrete modules in the brain 
helps forward my case for the right hemisphere being a superset o f  such modules. Later in 
my project I intend to give arguments that this superset has conscious mental states such 
that consciousness can operate in support o f  full personhood. But up to now 1 have been 
merely setting out evidence for establishing how the brain functions generally (as a set of 
recurrently networked modules), and showing that such functioning is often operant 
within a single right hemisphere (such as when observed in hemispherectomy patients)
2.2.4 Split-Brain vs. Split-Hemisphere: Terminology Implications
Finally, there is a bit o f conceptual worry about how a patient whose corpus 
collosum has been severed should be identified.
The phrase the patient stands in for a proper name to identify the person operating 
under a split-brain type experiment. O f course this is open to analysis as a definite 
description:
1. There is at least one subject o f  consciousness within the patient.
2. There is at most one subject o f  consciousness within the patient.
3. Whatever subject(s) o f consciousness within the patient there is, is (are)
currently operating within the scope o f a split-brain experiment.
Later, I shall specifically show why statements such as ( 1 ) and (2) have a definite 
truth value,'' and over the entire course o f  this project, 1 shall continually argue (2) is false, 
for it underestimates the case.
■* This is against Nagle (1997) who has argued that such statements cannot be accounted 
as either true o r false, given our ordinary concept o f  mind.
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Another pair o f  terms must also be considered. On the one hand, such a patient 
might be viewed as having a functionally single brain, but one that is structurally, although 
not fully separated. The term split-hemisphere patient, therefore, seems appropriate. On 
the other hand, the patient might be viewed as having a functionally double brain, but the 
two brains happen to share common resources, akin to how some Siamese twins share a 
single organ or set o f  organs. The term split-brain would be appropriate under this latter 
view.
If one is inclined to argue that there is only one mind in such a patient, then 
deference to the term split-hemisphere would best. However, if one is inclined, as I am, to 
argue that there is more than one mind in such a patient, then deference to the term split- 
brain would be advised. And, o f course, counting brains, minds, and persons is the whole 
issue o f this work. Already, then, 1 am forced to lay some o f  the cards on the table by the 
very merit o f the terminology being used. The term split-brain is preferred throughout this 
work unless an alternative term is expressively quoted from another source.
2.3 Biological Bases o f Asym metry
2.3.1 Animal Asymmetry 
There is patchy evidence o f  generalized hemispheric specialization in animals, and 
probably the safest view is that whatever hemispheric asymmetry appears in non-humans is 
probably slightly biased for emotion and, perhaps, for spatial representation. These biases, 
however, are fairly slight indeed. Studies across different modalities o f  behavior show only 
slight preferences among animals. Compared to other animals, the human being is very
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lopsided in hemispheric specialization (with the possible exception o f  the canary)
(Corballis 1993, 270, 272).
An exception to this general finding concerns cerebral asymmetry in language (or 
more properly, in communication), where there is some notable asymmetric processing. 
Songbirds, such as canaries, white-throated sparrows, and chaffinches, all seem to have 
left hemispheric control over their singing. (This was established by cutting the 
hypoglossial nerve that directly controls the bird’s syrinx, the equivalent o f the human 
larynx.) Macaque monkeys show a right ear advantage in distinguishing among sounds o f  
their own species. Female mice also show a left hemisphere advantage in recognizing 
communicative calls from their young during lactation cycles. Such asymmetries are all 
taken to suggest that, in some species, left hemispheric mechanisms are specifically 
developed to process events that serve a communicative purpose (Corballis 1993, 182- 
83).
2.3 .2 Evolutionary Advantages and Disadvantages o f  Asymmetry
Yet an overall question needs answering: why asymmetry rather than not? Most 
animals do not have a marked asymmetry in brain functioning. Consider the advantages 
and disadvantages o f  asymmetry o f neural functioning. It is sometimes thought that 
bilateral representation might serve as an additional reserve in the event o f  injury 
(Corballis 1993, 208). In the case of a human: when the right hand o f  a normally right- 
handed person is put out o f  commission, the left hand can take up the slack, even though it 
is uncomfortable for the user, and manipulation is not as efficient. Perhaps this same
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principle applies to cerebral representation. Duplicate memories or skills distributed in 
both hemispheres could provide backup in the event o f brain damage.
O f course, there also has been some discussion about the disadvantages o f
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asymmetry. One disadvantage is that double representation would depend upon the 
information moving through the corpus callosum, which would take extra processing time 
and, thereby, not be as efficient in ensuring survival. Execution and planning by means o f
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coordination o f  the two hemispheres would take more time. Also, having symmetrical 
representation would not be an efficient use o f  neural space. It is known that the evolution 
and manufacture o f tool use from homo hahilns, o f whom more shall be said in a moment, 
was correlated with an increase in brain size O f course, this had to be solved 
evolutionarily in the birth o f  human beings, for the birth canal imposes a limit on the size 
o f  the brain. In response to this counter pressure, the human brain is convoluted so that it 
can be folded to fit into the skull, giving more surface area for neural packaging. Also, 
human infants are born prematurely relative to  other primates, so that the brain can not 
only fit through the birth canal but also continue its growth after birth. Unilateral as 
opposed to bilateral representation o f praxis skills may be one further way o f cutting down 
the demand for neural space (Corballis 1993, 208).
The presence o f  bilateral symmetry in limbs for locomotion “was probably an 
adaptation enabling organisms to move along linear paths through an environment that 
exerted no overall constraints favoring one side or the other side” (Corballis 1993, 102). 
Corballis argues that the asymmetry o f  handedness probably arises when such locomotion 
pressure is no longer necessary, as two o f the limbs previously used for locomotion in 
bipedals are now free to specialize. Opening fruit or working with tools requires 
complementary roles in hands. For example, one hand might hold an object while the other 
manipulates it. Animals such as the lobster show this asymmetry o f manipulation in 
contexts where actions are essentially manipulative. Unlike other asymmetrical creatures, 
the differences in human hands are not structural but functional. This implies that the
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asymmetry resides not in the appendages themselves but in the brain structure that 
controls them ( 102-103).
2.3.3 Asymmetry in Earliest Humans
From what we know, the earliest humans to show asymmetry were homo hahilis.^ 
From hahilis on, there is a rearward shift in brain matter that can be attributed in part to 
an enlargement o f Wernicke's area (a general cortical region involved in the reception and 
processing o f language). The sylvian fissure in hahilis is also markedly like modern 
humans in that it is angled more steeply and upward on the right than on the left side o f 
the brain (The sylvian fissure demarcates the parietal and temporal lobes o f the brain.) 
(Corballis 1993, 185).
Even so, it is not clear what this developing asymmetry meant for cognition. 
Arguing from structural similarities in the brain o f  homo hahilis, such as increased vein 
and artery sizes, hence blood flow, to temporal lobes, to actual speech in homo hahilis is 
ill advised, since such structures need not be necessary or sufficient for spoken language. 
Indeed, Davidson and Noble (1989) suggest that “these structures were associated with 
vocalization, not true language, [and only] were exapted'' for language at a later stage” 
(Corballis 1993, 186).
’ The name literally means "handy person", given because o f  the putative association 
between this early human and the beginning o f  stone tool manufacturing. "Their earliest 
date is close to two million years ago. Habilis cranial capacity ranged from 509 to 752 cc, 
with an average o f 630 cc" (Harris 1993, 51). Today's humans have a cranial capacity of 
1040-1595 cc. with an average size o f 1350 cc. (Klein 1989, 101)
 ^ ‘Exaptation’ is the utilization o f a structure or feature for a function other than that for 
which it was developed through natural selection
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2.3.4 Infant Latéralisation and Asymmetry 
However, modem humans do show asymmetry o f  cognitive processing for 
language. Studies have found that even for learning speech, there is hemispheric 
specialization in infants. Various studies have shown that when the suckling reflex is 
correlated with left ear music stimulus and then with right ear syllable stimulus, the 
standard hemispheric specialization is apparent (Corballis 1993, 285-86).
Studies on infants also have shown that asymmetry o f the human brain can be 
detected early on. One o f  the earliest detectable is what is called the tonic neck reflex, 
which occurs around the twenty-eighth week after conception but will disappear by about 
twenty weeks after birth. It is induced by gently turning the head to one side, whereupon 
the arm and leg on that side extend, while the arm and leg on the opposite side flex, 
producing what is sometimes called a fencer's posture. Most infants show the reflex in 
rightward rather than leftward turns o f  the head. It is possible that the tonic neck reflex is 
also responsible for infants’ tendency to sleep or lie with their head turned to the right. 
This right sleeping persists in spite o f  the common practice o f moving the infant’s head to 
ensure equal turns for both sides (Corballis 1993, 282).
2.3.5 Language and Left Hemisphere Growth Spurt 
Finally, between the ages o f two and four, children develop the ability to construct 
grammatical utterances. Also, the left hemisphere undergoes a growth spurt during this 
time.’ The left hemisphere’s development o f its physiological properties may show it to be
’ I.e., the language hemisphere, which is the left for virtually all right-handed persons and 
most left-handed persons. Language usage and hemisphere specialization are considered in 
more detail later.
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the primary mechanism, for this ensures language being captured in the quickly forming 
neuro-connections. During this time in development, children also are playing at 
construction with building blocks and other objects o f  interest, and a vocabulary o f  geons* 
may develop in parallel with the vocabulary o f grammatical structures (Corballis 1993, 
309).
As a synopsis, I have been giving various reasons why asymmetry has arisen as a 
biological phenomena. By doing so, I secure why the right hemisphere has the cognitive 
properties it does. Furthermore, noting the biological bases for asymmetry will aid me in 
justifying why certain limitations must be taken into account for any criterion that 
presumes to establish the right hemisphere as an independent mind.
2.4 Development of Hemisphere Specialization Studies
2.4.1 Early Speculations 
The understanding that the brain has some lateralization o f cognitive processing 
goes back to the early nineteenth century. Early on, speculation arose about there being 
two minds within a single brain.
“ Irving Biederman has “proposed a theory of real-time human object recognition that 
posits that objects and scenes are represented as an arrangement o f simple, viewpoint- 
invariant volumetric primitives, such as bricks, cylinders, wedges, and cones, termed 
‘geons’. Geon theory has been implemented as a neural network (Hummel & Biederman, 
1992) and has undergone extensive assessment in psychophysical experiments (see 
Biederman, 1995, for an overview)” (Biederman 2002). 1 had earlier cited Pinker as 
thinking that whether such geometric primitives operate as the basis for facial recognition 
is a moot issue.
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In 1836, Mark Dax, a medical doctor in Montpelier, France, presented a paper to a 
local medical society in which he noted that among forty patients, many had suffered a loss 
o f speech from observed signs of damage to the left side o f  the brain. He further noted 
that not a single case correlated with right side damage alone (Corballis 1993, 168).
While there were earlier speculations based upon the anatomical midline o f  the 
brain, with its apparent duplication, the first extended discussion o f  duality o f  mind 
probably goes back to 1844. Arthur C. Wigan, an English physician, speculated that the 
two sides o f the brain function as separate minds, and that each would have a 
corresponding separate consciousness. Obviously, the notion has persisted (Corballis 
1993, 247).
In the 1860s Paul Broca found that patients with dam age to the posterior portion 
o f the third frontal convolution of the brain suffered a loss o f  speech. He named this 
condition aphemia. In 1865, Broca made further claims about damage to the left 
hemisphere, but Gustav Dax, the son o f Mark Dax, claimed that Broca had overlooked his 
father’s contribution to theories o f brain lateralization. B roca denied this, claiming he had 
not even heard o f  the elder Dax. Gustav, however, took initiative on the matter and had 
his father’s work published, “thereby securing Mark Dax’s place in history.” The term 
initially coined by Broca was later replaced by the term aphasia, which refers to any 
general disorder o f  spoken language (Corballis 1993, 170).
Immediately after and even concurrent with W igan’s and Broca's work, there was 
continuing speculation about what roles the hemispheres played in human thought and 
action, although there was only a bit more attention being paid to observational
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justification. John Hughlings Jackson, a British neurologist, had noted that the right
hemisphere was superior to the left in some non-verbal skills such as those involving
spatial perception (Corballis 1993, 23). Corballis explains:
In 1864, the perspicuous John Hughlings Jackson suggested that if “expression” 
resided in one hemisphere, then one might raise the question on whether 
“perception—its corresponding opposite” might reside in the other. A few years 
later, the French neurologist, Armand DeFleury and the Australian physiologist 
Sigmund Exmer independently made the similar suggestion that motor functions 
were represented more widely in the left hemisphere, while sensory representation 
was more widespread in the right hemisphere. (249)
In 1881 Jules Bernard Luys, a French physician, observed that differences o f 
personality correlated with differences o f left or right hemisphere damage to the brain. 
Those with left brain damage were less manic and hyperemotional than those with right 
brain damage. The left brain damage patients were usually passive and apathetic. Luys 
(1881) also argued that there was an “emotion center” in the right hemisphere (Corballis 
1993, 249, 337).
2.4.2 Brain and Split-Brain Research in the Twentieth Century 
At first, some brain scientists thought that the issue o f the corpus callosum having 
some special function for thought had been put to rest. Sectioning procedures seemed to 
have no effect on a patient’s thinking. As William Dandy wrote in 1936, when “the corpus 
callosum is sectioned longitudinally . . .  no symptoms followed its division. This simple 
experiment puts an end to all o f  the extravagant hypotheses on the functions o f the corpus 
callosum” (Corballis, 1983, 176). Scientists like Dandy did not have the technological 
apparatus to know how to look for symptoms. He could not have been more wrong.
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From 1920 to the 1960, there was very little investigation o f split-brain 
phenomena, perhaps because o f  a decline in the credibility o f  objective scientific activity in 
the face o f  hemi-hypnosis and other questionable techniques o f  affecting and interacting 
with non-split-brain patients. Behaviorism also was in full force, asserting a purely 
functional approach to the mind that was interested in "eschewing references to both mind 
and brain.” In the 1960s, however, the tide turned back toward interest in the doubled 
brain, perhaps in part because o f experiences with brain damage patients and the 
psychological consequences o f brain damage as a result o f  World War 11. O f course, the 
actual studies o f split-brain patients in the 1960s represent probably the strongest factor in 
a return to investigations o f these special patients (Corballis 1993, 250-51).
The studies of the 1960s, however, were still trying to determine whether the right 
hemisphere had any significant function. Corballis notes that the right hemisphere was 
generally regarded as inferior, even into the 1960s. At that time, there was still 
considerable speculation occurring about its contribution. For example, British zoologist J. 
Z. Young wondered as late as 1962 whether "the right hemisphere might be merely a 
‘vestige,’ although he wisely allowed that he would rather keep his than lose it” (Corballis 
1993, 249).
Two Los Angles neurosurgeons, Philip J. Bogel and Joseph E. Bogen, severed the 
main commissures, the fiber tracks that connect the two sides o f  the brain, in patients 
suffering from epilepsy. Although such surgeries had been performed in the 1930s, and 
while Sperry and others had done experimental procedures with animals in the 1950s, the
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effects on humans were not systematically explored or widely discussed until the 1960s, 
when Bogel and Bogen performed their surgeries (Corballis 1993, 22).
2.4.3 Popularization and Cultural Bias
As with any striking scientific achievement, the popularization o f this science bred
odd polarities. Even normal brains were caricatured as evenly split between the left
hemisphere’s linear, rational, and analytic thinking style, which o f course is fundamentally
a list of Western values, and the right hemisphere’s divergent, intuitive, representative, and
holistic thinking style, which is often associated with Eastern thought. Cultural biases were
read into the scientific evidence in these simple ways, as were other dualities found within
various cultures Corballis (1983) gives an interesting list o f
confucian concepts o f yen and yang, the Hindu notions o f Buddhi and manas, and 
the vistross distinction between the positive and mythic . . .  In the 19th century the 
duality gave expression to the common view that women and the people o f  other 
races were inferior to the white, European male. These undesirables, along with 
the insane, were relegated to the right hemisphere. (2 5 1, 252)
O f course, far more rigorous and controlled investigations were made by Roger Sperry
and others.
By recounting the development o f  hemisphere specialization studies, one can more 
easily appreciate the trajectory o f hemisphere studies as regards earlier views o f the brain. 
Furthermore, one can appreciate how shocking this very counter-intuitive notion o f  having 
more than one consciousness within a single patient must have been, especially during the 
I950's era where the study o f psychology through the lense o f  behaviorism was very much 
in vogue within the American Academy.
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2.5 Comparative Neurological Dysfunctions
Several key neurological dysfunctions share some resemblance to behaviors and 
dysfunctions o f  subjects under Sperry-type conditions. A quick survey o f  these 
dysfunctions is useful for comparing how the right hemisphere operates under 
neurologically isolated and thus informationally degraded conditions. Two sets of modules 
which share the same types o f behavioral effects under degradation might very well share a 
common set o f sub-processing activities. It is useful, therefore, to compare and contrast 
hypotheses about these other dysfunctions so as to form (or exclude) certain hypotheses 
about right hemisphere operation.
2.5.1 Blind Sight
Farah ( 1997) defines blind sight as the preserved visual abilities o f patients with 
damage to primary visual cortex for stimuli-presented regions o f the visual field, formerly 
represented by the damaged cortex” (206). She notes that the phenomenon was first 
documented by Poppel, Held, and Frost in 1973. They w ere studying patients with large 
scotomata, who, although they had no conscious visual experience o f controlled light 
flashes presented to the scotomatus region, nevertheless were able to move their eyes with 
some accuracy higher than chance toward the region o f  the flash (206).
Originally, it was hypothesized that blind sight results from the lower (and more 
primitive) parts o f  the brain that were monitoring the environment through non-conscious 
pathways. Gazzaniga thinks that this is probably wrong, even if it was an initially 
promising conjecture Instead, he thinks that blind sight processing is done in the newer 
(evolutionarily speaking) cerebral cortex. (Gazzaniga, Ivry, and Mangun 1998)
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In Sperry-type experiments, split-brain patients share symptoms with blind sight 
patients, since the respective hemisphere has virtually no conscious visual experience o f 
what the contralateral hemisphere sees. For example, the left hemisphere has no awareness 
o f  picture content when risque images are flashed to the right hemisphere. As was 
specifically noted earlier, the right hemisphere does exhibit behaviors which appear to 
show its awareness o f  the content
2.5.2 Alien Hand Syndrome 
Sometimes after a stroke, patients with lesions to the supplementary motor area 
(SMA) will arbitrarily reach out and grasp objects. They do so because externally guided 
lateral pre-motor pathways automatically initiate a motor plan at the sight of some object 
within reaching distance. The SMA concerns internal sources o f  activation while parietal 
motor activities are moved by external motivations—i.e., by perceptual situations 
(Gazzaniga, Ivry, and Mangun 1998, 405). This phenomenon is known as Alien Hand 
Syndrome.
‘Alien Hand’ (AH), first described as a sign in patients with callosal lesions, was an 
inability to recognize the left hand as one’s own when touched by the right hand with the 
eyes closed. No mention was made o f  involuntary or uncontrollable movements; however, 
there was later reported a patient with a set o f motor disorders bearing close resemblance 
to the current understanding o f AH behavior, although the designation o f AH was not 
used (Chan 1996, 287). “Bogen (1979), however, borrowed the term to describe the 
spontaneously self-unaware behavior o f  the left hand in split-brain patients.”(Chan 1996, 
287) Alien hand syndrome is also associated with intermanual conflict (IMG):
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The left hand, usually activated by verbal mediation or action o f  dominant (right) 
hand, moves toward objects with or without direct eye contact and can act 
independently o f  the right unless intermanual conflict occurs (IMC; left hand’s 
antagonistic movements to the right) [...] It often behaves in a manner which the 
patient verbally describes as foreign, alien or at least uncooperative. Since Bogen’s 
AH usually showed non-antagonistic, irrelevant or symmetric movements to the 
right, and it was considered a lesser form o f IMC (Bogen, 1979), they together are 
synonymous with diagonistic dyspraxia (287)
This is yet further evidence for independent modularized processing in the human 
brain (as discussed earlier) If such independently initiated modularization can occur at the 
motor-control level, then this hints that separated modules o f consciousness might 
similarly be able to act independently, even to the point o f carrying consciousness and 
personal identity Split-brain patients apparently are examples o f  Just such independent 
action.
2.5.3 Integrative Agnosia 
Patients with integrative agnosia are unable to group (or have trouble grouping) 
common elements together. As a first example, if one were to draw a geometric figure 
made up o f two diamonds and a circle, the patient with integrative agnosia would not 
draw the circle and the two diamonds as independent parts o f  the whole. Instead, the 
patient would draw one side of the circle, then one side o f the diamond, and then “skip 
around” as normal person would not, drawing each o f the segments independently 
(Gazzaniga, Ivry, and Mangun 1998, 193).
As a second example, a patient can be interviewed about what he or she sees in a 
picture—say, o f a combination lock. The patient may claim it is a telephone, but be making 
combination lock-like hand motions. The patient may even adamantly insist that it is a
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telephone when told otherwise by the experimenter, all the while making combination 
lock-like gestures. However, if the patient looks at his or her hands and then is told to 
make a guess about the picture, the patient will probably announce it is indeed a 
combination lock. Yet if attention is not drawn to the hands, the patient will continue to 
insist that the picture is o f  a telephone It is no coincidence that the patient says the 
combination lock is a telephone, since both share the property o f having numbers in a 
circle. This indicates that some process involved with what the agnosia patient sees is 
occurring (Gazzaniga, Ivry, and Mangun 1998, 164-65).
These phenomena have been explained by the Warrington Two-Stage Model o f 
object recognition. In this model, visual analysis occurs in both hemispheres when 
considering what one is directly looking at. The categorization begins on a perceptual 
level to filter out the perceived object from shadowing, patterns, and unassociated 
background objects. At just this level o f processing the patient might be able to recognize 
an object but be unable to specifically name it. Naming occurs in a second state—namely, 
under semantic categorization. The first state and its process occurs in the right 
hemisphere, the second stage in the left hemisphere. In semantic categorization, the visual 
input is tied to long-term knowledge stored in memory that allows the person to identify 
the name and function o f  what is seen. The Warrington model can account for categories 
specific to agnosia, such as lesioning o f the left hemisphere that results in associate 
agnosia and lesioning o f  the right hemisphere that results in integrative (also called 
apperceptive) agnosia (Gazzaniga, Ivry, and Mangun 1998, 186-87).
43
According to W arrington’s analysis, it seems that understanding the perceptual 
parts is sufficient for giving us an understanding o f  the whole. But integration problems 
faced by patients who attempt to synthesize parts into a whole argue against this idea. 
Each o f  the isolated parts o f  a given figure o f perception may be identified, but the patient 
is unable to integrate the parts with the whole component structure. For example, the 
parts o f  a combination lock—its numbers, its round dial, its clasp—all can be recognized by 
the integrative agnosia patient, but the parts cannot be tied together in gestalt fashion. 
Gazzaniga, Ivry, and Mangun write, “Object perception is truly a situation where the 
whole is greater than the sum of its parts” (197).
If a person can have integrative agnosia in which the perceptions are not integrated 
into wholes, it seems reasonable to hold that, along similar lines, split-brain patients could 
have a type of integrative agnosia in which the memories are not integrated. On this view, 
there could be an event—for instance, washing a car-about which the patient remembers 
touching the mirrors, spraying water on the windshield, rubbing wax on the hood, but 
would not be able to describe the whole event as washing a car. Instead, the patient would 
see the event as several unrelated, independent events.
The hemispheres o f  split-brain patients show differences o f ability when under 
Sperry-type conditions Perhaps the split-brain patient lacks an integrated view o f 
consciousness. Different memories are not grouped together by a unified individual, and 
verbal reports by the patient, therefore, do not match up with what the body is actually 
doing—such as selecting objects for identification in a Sperry-type experiment. However,
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even if this were the case, the memories still appear integrated enough to motivate some 
researchers, Sperry among them, to call each isolated hemisphere conscious.
2.5.4 Hemineglect
It is not unusual to encounter patients with brain damage who exhibit hemineglect. They
will ignore sides o f their bodies and claim that those body parts are not their own.
Likewise, in split-brain patients the two hemispheres will ignore one another as if they
were separate entities, each performing as if an independent agent, and neither affirming
that there are other components o f the patient that are (or perhaps should be) accessible.
In split-brain patients, one hemisphere does not acknowledge the other hemisphere
as a separate consciousness. Even though the left hemisphere is aware that the
uncontrolled hand in a Sperry-type experiment has maneuvered to pick up an object, its
explanations for that hand’s movements are completely contrived.’
2.5.5 Juvenile Autism
Autistic children have been described as mind-blind. Their module for attributing
minds to others is said to be damaged or malfunctioning. As Pinker (1997) explains:
Autistic children almost never pretend, can’t explain the difference between an 
apple and a memory o f  an apple, don’t distinguish between someone looking into a 
box and someone’s touching it, know where cartoon faces are looking but do not 
guess that it wants what it is looking at, and fail t he . ,  false belief task. (332)
The “false belief task” is pretending one thing while knowing another. Autistic children do
not have normal social awareness, but see others, apparently, as dynamic objects in space,
much like we might see a clock or a toy car.
’ Such contrived explanations will be covered in detail later under the topic confabulation 
behaviors’.
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2.6 Split-Brain Experiments
"What God has joined together, let no man separate. "
— Traditional wedding ceremony liturgy
"So far as I know, this is the most radical disconnection o f the cerebral 
hemispheres attempted thus far in human surgery. "
- (R. W. Sperry 1967)
2.6.1 Animal Split-Brain Experiments 
Roger Sperry, working with Ronald Meyers, discovered through experiments with 
cats that after a hemisphere separation surgery, when vision was blocked to one or the 
other eye while teaching cats a given task, such as pushing a panel with a triangle on it for 
food, it would result in the task not being transferred to the opposite hemisphere. The cats 
acted as if they had two different brains, hence the origination o f the term .split-brain 
(Gazzaniga 1985, 29).
Other experiments likewise demonstrated that visual discrimination learned by one 
hemisphere does not transfer to the other hemisphere in animal subjects. By means of food 
reward, cats also were trained to choose a “circle” over a “plus” stimulus. It was 
discovered that visual discriminations specifically presented to one hemisphere o f the brain 
were not known by the other hemisphere o f  the brain when the connecting commissures 
were sectioned in a commissurotomy'" (Gazzaniga, Ivry, and Mangun 1998, 329).
A division o f any collection o f fibers connecting parts of the brain o r spinal marrow via 
surgery
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2.6.2 Primary Components o f  Sperry-Type Experiments 
2 6.2.1 Handedness and Language Control by Hemisphere
Paul Broca, who had made some early observations on hemisphere specialization, 
assumed that the side o f the brain responsible for language is the one that controls the 
dominant hand. In left handers, therefore, the right hemisphere would be dominant for 
language, just as in right handers the left hemisphere would be dominant for language. 
That was not quite the case, however.
Among right handers, anywhere from 96 to 99 percent are left hemisphere 
dominant for language. But the pattern is not simply reversed for left handers. In a 
Montreal study with 122 left and mixed handers, “70% had language represented in the 
left hemisphere. Just as most right handers do. O f the remainder, 15% had language 
icpresented in the right hemisphere and 15% had language represented on both sides” 
(Corballis 1993, 192-93).
So while the data show that most right handers do obey what Broca hypothesized 
to be the case, most left and mixed handers do not conform. Persons who are not right 
handers are somewhat more mixed in their laterality (Corballis 1993, 193).
2.6.2.2 Text Processing in Normal Brains
In normal brains the presence o f  the commissures allows information to be 
transferred from one side o f the brain to the other. Most people will recognize words, 
letters, and other items with more accuracy when these are flashed to the right side o f  a 
fixation point in a split-brain experiment than if they are flashed to the left side. Even when 
the relative flow o f  text is excluded—e.g., where English moves from left to right, some
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other languages move from right to left —there is still a small advantage for presentation to 
the right side o f  fixation. It is thought that this reflects left hemispheric dominance 
(Corballis 1993, 180). Studies with diachronic listening in aural tests also show a right ear 
advantage and provides further evidence o f  left hemispheric specialization.
2.6.2 3 Features o f  Hand-Arm Control in Normal People
Corballis (1993) notes that it has been shown that right handers have superiority in 
throwing objects, such as darts, but there is no superiority in blocking thrown objects, as, 
for example, in not being able to catch objects such as tennis balls. Throwing has a strong 
praxic element and has even been suggested as the originating evolutionary force behind 
handedness. But blocking a projectile is a direct response to a spatial event and is best 
accomplished symmetrically. Such a symmetrical response is stimulus bound: it is an 
action that occurs directly in response to events found in the perceptual environmental 
(206-207).
Language processing, text processing, and features o f hand-arm control in normal 
people are the primary components in Sperry-type experiments. Empirical behaviors of 
split-brain patients are starkly different from the normal person's responses.
2.6.3 Sperry-Type Experiments 
Sperry’s idea to communicate with the hemispheres independently was not without 
precedent. One o f  the earliest techniques o f  (or perhaps, attempted techniques of) 
communicating with the hemispheres independently was developed by Gabriel Descourtis. 
Descourtis sought to hypnotize separately the tw o sides o f the brain. There are accounts 
and even photographs o f  patients who were in a so-called double trance “with one side o f
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the face smiling, and the other side showing fear," but the technique was based on 
hypnotizing a patient with each eye open in turn. The belief was that each eye projected to 
the opposite hemisphere (Corballis 1993, 250). This is now known to be false, and many 
were aware o f this fact even in Sperry's time. The advance to come was in the ability o f an 
experimenter to isolate the hemispheres, nevertheless.
2.6.3.1 A Tvpical Sperrv-Tvpe Experiment Setup
It is widely acknowledged that Sperry and his various associates at the California 
Institute o f Technology carried out the first extensive psychological studies o f split-brain 
patients. The operation that produces split-brain patients consists o f sectioning the corpus 
callosum and sometimes certain other minor links that join the cerebral hemispheres. It is 
done to relieve severe epilepsy. Medically, this type o f procedure is considered a success. 
Sperry writes, “A person two years recovered from the operation, and otherwise without 
complications, might easily go through a routine medical checkup without revealing that 
anything was wrong to someone not acquainted with his surgical history” (Marks 1980,
3). At first, the psychological results ran parallel to the medical results. After the 
operation, anyone acquainted with such patients failed to notice any dramatic changes in 
intellect, behavior, or personality. In fact, in the 1940s neither casual observers nor 
professional psychologists were able to find any interesting psychological result after 
interviewing and testing such patients. Because o f  there being no apparent effect on the 
person, there was speculation that the corpus callosum served no useful function for the 
hemispheres and was perhaps present only to provide mechanical support in order to keep 
the hemispheres from sagging (Marks 1980, 4).
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Split-brain phenomena arise when the experimenter confines input from the senses 
to a single hemisphere. (This is not possible with taste, however.) The most common 
types o f experiments control visual conditions in the following way:
lET i CUE
USE
Figure 5 Things seen to the left o f  a  central fixation point with either 
eye are projected to the right hemisphere and vice versa (Kolak 1991, 
57)
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A patient, McX, is instructed to focus on a central point on a screen Two visual 
cues are then flashed on the screen for a short duration (around a tenth o f  a second). This 
duration is too brief to permit eye movement. If the eyes were given time to move, this 
would feed the visual information to the opposite half o f  the visual field and allow both
f .
Figure 6 A Sperry-type experimental setup. Visuo-tactile 
associations succeed between each half o f  the visual field 
and the corresponding hand. They fail with crossed 
combinations in which visual and tactual stimuli are 
projected into opposite hemispheres. (Sperry 1967, 64)
hemispheres access to the information. However, when such eye movement is constrained 
properly, information taken from the right visual field feeds directly to the left hemisphere,
and information taken from the left visual field feeds directly to the right hemisphere. The
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experiment then proceeds by flashing two objects, whether icons or words, at McX's point 
o f  focus—for example, the words “key ring” might be flashed, with “key” to the left o f the 
point o f focus and “ring” to the right o f  the point o f  focus. When M cX is questioned as to 
what was seen, M cX responds, “ring.” Yet, further questioning about what type o f ring is 
as likely to elicit responses o f  “boxing ring,” “wedding ring,” or “ring o f  a bell” as to elicit
f f  z
F igure  7 Another Sperry-type experimental setup (adapted)
“key ring.” McX's verbal testimony shows no evidence for McX's perception o f  the word 
“key.”
Contrary to  this testimony, if McX is directed to retrieve from an array o f 
concealed items via his left hand what he saw, McX will retrieve a key and reject any rings
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found among the array o f  items. Here, McX's behavior shows no evidence o f  perceiving 
the word “ring” but does confirm his perception o f  the word “key.” If McX 
simultaneously sorts through the concealed array o f items with both hands in order to pick 
out what was seen, both hands will tactually scrutinize independently. The left hand will 
acquire and release a ring before it maintains its final hold on a key, and the right hand will 
acquire and release a key before it maintains its final hold on a ring. Generally, in such 
experiments,
when the response demanded is controlled by the left hemisphere, it indicates that 
[McX, in this example] was aware o f  “ring” and unaware o f “key .” When the 
response demanded is controlled by the right hemisphere, it indicates that [McX] 
was aware o f “key” and unaware o f “ring.” Someone seems to have seen “key,” 
and someone seems to have seen “'ring,” and they seem unaware o f  each other. No 
one is aware o f  seeing “key ring.” (Marks 1980, 5)
2.6.3 2 Regions o f Specialties in the Corpus Callosum
In light o f such experimental results, the corpus callosum, therefore, plays a truly
pivotal role in integration o f  consciousness between the hemispheres. It is not merely for
support, nor even just a general pipeline for information exchange; it is a well-organized
communication system between the two hemispheres.
Consider other examples o f only partial sectioning. In the spleinal region, which is
the posterior area o f  the callosum, one finds that visual information is transferred between
the hemispheres. In a sectioning o f the corpus callosum, if this posterior part is spared,
information exchange about visual perception still actively runs its course between
hemispheres. But there is loss of a different kind. The patient may have no awareness
when the experimenter requires that tactile information be shared between the
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hemispheres." Noting this was not a surprise to neurologists, since animal data had shown 
there were major callosum subdivisions concerned with different modalities o f  sensation 
(Gazzaniga, Ivry, and Mangun 1998, 331).
The anterior part o f  the callosum, on the other hand, concerns the exchange of 
semantic information. If Just this anterior portion is sectioned, a patient may observe the 
word “knight,” which is fed into the right hemisphere. The patient may describe a mental 
picture, such as “two fighters in a ring,” “wearing helmets,” and “sitting on horses,” yet 
guess the word as “knight” only after giving such descriptions. In other words, the patient 
does not offer a report without the presence o f  the descriptions. But if the corpus 
callosum is completely sectioned when the right hemisphere encounters the word “knight,” 
the patient will report not seeing anything at all. The partial sectioning allows higher- 
ordered descriptions to transfer between hemispheres. The left hemisphere is then able to 
work on what was seen based upon the descriptions. The full sectioning halts all such 
transfers (Gazzaniga, Ivry, and Mangun 1998, 332).
2 6 3 3 Independence o f  Neural Devices
Implicit in this idea o f transfer o f  information is the view o f the brain as a 
collection o f devices. Indeed, Gazzaniga, Ivry, and Mangun hold an evolutionary 
perspective on how the brain works. Our mental life reflects the actions o f  many, if not 
thousands, o f neural “devices” in our brains. Based on this view, since there is already 
acknowledged to be a plurality of such devices, it is not a frightening thesis that when we
' ‘ This could be empirical evidence that a separate person is already present when the two 
hemispheres disagree on what was touched or that there are two “survivors” when tactile 
disagreement instantiates.
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split the hemispheres separate consciousnesses arise, for what occurs is a reshuffling o f the 
plurality o f devices (Gazzaniga, Ivry, and Mangun 1998).
2.6.4 Task Specialization
2.6.4.1 Opposite Hemispheres and Execution and Perception o f Tasks
Upon further study o f the hemispheres when isolated in Sperry-type experiments, it 
was found that the hemispheres had differing strengths and abilities. But when dealing 
with the specializations o f  the left and right brain, one must distinguish carefully between 
the perception o f a task and the execution o f  a task.
For example, the right brain is better at executing a task o f stacking blocks. One 
might, then, erroneously assume that this hemisphere is better at perceiving and analyzing 
visual stimuli. However, that is not the case. Although the left and right hemispheres show 
marked differences in the ability to manipulate and stack blocks o f different colors so as to 
match patterns, under conditions o f a simple picture-to-piciure match, apparent 
differences between spatio-visual stimuli in the tw o hemispheres disappear. One must not, 
therefore, mistake the mental capabilities o f each hemisphere as being indicated by motor 
execution capabilities (Gazzaniga 1985, 54).
Sometimes hemispheric specialization claims are made on the basis o f  mistaking 
execution of tasks for differences in perception and processing. For instance, since there is 
a single, final common path where neurons can exit from the brain to enervate arms and 
legs, the non-speech capable right hemisphere will come to a tacit agreement with the left 
hemisphere. In this situation, the right hemisphere will take up tasks for which it is 
particularly capable, leaving other tasks, such as talking, to the left hemisphere. In this
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instance, what seems like specialization in thinking turns out to merely to be a distribution 
o f labor over common resources (Gazzaniga 1985, 55).
2.6.4.2 Specialization o f  Hemispheres
That the right hemisphere has certain advantages over the left hemisphere in 
performing some tasks (such as spatial relation skills or more holistic analysis o f sense 
data that comes in) is regularly noted. It can be argued, however, that the left hemisphere 
would be as proficient as the right hemisphere were it not somehow better at the task at 
which it excels (Corballis 1983, 254). That is, the left hemisphere may have a weakness in 
some tasks at which the right hemisphere is better simply because o f the invasion of 
language and practic representation. O f course one is left wondering where one would find 
a functioning brain that happened not to have the language and practic areas active. But 
the point is that the division o f  labor between the hemispheres easily can be confused with 
their respective, inherent functions.
2.6.5 Inference Abilities 
As was seen earlier, both the right and left hemispheres are able to read and choose 
between test alternatives (Gazzaniga, Ivry, and Mangun 1998, 527). But the right 
hemisphere’s abilities for inference are limited. The right hemisphere cannot make same- 
difference judgments when two simultaneous figures are presented in sequence; at least, 
those right hemispheres that have no language capacity are unable to do this. Some right 
hemispheres, however, do have such language capacity. Some people are able to speak 
using either hemisphere, and others even have a wide vocabulary that is duplicated in both 
hemispheres (Gazzaniga, Ivry, and Mangun 1998, 548, 549).
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The right hemisphere cannot make other simple inferences as well. For example, if 
the words “finger” and “pin” are presented to the right hemisphere, and various other 
words are presented as possible choices for inference by the patient, the left hemisphere 
easily picks out the word “bleeds” to associate the inference between “finger” and “pin.” 
But the right hemisphere is unable to do this and merely responds with random choices. 
Even when the word “bleeds” is in the right hemisphere’s lexicon, it cannot make such an 
inference. That the right hemisphere has not associated this link between "finger" and 
"pin" is probably not a catastrophic failure in performing any simple deductive inference, 
for the right hemisphere can maintain a memory o f  things it has seen in immediately 
previous stimuli and associate such memories together for semantic deduction. For 
example, the right hemisphere can put letters together to form simple words (Nagle 1991) 
Thus, some form o f conjunction introduction would apparently be within its cognitive 
powers if it could infer plurals (e g ’ants') from singulars (e g 'ant'). Conjunction 
elimination would move in the other direction.
Further inferences, such as ones drawn from mathematics and geometry, are 
likewise outside o f  its capabilities; this is true even if geometric puzzles are constructed at 
a second-grade level o f  complexity. Even patients who have right hemisphere language 
abilities are unable to make more complex inferences (Gazzaniga, Ivry, and Mangun 1998,
'■ One caution here is that since conjunction introduction/elimination is supposed to work 
on propositions, and not letters, and since the case I've given is in regards to letters; it has 
not been established, therefore, that simple conjunction deduction is occurring. Perhaps 
the right hemisphere is holding (alleged) propositions in its (alleged) mind. But this issue is 
just as difficult to assess for otherwise normal minds. While I am prepared to argued that 
the right hemisphere has its own independent mind, I will remain prudently silent on just 
what and where propositions are.
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549), This is somewhat surprising because the right hemisphere has fairly advanced 
abilities in spatial understanding.
As a contrasting example, the left hemisphere, when shown a picture o f a pot and a 
picture o f  a pan, can readily point to a third picture o f  a pan with boiling water in it. The 
right hemisphere cannot do this. Certain types o f  inferences are apparently beyond the 
right hemisphere. Even though the gross anatomy structures and number o f neurons in the 
right hemisphere is essentially the same as in the left, there are readily identifiable 
differences in their abilities for the types o f tasks noted (Gazzaniga 1998, 153).
2.6.6 Hand Control
2.6.6.1 Split-Brain Patients and Bi-Manual Coordination
In experiments in which normal subjects were briefly shown two patterns (when 
the figures were flashed independently to each hemisphere) and in which they were 
instructed to re-draw these simultaneously with both hands, these subjects were able to 
draw symmetrical patterns but had severe difficulty when either o f the patterns was 
rotated 90 degrees, thus eliminating the mirror symmetry.
In contrast, split-brain patents performed equally well under both conditions. They 
were able to draw the perpendicular patterns as easily as the mere symmetry patterns.
(This also can be accounted as further evidence o f  the modularization o f neural 
mechanisms.) It should be noted, however, that there was a distinction between the spatial 
and temporal activity o f those who were doing the drawing, even though the split-brain 
patients could draw perpendicular patterns as easily as symmetrical patterns. The hands 
always operated in synchrony: each segment o f  a  three-sided figure was drawn co-
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instantaneously; each segment was initiated and terminated at nearly the same time It is 
conjectured that this synchronicity o f  bi-lateral hand action is regulated by sub-cortical 
mechanisms (Gazzaniga, Ivry, and Mangun 1998, 408-409).
2.6.6.2 Split-Brain Patient W.J. and Competition o f  Left and Right Hands
The case o f W.J. is illuminating for understanding hand control in split-brain 
patients. In a simple test o f  arranging blocks, a patient is told to create patterns that match 
cue cards. Using his right hand, W .J., who had his brain surgery in 1961, could not 
arrange four simple red and white blocks into the pattern assigned by the experimenter 
The systems in the right hemisphere had been separated by the surgery from the motor 
apparatus that controls the right hand.
Using his left hand, however, W.J. could easily arrange the blocks into the 
assigned pattern because the specialization o f the right hemisphere allowed him to perform 
the task. In W .J.’s case, the right hand often would attempt to arrange blocks and the left 
hand would attempt to intervene. Ultimately, W.J. had to sit on his left hand so that the 
left hemisphere could use the right hand to attempt to accomplish the task. Even this was 
ultimately not successful; W .J.’s tw o hands could be seen competing again to arrange the 
blocks correctly. As the right hemisphere operated the left hand, the left hemisphere would 
upset the pattern o f blocks with the opposite hand; hence, the hands were in competition 
(Gazzaniga, Ivry, and Mangun 1998, 323-24). This independent and competitive limb 
control is one o f  the most striking empirical examples o f  evidence that there are actually 
two consciousnesses within a single patient.
2.6.7 Spatial Abilities
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2.6.7.1 Visual Testing as Primary Vehicle for Sperrv-Tvpe Experiments
The eye movements in a human being take roughly 200ms of perception time to 
respond. If a stimulus is presented at less than the 200ms window, the experimenter “can 
be confident that the stimulus was lateralized,” which is to say it was picked up by only 
one hemisphere, given the short perception time. However, techniques have become 
available that can dynamically track the eye movements and present the stimuli to the split- 
brain patient in more natural fashion (Gazzaniga, Ivry, and Mangun 1998, 330).
Researchers o f split-brain phenomena primarily use visual stimulation experiments 
because visual perception is the preeminent way in which humans encounter the world, 
and the visual system is also the most strictly lateralized o f  the various sensory systems.
2.6.7.2 Right Hemisphere and Spatial Manipulative Skills
In discussion o f hand control, we noted that one test o f  split-brain patients 
concerns their abilities to stack blocks. DeRinzi worried that early studies o f  the right 
hemisphere may have overemphasized the differences in manipulating blocks, so that the 
right hemisphere is thought to be better at this task than the left hemisphere. He also has 
noted that some studies done in the early 1980s did not show the hemispheric bias o f 
earlier studies o f  this particular task. The evidence in his time suggested that spatial 
manipulation skill apparently involves more spatial and sequential skills that are dependent 
on both left and right hemispheric processing (Corballis 1993, 254-55). But the most 
recent studies have seemed to reaffirm a notable difference in the spatial processing ability 
of the right hemisphere.
2.6.7.3 Left Hemisphere and Abilitv to Arrange Shapes bv Parts
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Pinker ( 1997), for instance, affirms that the left and right hemisphere approach 
spatial relationships differently. The left hemisphere is the seat o f the ability to recognize 
and imagine shapes based on the arrangements o f  their parts. The right hemisphere, on the 
other hand, is good for measuring whole shapes. It is able to judge, for example, whether 
a rectangle is taller than it is wide or how close a particular dot is from some other object. 
Pinker reports on a neurological patient who had suffered a left hemisphere stroke that 
affected his ability to recognize shapes. '“ When I tried to imagine a plant, an animal, an 
object, I can recall but one part. My inner vision is fleeting, fragmented; if 1 am asked to 
imagine the head o f a cow, I know it has ears and horns, but I can’t revisualize their 
places’” (271).
2.6.8 Hemispheric Attributes with Substructure Cross-Integration 
Some attributes, such as attention, emotion attributes, and certain speech abilities 
although tied to a respective hemisphere specialization, also seem to rely on an integrated 
subsystem accessible to some degree by both hemispheres.'^ I shall briefly address these; 
since, for example, attention and emotion are important elements in my later discussions o f 
consciousness and personhood.
2.6.8.1 Split-Brain Patients and Integrated Spatial Attention
Split-brain patients have easy control over the eyes in either visual field. They can 
use either hemisphere to direct their attention to any position, either in the right or left 
visual field. Because either hemisphere can control eye movement in spatial tests, it
This was noted earlier in the section on substructures.
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appears that the two hemispheres are relying on a common system that orients focus to a 
single area o f  attention. Furthermore, split-brain patients cannot divide their attention to 
independent points in the visual field. Certainly normal people cannot do this, but it was 
thought that perhaps the split-brain patients might have this ability. Tests indicated, 
however, that they could not divide their attention independently in the two halves o f  their 
visual perception. It seems, therefore, that there is only one “integrated spatial attention 
system.” Just like normal observers, their attention system is unifocal (Gazzaniga, Ivry, 
and Mangun 1998, 338-39).
2.6.8 2 Emotion Attributes
The left hemisphere has complex cognitive machinery to distinguish between 
sorrow and pity It understands the feelings associated with each of these states. The right 
hemisphere does not, however, have the same cognitive apparatus for such distinctions. It 
has only a narrow conception o f  awareness in comparison to the left hemisphere 
(Gazzaniga, Ivry, and Mangun 1998, 548).
In split-brain patients, when emotional stimuli are fed to the right hemisphere, the 
left cannot report what was seen by the right hemisphere, but the left hemisphere is able to 
report how it felt about the stimulus, such as whether the stimulus represented something 
good or bad. From this it is concluded that different pathways within the brain handle 
emotional and cognitive representations o f the stimulus. Since this information came from 
studies o f  split-brain patients, it is assumed that the emotive information passes through 
the anterior commissure, perhaps from one side o f the amygdala to the other through this 
minor commissure (Gazzaniga, Ivry, and Mangun 1998, 516). O f course, some people
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naturally have a split amygdala. One is left wondering, therefore, if  the anterior
commissure would be the only or primary substructure for such transfer.
Furthermore, there is some evidence to suggest that the negative emotions are
housed in the right hemisphere processes and that the positive emotions are housed in the
left hemisphere processes. One example o f this comes from observations o f patients who
underwent a sodium amytal test. Boas (2001 ) gives an overview o f this test:
Fifty years ago John A.Wada developed the intracarotid amobarbital procedure 
(lAP), a test in which first one and then the other cerebral hemisphere is 
temporarily anaesthetized through direct intracarotid application o f sodium amytal. 
The lAP was devised initially as a method to allow unilateral electroconvulsive 
shock therapy for psychosis. The method subsequently proved its value for the 
latéralisation o f  language and, following adaptation o f the test protocol, for the 
assessment o f  memory functions. Thus the lAP became a standard test in the 
presurgical evaluation for resective surgical treatment o f  medically intractable 
epilepsy.
When the left hemisphere is anesthetized by this procedure, there will be a catastrophic 
reaction, which means the patient may have outbursts o f weeping, despair, swearing, guilt, 
or aggression. But when the right hemisphere is anesthetized, the patient may have a 
euphoric or maniacal reaction. Damage to these hemispheres will at times lead to the same 
results (Corballis 1983,264).
Further evidence for emotive differences in the hemispheres comes from 
experiments with facial expressions. Grimaces on the left side o f  the face, analogous to 
smiling, make people feel sad while grimaces on the right side o f  the face induce a more 
positive although more difficult to characterize emotional state. Corballis (1983) notes 
that because the left side o f  the brain controls the right side o f the face, and vice versa, the 
results are again consistent with the idea that the two sides o f  the brain control
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complementary emotions, with the right side tending to evoke negative emotions and the 
left side positive ones (266).
Such indications stand as further evidence that the respectively isolated 
hemispheres are conscious. At the very least, they maintain some set o f emotional 
dispositions along with their cognitive processing, even if the right hemisphere does not 
have Hilly developed cognitive processing abilities No studies have followed up on 
emotional memory o f  the respective isolated hemispheres. If these hemispheres could 
produce recall o f the emotions they have experienced in the recent past under an lAP 
procedure, however, this would be evidence for an even stronger position—that they are 
also individualized persons.
2.6.8.3 Left and Right Hemisphere Interaction
Even in split-brain patients, if the left hemisphere is flashed a numeral “ 1” or “2,” it 
can easily name what was flashed. However, contrary to what one might expect in a split- 
brain patient, if the right hemisphere is flashed a “ 1” or “2,” and the left hemisphere is 
aware that the right hemisphere is being flashed a “ 1” or a “2,” it can accurately name 
which o f the two numbers was presented to the right hemisphere. Again, this would seem 
to indicate that there is still some sort o f neural connection carrying information at an 
unconscious level between hemispheres. Clearly, the separation is not complete. But what 
is more interesting is that the left brain is not aware that the speech apparatus has 
communicated the correct information. The right brain somehow accesses the left
'■* The reference in Corballis is to a study by Schiff and Lamon (1989).
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hemisphere speech motor system and places the correct information for what was 
observed. This phenomenon occurs only if the left brain is not flashed its own information, 
for example, another, concurrent numeral “ 1” or “2.” If both hemispheres are flashed a 
numeral “ 1” or “2”--for instance, when the left hemisphere is flashed a “ 1” and the right a 
"2"—then the left hemisphere will perform only at the level o f  chance in evaluating what 
the right hemisphere sees. Gazzaniga (1985) concludes from this that “this striking 
dissociation clearly demonstrates that a conscious system does not have access to all 
information that governs what is taken to be a conscious response” (120). This is accepted 
for normal persons, but it also is true for split-brain patients under Sperry-type conditions.
2.6.9 Confabulation Behaviors 
When the left hemisphere confabulates a story on why the right hemisphere would 
pick out a shovel, while the left hemisphere would pick out a chicken coop (or some other 
otherwise reasonably associated object), each hemisphere has an awareness o f what 
William James would call a fringe. A fringe is the consciousness o f  this halo o f  relations 
around the image by a name. When we think about different things, in turn, our thoughts 
must have a starting point for each element. For example, if we were to think o f three 
letters A, B, and C, our consciousness o f C is more intense than the consciousness o f B, 
which is more intense than the consciousness o f  A. This process is like overtones in music. 
James claims that the ear does not separately hear them; they blend with the fundamental 
note and suffice it and sculpture it. Likewise do the waxing and waning brain processes at 
every moment blend with and suffice and alter the psychic effect o f  the processes that are 
at their culminating point (James 1997, 78).
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Now, the issue at hand for the split-brain experiment is when did the experimenter 
ask the patient, “Why did you chose the shovel?” It turns out this interview question is 
asked after the experimenter releases the patient from the apparatus. Is the patient giving a 
description o f why he did something based on his immediate, self-acquaintance with doing 
it, or is the patient giving a description based upon the mere description as communicated 
by the experimenter?
If the patient is giving his description by means o f his own acquaintance, we know 
that the right hemisphere has somehow communicated its past actions to the memory it 
now shares with the left hemisphere. On the other hand, if the patient is merely giving a 
description based upon the experimenter's description o f what happened, then the patient 
doesn’t have a real acquaintance, for he is confabulating based either (1) upon his justified 
trust o f what the experimenter said and not o f  what his own memories indicate; or (2) 
upon his piecing together the disjointed memories that remain transient from the 
experiment and confabulating the fine details that would make these disjoints coherent. 
(This would be analogous to the manner in which court witnesses involuntarily fill in 
details they didn't see about a car wreck that they did see.)
Is the patient reporting memories o f  events, or is the patient giving one or another 
subtle type o f confabulation? In James’ terminology we might ask: Does the left 
hemisphere have a fringe of selecting the shovel? The propositional utterance by the 
patient does not resolve what it is like to come out o f the experiment. One would wish an 
experimenter would put the patient back under the Sperry-type condition and then show 
the right hemisphere a few token shovels and ask, “Which shovel did you pick? ”
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Moreover, the experimenter could do the same for the left hemisphere: present shovel 
tokens and ask it, “Which shovel did you pick?” i f  the right (or left) hemisphere could pick 
out the shovel last chosen in the first split-brain context, then this would show that there 
indeed had been some memory overlap, for the hemisphere would have only its own, 
isolated experience to go on.
In most experiments on split-brain patients the discussion centers on presenting 
pictures to each hemisphere and then inquiring about what was seen. But in some patients 
words can be flashed to the opposite hemispheres. For example, a simple command such 
as “walk” could be flashed to the right hemisphere. When this happens, a patient will 
typically respond by standing up and leaving the testing area. When asked why this 
happens, the subject will respond that he or she is “going into my house to get a Coke” 
(Gazzaniga 1985, 72), Here, the left hemisphere makes up an explanation o f overt bodily 
behavior that was initiated by the opposing right hemisphere.
On the standard method for presenting different cognitive tasks to each 
hemisphere, Gazzaniga, Ivry, and Mangun argue that the left hemisphere will interpret 
what the left hand is doing even apart from obvious associations o f  what the left hand 
indicates with reference to what the right hemisphere is seeing. For example, if the left 
hemisphere is shown a chicken claw and the right hemisphere is shown a snow scene, the 
left hand, again which is controlled by the right hemisphere, will pick out a shovel in 
association pictures. But the right hand will pick out a chicken head in such picture sets. 
When asked, the left hemisphere will indicate that the left hand “picked a shovel because 
one needs a shovel to  clean out a chicken shed.” Gazzaniga, Ivry, and Mangun (1998)
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explain: “Here the left side o f  the brain, observing the left hand’s response, interprets that 
response to a context consistent with its sphere o f  knowledge—one that does not include 
information about the left hemisphere snow scene” (543). What is not included here is a 
possible response o f the right hemisphere. The right hemisphere, as is well known, is not 
verbal; hence, it cannot be queried at a linguistically behavioral level. One is left 
wondering: if the right hemisphere could speak, would it make up a similar explanatory 
fiction based upon the right hand pointing to a chicken head? It happens that some split- 
brain patients have language production from both hemispheres. What would be 
impressive is if a split-brain patient with language production in both hemispheres could 
give the experimenter a right hemisphere report under the same conditions o f  the 
experiment. Unless this can be done, Gazzaniga’s positing of the left hemisphere as being 
the interpreter is suspect.
2.6.10 Language Issues 
Language issues are also important for analyzing split-brain experiments, because 
how one understands language behavior often colors how one will categorize the right 
hemisphere-i.e., as having independent conscious states (or not). The left hemisphere is 
where the primary language functions are processed. The left hemisphere controls speech 
and can do so even when separated from the right hemisphere. The right hemisphere, in 
contrast, is mute and has no control over speech.
There is convincing evidence, however, that the right hemisphere can take over 
language when one reviews cases o f patients who have had the left hemisphere surgically 
removed in order to avoid fatal brain conditions. The extent to which the right hemisphere
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can take over language correlates directly to the age at which the left hemisphere becomes 
incapacitated or is removed or both. If the left hemisphere is incapacitated before the age 
o f about two, the right hemisphere is able, more or less, to completely take over language 
function. Any later than the age o f two, recovery o f  language use declines. At the age of 
puberty or so, decapacitating the left hemisphere will result in essentially permanent 
aphasia. Adult patients who have had their left hemisphere removed usually have great 
trouble with expressive speech, although they often can recite automatic phrases or swear 
or perhaps even sing. Adult patients do not lose an understanding o f  speech, but they do 
have great difficulty in reading and usually cannot write at all. Generally, the adult 
hemispherectomy patient shows the same profile and language skills as does the right 
hemisphere o f a split-brain patient (Corballis 1983, 288).
in a small number o f  cases, split-brain patients have been able to produce speech 
from both hemispheres—at least after a time. The right hemisphere maintains some 
plasticity for as long as ten, even thirteen years after callosal surgery. This development of 
speech in the right hemisphere, however, is very limited. For example, if an object is 
presented to each field o f  a patient’s vision, both the left and right hemispheres might 
name the object but be unable to judge whether the named object is the same object. Both 
hemispheres might name a key, for instance, but if asked whether the object was the same 
or different, the patient would be unable to judge (Gazzaniga, Ivry, and Mangun 1998, 
337).
A distinction is drawn between the chromatical and lexical functions when 
examining brain lesions in patients, and this is informative for dealing with split-brain
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patients under Sperry-type conditions. As the term is used here, the lexicon is the mind’s 
dictionary in which words are associated with specific meanings. The lexicon's function is 
a memory o f word strings operating as idioms. Whole phrases, such as “you can’t teach an 
old dog new tricks,” are probably each found in a single lexical entry. Such words and 
phrases do not reflect an underlying interaction o f  syntax and semantics (which would be 
chromatical functions), but are drawn directly from the memory system. As we have 
noted, language and speech are generally localized to the left hemisphere, although some 
right hemisphere patients have been seen to retain linguistic function. Yet the linguistic 
function that is retained is lexical in nature; thus, the limited language functions present in 
the right hemisphere are based on memory and not based on grammatical processing 
(Gazzaniga, Ivry, and Mangun 1998, 333).
Certain patients who possess some language in their right hemisphere, while they 
cannot use syntax such as word order to disambiguate stimuli (word strings), can still 
judge whether one set o f  utterances is grammatical. The right hemisphere can recognize a 
pattern o f acceptable utterances in the grammatical sense but cannot use that information 
to actually understand the word strings (Gazzaniga, Ivry, and Mangun 1998, 334-35)
There has, however, been some controversy on just what the right hemisphere is 
capable o f in its language and speech functions. The Peabody picture vocabulary test 
requires persons to pick out pictures corresponding to spoken words. Eran Zaidel used a 
contact lens technique in order to restrict viewing under the conditions o f  this test. He was 
able to test each hemisphere’s comprehension. The right hemispheres o f  two adult split- 
brain patients had scores on this test equal to those o f  an average sixteen- and eleven-year-
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old, respectively. Zaidel later noted that the visual vocabularies o f the patients tested were 
not as good, being about five years behind the auditory vocabularies (Corballis 1983,
177). Gazzaniga has some contention with Zaidel's early experiments on right hemisphere 
language comprehension and believes that right hemisphere comprehension is an exception 
rather than the rule. Zaidel replies that the two patients he tested extensively were selected 
because o f being relatively free o f complications. He felt his patients would most likely 
reflect the state o f affairs in an otherwise normal brain (Corballis 1983, 179).'^
While the right hemisphere has the ability to make only simple semantic judgments, 
surprisingly it also can read. It is limited, however; complex sentences, such as “the boy 
that was hit by the girl cried, " are easily misunderstood by the right hemisphere. The right 
hemisphere is better at making distance semantic relations than the left hemisphere. For 
example, the right hemisphere can process words like “dog-horse” as being in the same 
semantic catalogue (Gazzaniga, Ivry, and Mangun 1998, 311).
Shallice and Saffran (1986) have further examined the possibilities that implicit 
reading— that is, reading o f  a non-letter by a letter basis—is a reflection o f  operations in 
the right hemisphere reading mechanisms. True, the right hemisphere does not have as fine 
semantic distinctions, nor can it draw upon syntactic and morphological capabilities to the 
degree that the left hemisphere can. Examinations o f  split-brain patients (and normal 
subjects), however, show that the right hemisphere appears to be better at reading 
concrete words and higher-frequency words even though it is ignorant of morphology.
”  Corballis is referencing Gazzaniga (1983). See Zaidel (1983) for Zaidel’s response.
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The right hemisphere also is thought to be deficient at deriving the sounds o f  words from 
mere print (Farah 1997, 230).
To this point, I have been discussing a representative range o f experimental data 
pertaining to split-brain patients under Sperry-type conditions. 1 have covered both the 
history and the typical components o f a Sperry-type set up, and I have also noted various 
significant behaviors o f  the patients pertaining to handedness, text processing, spatial 
abilities, and emotive responses. Naturally, this is the data that will inform one’s position 
regarding the status o f the individual hemispheres, particularly the right hemisphere, over 
the course of a Sperry-type experiment.
1 now move to discuss what Gazzaniga calls The Interpreter I will agree with 
Gazzaniga that there is such a device, but I will disagree with him that there is only one, 
and that it is located only in the left hemisphere. 1 shall argue that the empirical data 
shows otherwise. Along the way, I will also consider whether positing an interpreter is 
just a new form o f an old confusion which goes under the name 'Homunculaust Fallacy.’ 
Eventually, 1 will find that such a fallacy is not committed by positing an interpreter. 
Positing an interpreter in both the left hemisphere and right hemisphere is important, since 
the interpreter functions as the necessary cognitive structure for tracking the narrative of 
the self which is to say it is a necessary structure for both consciousness and personhood.
2.6.11 The Interpreter 
Glover notes that some views describe a functional system within the brain as ones 
that "can generate a picture” wherein "I occupy my body as a driver occupies car” (Glover 
1988, 96). On the assumption that the brain has a modular organization—and this
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assumption seems well founded—the role o f The Interpreter module is to act as an 
executive system that caches and unifies all the parallel activity o f the separate modules. 
Using Glover's metaphor, we can say that it is the interpreter that sits in the driver’s seat. 
Gazzaniga holds that the interpreter is a necessary element, perhaps even necessary and 
sufficient element, for the formation o f beliefs. The ability to form beliefs is important 
because this separates humans from being simply stimulus-response organisms in the face 
o f  the events o f everyday life. “In many ways [the interpreter] is the system that provides 
the story line or narrative o f our lives” (Gazzaniga, Ivry, and Mangun 1998, 545). It 
enables the reconstruction o f  the past, albeit very imperfectly, if even sometimes outright 
fictionally. Gazzaniga's most recent work The Mind's (1998) makes it very clear that 
the interpreter is the essential element o f personhood, for it is "a left-hemisphere 
interpreter that constructs theories to assimilate perceived information into a 
comprehensible whole" (26). Even at the expense o f  accuracy of reconstructing the past, 
Gazzaniga thinks that the interpreter "is really trying to keep our personal story together" 
and that it "expands the actual facts o f our experience into an ongoing narrative, the 
self-image we have been building in our mind for years" (26-27).
A question immediately arises. Split-brain patients presumably have a past, for in 
standard experiments both the left and right hemispheres can identify information that they 
considered just earlier—for example, what they recently picked up or what they felt 
underneath a table. Now if this interpreter is specific only to the left hemisphere, and this 
interpreter is what gives the mind the ability to track its past, one is left wondering how it 
is the right hemisphere can keep track o f its past. For instance, if the left hand were to
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pick up, say, a sm oker’s pipe, and the right hemisphere were queried on what it held a few 
seconds ago, it can indeed draw a rough picture o f  a pipe.
This is a worrisome aspect for Gazzaniga’s idea o f The Interpreter as being the 
essence o f the person. If there is not an interpreter in the right hemisphere, then this could 
be evidence that there is no person there, since there is no subjective line o f  continuity of 
consciousness; and since there is no neural substratum to link a memory o f  separate 
perceptual events together
One is left wondering, therefore, how the right hemisphere comes to  know that it 
had such a pipe a few moments ago? From Gazzaniga's position, it does not have an 
interpreter, at least not if the interpreter is identified as a left hemisphere neural device.
But such an identification makes one suspicious that this position on the interpreter is 
more an abstraction about favored clusters o f  behaviors than an actual neural component.
Someone friendly to Gazzaniga's position might ask: If hath the left and the right 
hemispheres are alleged to have such a neural device, is such a device a necessary 
component o f a human consciousness? It would seem so, even if such a device could reach 
back only a few moments into the past (a problem some diseased patients have). If there 
really were no past to reach into, not even a second or two ago, the mind would exist in a 
complete jumble o f  chaos. Yet even in the diseased patients often described in the 
literature, this is not noted to be the case. Churchland (1995), for example, describes a 
patient for whom re-introductions would be necessary whenever Churchland left the room 
and returned. Yet as long as Churchland was in the room, the patient could keep track of 
who his visitors were. The train o f  memory was short, but present, nonetheless. Yet if
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there were no interpreter, moment by moment the mind (or better, some mind) would be 
encountering a new experience; in fact, everything would appear new. At best, having a 
mind under such moment-by-moment circumstances merely becomes trivialized to having 
an experience. The behavioral evidence justifies Gazzaniga’s position that there is an 
interpreter in the brain’s left hemisphere, but he understates the case. There also is 
evidence for an interpreter in the right hemisphere.
Before addressing such evidence, let me take a moment to address a possible 
counterargument to there even being an interpreter in either hemisphere. The worry is 
that in positing The Interpreter one is committing some version of the Homunculaust 
Fallacy'.
The argument proceeds as follows. (I) If The Interpreter is essential for tracking 
narrative changes of self over time (or o f at least constructing some more or less accurate 
narrative o f such changes over time), then does not it need a sub-interpreter that serves 
that role for it, and so on, all the way down? If so, then one has a vicious regress o f 
non-explanatory constructs. (2) On the other hand, if  The Interpreter needs no 
sub-interpreters, then the interpreter is yet another device for tracking narrative changes 
within the self one which is posited to explain how the patient keeps track o f  these 
changes over time. But again, the explanation is vacuous; a like device is posited to 
explain the original device. Now one will either posit sub-interpreters or not. But this 
presents a dilemma: any claims to positing The Interpreter leads to either a regress or to a 
vacuous explanation.
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Concerning the regress, I contend that the rhetorical question in ( I )  should be 
answered, "No." It turns out that one may have an interpreter without necessarily positing 
any sub-interpreters. While there may very well be sub-interpreters that maintain enough 
cognitive systems to themselves be identified as minds, there may also be sub-interpreters 
that are primitive in the sense that any sub-systems of those sub-interpreters cannot be 
identified as minds.
It turns out that a human mind is encamalized through a particular configuration of 
modules exhibiting a particular information state.''* If some subset or subsets o f the brain 
exhibit the right configuration, then there actually would be yet another individuated, if 
attenuated, mind — something akin to a homunculus, "a little man", but only as compared 
to an otherwise fully unified set o f  modules. The regress has a stopping point when a 
particular configuration o f  modules is not present in the human brain.
Thus, one avoids the dilemma, and thereby the accusation o f committing the 
homuncular fallacy when positing an interpreter. I now move on to discuss there being 
evidence for an interpreter in the right hemisphere.
In split-brain experiments, the left hemisphere will often report on what the left 
hand is doing, after subjects have been presented with items to report about. For example, 
the left hemisphere would see a chicken claw while the right hemisphere would see a snow 
scene. When given association tasks, the right hand will select a chicken from a second set 
o f  objects, indicating association with what its controlling hemisphere (i.e, the left
In part two of this project, I will talk specifically about important higher order relations 
among modules which brings this information state about. And in part three, I will develop 
a theory on individuating a mind as it is encamalized through is associated brain.
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hemisphere) saw—namely, the chicken claw. But when the left hemisphere is queried about 
why the left hand picks up a shovel, it will confabulate information in order to “weave its 
story in order to convince itself and you, that it is in full control” (Gazzaniga 1998, 23- 
25).
At issue is whether the rif’ht hemisphere also weaves such a story. As earlier 
noted, the right hemisphere does not have the linguistic ability of the left hemisphere, and 
it does not operate at the level o f cognitive maturity o f the left hemisphere. (Generally, a 
right hemisphere operates with the cognitive maturity o f a toddler.) Presumably, the right 
hemisphere could likewise confabulate a contextually consistent story on what the left 
hand is doing. And it will sometimes disagree with the verbal account o f the left 
hemisphere. Thus, on the face o f it, the right hemisphere is aware o f a past. Gazzaniga 
(1998) says that only the left brain has an interpreter, and that this interpreter maintains 
“our general capacity to see how continuous events relate to one another” (24).
Under experimental conditions, however, the right hemisphere seems to have this 
capability, albeit to a lesser degree. When shown two sets o f  pictures, the right hemisphere 
is as equally adept as the left hemisphere in identifying whether a set o f pictures in one 
series had appeared in an earlier series. But when the later set was replaced with topically 
related pictures, instead o f  exact duplicates, the right hemisphere performed better at 
relating the topically related pictures o f the second set to the first than did the left 
hemisphere. The left hemisphere incorrectly recalled the first set o f pictures as being 
related because o f  its proclivity for confabulating context. Even here, the right hemisphere 
is showing that it is aware o f  continuous events that were related to one another. Indeed,
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it knows that this second set does go with the first set, that there is a second set relative to 
some first set, and that the first set preceded in time the second set Why Gazzaniga thinks 
that the right hemisphere is not functioning with some interpreter-like mechanism is quite 
odd Interpretive behaviors are occurring, and if it is the empirical behaviors that lead to 
the positing o f an interpreter, then the right hemisphere must likewise be accounted as 
having an interpreter, even if one o f lesser capability.
It turns out, however, that there is some disagreement on how much the right 
hemisphere is aware o f  its past. Some writers, Gazzaniga foremost among them, seem to 
indicate that the right hemisphere lives only in the present. Other writers, such as Nagel 
(1991), however, note tha t the right hemisphere will sometimes disagree (by hand 
gestures) when the left hemisphere reports inaccurately about what the right hemisphere 
perceived during the course o f  a Sperry-type experiment. There is, therefore, at least some 
reason to think that the right hemisphere has enough short-term memory to compare what 
is perceived in the past w ith what it perceives in the present. For example, the right 
hemisphere is able to draw  pictures of what it perceived during Sperry-type experiments, 
and this is possible only if  there is an awareness o f  the past. Such awareness leads one to 
think it has at least the rudimentary narrative memory function for maintaining a personal 
identity.
In the overall task o f  counting persons over the course o f Sperry-type experiments, 
it is important to posit an interpreter for the right hemisphere. Having an interpreter is a 
necessary element o f  personhood, for as was earlier noted, it tracks the very narrative of 
the self. Split-brain studies concerning the right hemisphere do not rule out its having an
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interpreter. Indeed, they seem to support there being such a device present. The right 
hemisphere, therefore, is legitimately thought to have the necessary cognitive structure to 
support consciousness and even personhood
I shall now move to narrow down just which aspects o f consciousness are 
important for getting a clearer understanding o f  split-brain patients. Naturally, I am 
particularly concerned to show that the right hemisphere is conscious. But Just what do 1 
mean by conscious? Ultimately, I shall find Lycan’s position on the m atter o f defining 
consciousness to be the most fruitful.
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3 CONSCIOUSNESS
This consciousness that is my se lf o f selves, that is everything, and yet
nothing at all—what is it?
— (Julian Jaynes 1976)
3.1 Introduction
In addressing the status o f the right hemisphere, one must first take a stand on 
consciousness. I claim there is indeed such a thing. O f course, that divorces me from the 
skeptics on consciousness and the radical eliminative materialists who would change the 
language locutions o f  mind and limit our ontology to the clean and controlled entities o f 
physics or, at the very least, to what we can pretend to be the clean and controlled entities 
o f physics.
Indeed, I find it necessary to throw  all caution to the wind and claim that 
consciousness can, in principle, be explained. This is a faith claim on my part, as no one 
seems to have done it; and perhaps it is even a modal faith claim—I have faith that 
someone could do it. From a phenomenological point o f view, I certainly think I am 
conscious, in the sense that there is something that it is like to be me and something it is 
like to see red versus seeing blue, versus hearing middle C on a piano, versus being kicked 
in the shins.
Admittedly, introspective reports are notoriously inaccurate. Psychologists and 
sociologists take great delight in showing us exceptions to our own accounts o f why we 
do what we do and what we were thinking, when wc were thinking it. At any rate, even if 
my readers do not think they are conscious, I certainly think I am conscious and proceed 
upon this assumption as if it applied to all other homo sapiens who exhibit behaviors o f the
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same type as my own. (Some justification for this assumption is given in the discussion of 
qualia below).
O f course, by the very employment o f  the word consciousness, one is apparently 
committed to some meaning o f that term. It is not an unreasonable request for someone to 
ask, “What do you mean by consciousness' when you say that you are conscious’’” One 
might then lay out the connotation o f the word, perhaps even aiming for a definition. This 
is an overly optimistic hope for several worrying reasons that are noted in the section that 
immediately follows.
Naturally, an analysis o f a definition (an alleged definition) would lead to further 
questions about the constituent terms. One is always tempted by, yet usually well advised 
to Jettison, profound, continental-sounding phrases such as “the something likeness o f  my 
perceptions” or “the being-what-it-is o f my experience.” Unfortunately, getting some hold 
on the meaning o f  the term consciousness demands a certain embarrassing and unpleasant 
participation in such talk. Yet, at this point, it seems the only business available within 
which to sell a description of consciousness to one’s readers. It is hoped the price is not 
too high.
3.2 Defining Consciousness
3.2.1 Worries over Defining Consciousness
Stuart Sutherland (1995) captures something of this embarrassment in his 
definition o f consciousness, although he is a bit more pessimistic about the subject, if  not 
the definition, than is necessary.
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CONSCIOUSNESS: The having o f  perceptions, thoughts, and feelings; 
awareness. The term is impossible to define except in terms that are unintelligible 
without a grasp o f what consciousness means. Consciousness is a fascinating but 
elusive phenomena: it is impossible to specify what it is, what it does, or why it 
evolved. Nothing worth reading has been written about it. (95)
A more toned-down view is expressed by George Miller ( 1962) who writes that
“consciousness is a word worn smooth by a million tongues [,..] Depending upon the
figure o f  speech chosen, it is a state o f being, a substance, a process, a place, an epic
phenomenon, an emergent aspect o f  matter, or the only true reality” (25).
Dretske (1997) resorts to making an ethical judgment on the matter, writing that
“no useful theory o f  consciousness can hope (nor, I think, should it even aspire) to capture
all the subtle nuances o f ordinary usage” (773). Finally, Lycan (1997) admits that he can
only hear a natural sense o f the phrase “conscious state” as meaning the state one is
conscious o f  being in, but he makes a somewhat disarming analysis o f  how the word
‘consciousness’ is used. He notes, “The philosophical use o f ‘consciousness’ is by now
well and truly up for grabs, and the best one can do is to be as clear as possible in one’s
technical specification” (759). We should admit that consciousness is a cluster concept
with the most difficult aspect to explain being qualia,' itself another another cluster
concept (Bunnin and James 1996, 180-82).
But there are aspects to consciousness that do not have qualia as a key component,
such as the mechanisms of the unconscious, the attentive and control components o f
consciousness, and its representational aspect. Giizeldere (1997a) thinks that these other.
I directly address qualia later, but for now I can roughly define this term as the 
subjective feel that certain mental events exhibit.
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nonqualitative aspects o f  consciousness can ultimately be understood or explained apart 
from the quality o f  aspects (22).
In the next section, I try to hone the definition by moving through, at first, very 
broad, nebulous definitions offered by key writers. As more definitions o f the term are 
reviewed, 1 try to narrow the scope o f  the discussion to what 1 take to be a controlling 
view o f consciousness, even if 1 offer no outright definition o f consciousness.
3 .2.2 Precising a Definition o f Consciousness
While not himself one to dwell on definitions. Pinker (1997, 134-35) gives four 
meanings for how consciousness often is described by writers on that subject. These are 
descriptive for all that they take in;
1. First, as in the writings o f Stephen Jay Gould, a well-known theorizer about 
evolution, consciousness is used as a synonym for intelligence, albeit o f  a very lofty kind.
2. Another meaning for consciousness is self-knowledge. Consciousness is 
understood as an internal model o f the world, and this model contains the self. In this 
sense, a conscious entity can feel pain, can see blue, and can think o f itself as doing these 
things. Pinker holds that this ability is no more mysterious than any other topic in memory 
or perception. He asks, ‘i f  1 have a mental database for people, what is to prevent it from 
containing an entry for myself?” (Pinker, 134) It is often noted that midlife, adult 
chimpanzees, orangutans, and human beings are able to recognize their own reflections in 
mirrors. This is supposed to be evidence for consciousness, and no doubt Pinker has in 
mind this self-knowledge definition o f  consciousness. In light o f this he asks again, “If I 
can learn to raise my arm and crane my neck to sight a hidden spot on my back, why
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couldn’t I leam to raise a mirror and look up at it to sight a hidden spot on my forehead?” 
(Pinker, 134) Indeed, Pinker points out that even pigeons have been trained to recognize 
themselves in mirror He also adds that any beginning programmer o f  a robot could 
construct software so as to allow the robot to recognize itself in a mirror. Self-knowledge, 
he says, is a common topic in cognitive science but not a paradoxical mystery. He notes 
that because it is so easy to say something about self-knowledge, writers can crow about 
their 'theory o f  consciousness.”
3. A third sense of consciousness is in terms of access to information Here one 
might be referring to products o f vision and contents of memory for the reasons behind 
decision making and rational thought or to internal calculations o f  vision, automatic gut- 
level responses, repressed desires, or other systems that are not directly accessible to a self 
that has consciousness. Again. Pinker holds that this is not the most mysterious sense o f 
consciousness since even computers have access to information about their internal state, 
and, likewise, they do not have full information about all internal states, as they cannot 
report upon why they are in such states. For example, a computer may recognize a printer 
is not responding but not be able to say why the printer is not responding, even if the 
printer itself does have access to that information, such as in a paper jam. Pinker sees this 
as a very close analogy to the way human consciousness is sometimes cashed out in terms 
of access to information, but he nevertheless does not find this a satisfying account o f 
consciousness.
84
4. Finally, the most interesting sense, in Pinker’s view, is consciousness understood 
dis sentience: subjective experience, phenomenal awareness, raw feels, first-person present 
tense, “what it is like” to be or do something, if you have to ask, you’ll never know.
Marvin Minsky has called consciousness a “suitcase” word.'" By this he means there are a 
host o f things the word might mean, depending on where it is used and on who utters it. If 
this is the case—and I think it is—one can see that Pinker is fully packed! One can easily 
discern overlapping areas among Pinker’s four-fold senses. Minksy’s perplexity dates back 
twelve years previous to Pinker’s work and he asks questions that any such broad, all- 
encompassing map o f the term consciousness must face: “What do we mean by words like 
sentience, consciousness, or self-awarenessl They all seem to refer to the sense o f  feeling 
one’s mind at w ork-but beyond that, it is hard to say whether there are any differences in 
what they mean” (Minsky 1985, 152).
Earlier in his career, it looked as if Gazzaniga (1985) was defining consciousness 
as something capable o f affecting action. A brain module is considered conscious, because 
it is “very capable o f  affecting action” (117). Yet Just because a brain module cannot 
internally communicate to the language and cognitive system does not mean it should be 
characterized as unconscious. In more recent works, however, Gazzaniga holds that 
consciousness is a feeling about specialized abilities. These feelings center on the objects 
we see, hear, and feel. Consciousness also includes feelings about our capacity to think 
and use language (Gazzaniga, Ivry, and Mangun 1998, 546, 548).
'* Speech given at computer game developers conference (1999).
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Gazzaniga’s change is a first hint o f  a chasm in the discussion about 
consciousness—what Chalmers (1995) and others since have distinguished as the 'easy" 
and “hard” problems o f consciousness. Giizeldere gives a short survey o f the difference: 
The “easy problems” are those concerning the explanation o f various cognitive functions: 
discriminatory abilities, reportability o f  mental states, the focus o f  attention, the control o f  
behavior. Chalmers’s point is that “there is no real issue about whether these phenomena 
can be explained scientifically” (29). They can be. “What makes the hard problem’ o f 
consciousness a different kind o f  problem,” Chalmers maintains, “ is its resistance to all the 
methods that explain, or have the potential to  explain, the rest o f  the problems” (29). 
Generally, “the really hard problem is the problem of experience” (30). More specifically, 
it is the subjective aspect of every experience that resists explanation. “There is something 
it is like to be a conscious organism and have experiences. In other words, ‘what it is like 
to be’ constitutes the subjective character o f  the experiences o f the organism in question” 
(30).
When the heterogeneity o f subjective feel is emphasized, consciousness becomes 
“a superordinate term meant to cover all mental states, events, and processes that are 
experienced—all the states that there is something-ii-is-like for the subject o f them to be 
in" (Flanagan 1997b, 97-98). This, supposedly, is what gets the “hard problem started.” 
Flanagan, however, thinks a naturalized account can give us a respectable science o f  mind 
(107).
Following Rosenthal (1990), Dretske (1997) distinguishes two types o f 
consciousness. Creature consciousness is where “agents are said to  be conscious in an
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intransitive sense o f  this word (he regained consciousness) and in a transitive sense (he 
was conscious o f  her )” In contrast, state consciousness always has an intransitive sense in 
that certain internal “states, processes, events, and attitudes (typically in or o f conscious 
beings) are said to be conscious.” Dretske further notes that “transitive creature 
consciousness implies intransitive creature consciousness.” One “cannot see, hear, taste, 
or smell something without thereby being conscious.” He adds, for example, that one 
cannot be aware that one’s checkbook doesn’t balance or conscious that one is late for an 
appointment without being a conscious being (777; all quotations from Dretske).
Dretske’s position is also echoed by Goldman (1997), who holds that 
consciousness may be consciousness o f  a particular object or event. Goldman writes, “To 
be conscious o f  an object, x, is to be in some (partial) state o f  phenomenal awareness that 
includes a representation o f x. In other words, x is the referent or intentional object o f a 
conscious state or representation” (111). Goldman admits this is a reasonably accurate, 
although only approximate definition o f consciousness, since it already uses a synonym o f 
“phenomenal awareness” in its definition. My point here is just to give another shade o f 
meaning o f  consciousness that is not exclusively based in qualia but has a vector or sense 
of pointing outside itself.
The word “outside” here does not merely refer to things “outside the head,” as the 
phrase is off-quoted, but means more specifically “outside the module.” But even this is 
not quite right, for there very well might be a self-directed view that also counts as 
“outside,” perhaps akin to how statements about English sentences, meta-statements, can 
themselves be English sentences. -  e.g.. T h is  English sentence ends with a period.’
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Lycan ( 1997) defines consciousness as “the functioning o f  an internal attention 
mechanism directed upon lower-order psychological states and events” (755). He further 
defines attention mechanisms as “devices that have the job of relaying and/or coordinating 
information about ongoing psychological events and processes” (755).
From all o f  these definitions, several aspects concern an analysis o f the right 
hemisphere being conscious, and, therefore, o f  there being more than one person present 
in a single patient over the course o f a Sperry-type experiment. First, although there will 
no doubt be some aspects o f consciousness that are attenuated, or even not present, the 
suitcase, as it were, must be sufficiently packed with what we normally think o f  as 
essential aspects o f  consciousness. Second, being conscious must affect action in some 
discernable way, as contrasted with unconscious actions. Third, questions about whether 
the right hemisphere has the “what-it’s-likeness” o f experience must also be addressed, 
even if a rigorous and satisfying explanation for subjective feels cannot be completed. 
Finally, if the right hemisphere is conscious, some account of what it is conscious o f must 
be attempted, which entails making statements about what is represented by the right 
hemisphere. Representations “outside” the module shall be noted, with attention given 
specifically to how internal monitoring mechanisms o f the brain coordinate information 
about mental psychological events and processes.
3.3 Identifying the Essential Issues in Consciousness
3.3.1 Introduction
In this section I discuss essential issues o f  consciousness. I first make a few 
remarks in order to absolve myself from having to solve the mind-body problem in order
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to talk about consciousness. Second, I outline why consciousness is not an all-or-nothing 
affair. Consciousness comes in degrees, but that requires I explain just how this can be. 
Therefore, third, I outline a modular systems approach to consciousness and use that as a 
basis for my supposing a higher-order theory o f  consciousness. Fourth, I consider two 
representative samples o f  higher-order consciousness theories, Rosenthal’s and Lycan’s, 
and then defend why the latter is the one I find preferable. I also give some special 
attention to introspection, since it would be the highest form o f  consciousness within 
higher-order theories. Fifth, I consider challenges to consciousness, one from Dennett and 
the other from the possibilities of “Zombies.” The latter challenge demands I take up the 
discussion of qualia Finally, I close out my discussion of the essentials o f  consciousness 
by laying down a Turing-like criterion for detecting consciousness and by considering how 
the various essential issues o f consciousness might fit into my overall position that a 
Sperry-isolated right hemisphere is indeed conscious.
3.3.2 Absolving the Mind-Body Problem 
Bernard Baars ( 1997) notes that there already is a great deal o f  reliable, empirical 
information available on consciousness, although it has been based on decades o f research 
under other labels. He believes we are in principle able to treat consciousness as a variable, 
one that can be studied if we hold the content o f  consciousness as constant as possible.
Even apart from solving the mind-body problem, psychology has had the ability to 
make some reliable generalizations about conscious experience, such as research on 
recollection from long- and short-term memory, voluntary vs. involuntary control of 
attention, and activities o f  sense perception. The very success in these areas shows that
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critical facts about consciousness can be specified without either evading the issue or 
requiring that we first solve the mind-body problem (197).
In this work, I take up Baars’s gambit—namely, that it is not necessary to solve the 
mind-body problem in order to make claims about consciousness. Obviously, one cannot 
completely ignore metaphysical positions on the mind while addressing consciousness, so I 
at least make some preliminary remarks about my position on the mind-body problem.
Ultimately, I hold that consciousness is a configuration o f  mind, and that human 
minds are encarnalized through the neuro-network o f the human brain.”  Minds are not 
properties (at least not straightforwardly) but particulars (of a special type). They are o f a 
class o f metaphysical entities known as “superficial particulars” (Casati and Varzi, 1995). 
Minds are dependent particulars, they cannot exist alone, they need a host, within which 
they find a place to be.
The configuration o f  consciousness, therefore, is not a simple sum of the parts o f  
individual neurons. Consciousness is a configuration o f a higher-order entity (the mind) 
encarnalized through lower-order entities (neurons, along with their components). The 
correlation between brain events and phenomenal events is evidence enough that our high 
level capacities exist because o f low level interactions. Although I have metaphysical 
biases here, as much as possible I try to avoid judgments on whether a given configuration 
o f mind is just a high level description or an actual ontological state. I recognize that this
”  Perhaps minds can emerge from other structures, perhaps even non-brain or non-organic 
structures. I take no position on this here.
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is a most interesting question, but it is one that I cannot properly address until part three 
o f this project.
Even if some configurations o f mind are just descriptions, they are descriptions 
that we should levy not only at other persons but also at persons whose hemispheres are 
split under experimental conditions. The right hemisphere, I argue, has the sufficient 
capacities for us to attribute consciousness to it. It has, although to a lesser degree, the 
same traits that we otherwise attribute to configurations o f normal minds.
3 3 3 Degrees o f  Consciousness
Earlier, the word decree was used in regard to attributing consciousness to the 
right hemisphere. It is not always desirable to talk o f  consciousness in a binary fashion. 
Patients with critical brain damage range along the full spectrum of functionality. Some 
lacking all brain functions are unresponsive to any test. Others with only an attached brain 
stem can track light with their eyes, react to pain or reflex stimulation, yawn, sigh—all o f 
this on their own while otherwise maintaining only standard metabolic functions.
Giizeldere ( 1997b) also believes that it is sometimes necessary to talk about degrees o f 
consciousness, which allows one to say that normal human beings are “more conscious” 
than those with brain damage, that brain damaged patients are more so than those without 
a brain stem, and so forth (47).
Speaking against Searle (1997b), who holds that consciousness is an on-off affair, 
Lycan ( 1997) argues that consciousness comes in degrees, or what he describes as 
“degrees o f  richness or fullness.” Humans are said to be richly conscious, and less complex 
animals, while still conscious, are less fully so. O f course, a minimal level o f attributes is
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necessary for consciousness to obtain, but this is consistent with what Lycan has written 
elsewhere. Lycan holds that “a thing is conscious, at all, if it is conscious to any degree at 
all—that is, if it has at least one internal monitor operating and contributing, etc” (766) to 
its mental activities. He goes on to argue that if  something has more monitors, integrates 
more, or integrates more efficiently for control purposes, then that thing would be 
considered more richly or more fully conscious (766).
As we consider the richness o f consciousness, we have some trouble 
contemplating a spectrum-degraded, loss o f consciousness, since we exist with such a rich 
and full, what Lycan calls “remarkably non-gappy,” luxury o f sense modalities (766). By 
analogy it is difficult for us to abstract with our short-term memory (which commands 
only five to nine “chunks” o f  information) just what, say, a quintillion objects would be 
like. Nevertheless, we have some ability to formulate a notion o f one quintillion and can 
make sense o f such talk. Mathematicians do this regularly. Likewise, we can abstract very 
low degrees o f consciousness, even if it is highly implausible that we can render by such an 
abstraction the notion o f  being only as conscious as an ant or a slug.
3 .3.4 A Modular Systems Approach
Earlier, I discussed the modularization o f  brain function and found, for instance, 
that chronometric evidence supports there being discrete modules in the brain dedicated to 
specific tasks. Another instance o f this was face recognition. I also noted how modularity 
could be artificially induced, either by a Wada procedure or by surgeries. Ultimately, I 
claimed that the brain was a society o f  modules.
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The mind is a result o f  the processing and configuration o f these modules. I must 
now concern myself with determining how consciousness fits in with such a view o f 
modularization. Ultimately, 1 want to show that the right hemisphere is conscious. I must, 
therefore, discuss how some set o f modules can be coordinated into consciousness at all.
Although I did not define a module explicitly in part one o f this work, “Cognition,” 
I shall borrow Garfield’s (1995) definition in order to show how consciousness results 
from coordination o f brain modules: “Broadly speaking, a module is a relatively 
autonomous component o f  the mind—one that, while it interacts with, receives input from 
and sends output to, other cognitive processes o r structures, performs its own internal 
information processing unperturbed by external systems” (442). A module is a neuro­
system that is independent to some degree from other components o f  the mind.
Sometimes, consciousness is viewed as being a property o f certain specific neuro­
systems that are joined to other neuro-systems, which are not conscious. But Kinsbourne 
(1988) theorizes that a better way to view consciousness is as a state o f  integration among 
different neuro-systems (Farah 1997, 225). As an example o f his theory, patients who have 
neglect do not lack for the transmission o f perceptual information between systems that 
normally result in conscious awareness. Rather, the problem is a weak o r degraded 
representation of the stimulus such that it has not gained sufficient influence over all other 
concurrent patterns o f  activity. A brain would otherwise use these patterns to create a new 
global brain state into which representation is integrated (Kinsbourne 1988, 225). This is 
in contrast with other accounts (cf. Damasio 1990) where one might have normal 
percepts, but there is a disconnection o f  these percepts from other neuro-systems in the
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brain (Farah 1997, 225). For my purposes, I favor the Kinsbourne view o f a coordination 
(= integration) among various brain modules.
Thinking more generally. Van Gulick (1997) reviews Baars (1988), who holds that 
one o f  the most important functions o f  consciousness is to broadcast information 
throughout the nervous system. It has the function o f  making information widely available. 
Building upon this view. Van Gulick notes that objects within our phenomenal awareness 
are represented from many different perspectives and modalities and yet still harmonize 
and agree. Conscious phenomenal awareness, therefore, probably involves large-scale and 
higher-order patterns o f  brain activity, which encompass many different sensory and 
representational modalities. “Because o f  their highly integrated and multi-modal content, 
conscious phenomenal representations require rich associative networks o f activation as 
their basis. Thus, any type o f brain activity able to serve as the neuro-substrate for 
phenomenal representations would seem o f necessity also able to fulfill the function of 
broadcasting information’” (Van Gulick, 440).
Regarding such associate networks, there is an especially relevant point worth 
noting here. In the case o f the right hemisphere, although it does not have the full 
associative networks o f  a normal brain, there are still plenty o f connections and 
modularization o f  sensory modalities and apparently representational modalities, since 
split-brain patients operating from the right hemisphere are able to engage short-term 
memory, kinetic memory, and a basic ability to report what they have grabbed or pointed 
to.
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The big question is how the myriad o f  modules is bound together for coordination.
Stich jibes that “consciousness is inferentially promiscuous” (Pinker, 137). It is available
to a large number o f  information processing components in the brain rather than to a
single component (Pinker, 137). Currently there is no sure answer to this, but there is a
tempting option, one that seems almost irresistible. It comes from the work o f Francis
Crick and Christof Koch (1997) in their study o f vision:
Because any object will have different characteristics (form, color, motions, etc.) 
that are processed in several different visual areas, it is reasonable to assume that 
seeing any one object often involves neurons in many different visual areas. The 
problem o f how these neurons temporarily become active as a unit is often 
described as “the binding problem.” As an object seen is often also heard, smelled, 
or felt, this binding must also occur across different sensory modalities. (284)
O f course this question could be asked not just concerning the modules that coordinate
vision, but for all o f  the modules that coordinate for consciousness.
Crick and Koch have put forth an interesting hypothesis that subjective awareness
is linked to oscillation patterns in a range o f about 40 Hz in relative groups o f neurons.
The relevance is in terms o f the neurons involving certain decoding tasks where 40 Hz
oscillatory spikes are synchronized. These 40 Hz oscillations have been found in the
thalamus, the olfactory bulb, single neurons, and neuronets in the retina, among other
places. Llinas and Ribary (1993) have suggested there is a nonspecific system consisting o f
the thalamocortical loop that finds contentful states of 40 Hz oscillations for particular
modalities. An example o f this is where a neuro-system subserving a sensing modality such
as sight provides the content o f an experience while the more generalized system, which
consists of the resonating activity in the thalamus and cortex loop, provides the temporal
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binding o f this content into the cognitive experience that we subjectively experienced as a 
single conscious state (Flanagan 1997b. 103).
So Crick and Koch have suggested that synchronization across visual areas helps 
bind conscious awareness o f  visual stimuli. Dimasio (1990) proposed a similar 
identification, although more globally He suggested that these 40 Hz oscillations bound 
all o f conscious awareness, vibrating across different modalities specific representations of 
an object rather than just being limited to the visual system, as in Crick and Koch’s 
account (Farah 1997, 205).
Even with this tantalizing evidence o f 40 Hz oscillations, Flanagan (1997b) warns 
that it is unclear whether this phenomenon is “a marker, a constituent component, or a 
cause o f a vivid conscious experience (which one it is, is o f course very important)” (103); 
thus, sometimes the sense o f  what binding’ means shifts around in discussion. Even 
further complicating the matter. Crick and Koch think it possible that there might be 
several forms of visual awareness (Crick and Koch, 281 ;284), and, by extension, even 
more forms of consciousness in general.
3 .3 .5 Higher-Order Theories o f Consciousness
You cannot think about thinkiu}', without thinking about thinking about
something.
-  Seymour Papert
If modules can be coordinated—i.e., if there can be one module that has as its 
inputs the outputs o f  yet other higher-level modules, then this would easily lead one into 
discussions of Higher-Order Theories (HOT) o f consciousness. I have been purporting 
that such coordination is possible; 1 now explain and develop a position on Higher-Order
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Theories o f consciousness. This is important for my overall project, as I have affirmed that
the right hemisphere is made up o f modules. I now need to show how those modules
might be configured to maintain consciousness.
Higher-Order Theories o f consciousness have come from several different camps.
Armstrong, Churchland, Lycan, and Rosenthal have all put forth versions. No doubt there
are more. Higher-Order Theories state that an organism is in a conscious mental state
when that mental state is the object o f a second, higher mental state. One mental state is
said to be “higher” than another when the first mental state is about or directed toward the
second mental state. Therefore, consciousness is not the property o f  any single mental
state, but a relation—f have been using configuration so that sets o f  relations can be
allowed—between tw o (or more) mental states.
The idea o f  higher-order mental states is not new. Descartes held that
consciousness was a type o f  higher order o f  awareness, what is called “second order
awareness” today. In a letter to Amauld dated 29 July 1648, he wrote:
When an adult feels something, and simultaneously perceives that he has not felt 
this before, I call this second perception reflection, and attribute it to the intellect 
alone in spite o f  its being so linked to sensation that the two occur together and 
appear to be indistinguishable from one another. (Cottingham, Stoothoff and 
Murdoch 1991, 221)
Descartes had also written in June 1640, “Pain exists only in the understanding,” where 
understanding, in D escartes’ view, is itself part o f  the mind (Cottingham, Stoothoff and 
Murdoch 1985, 85). What is new is that higher-order mental awareness, consciousness, is 
not a property o f  every mental state, but only o f some mental states.
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One might classify HOTs as being closer to  or further from Descartes’ original stance on 
higher-order awareness. Consider two representative samples: Rosenthal and Lycan.
3.3.5.1 Rosenthal
On the one hand, Rosenthal ( 1997) explains that there are “serious theoretical 
reasons” to reject Descartes’ view o f consciousness, for “if all mental states were 
conscious states, it would be impossible to give any nontrivial, informative explanation” o f  
the nature o f  consciousness. Yet, on the other hand, Rosenthal does not completely reject 
Descartes, for he still thinks “nothing in nonmental reality seems suited to explain what it 
is for a mental state to be conscious.” The big move for Rosenthal is to have an 
intermediate step. “We still would not explain consciousness directly in nonmental terms, 
but the explanatory chain would reach nonmental reality by way o f some nonconscious but 
mental intermediate. The intermediate step would dispel the apparent unintelligibility o f 
explaining consciousness straightaway in nonmental terms” (735).
One can see some explanatory advantages to a via media view. First, perhaps there 
is not a bifurcation o f  mental states, where some are conscious and some are not. More 
likely, there is a spectrum o f conscious mental states, and at somewhere along that 
spectrum falls attention. Attention is not quite consciousness and is not quite pure mental 
state, but a more or less intermediate state between these two. We can, therefore, account 
for the mental operations'” we share with higher animals and yet still save introspection 
and higher-order thought as higher than mere attention and, thus, beyond what animals are 
able to exhibit.
This may be what Giizeldere is obliquely complimenting, 800 fn. 4.
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Second, Rosenthal asks perhaps one o f the essential questions, if not the essential 
question about consciousness. Since consciousness does not reveal itself as an extrinsic 
property o f conscious states, can we not conclude on the basis o f  introspection that it is an 
intrinsic property?’* Eliminative materialists such as Churchland are often quick to 
indicate that introspection is not a reliable way to understand mental activity, and here, 
Rosenthal agrees. He notes that the deliverances o f consciousness are compatible both 
with its being an intrinsic property and with its being an extrinsic property. On either 
account, intrinsic or extrinsic, consciousness is mute about its own nature (1997, 739).
Yet, even if consciousness is not prima facie an extrinsic property of mental states, 
Rosenthal will remain with the HOT approach, for, as he earlier noted, "it is only if we 
regard being conscious as a relational property that we can explain what such 
consciousness consists in” (737).
It should be noted that Rosenthal seems to have quite a bit riding on the precise 
status o f the extrinsic property o f consciousness. Elsewhere he has written that "a state’s 
being conscious is its being accompanied by a roughly simultaneous higher-order thought 
that one is in the target mental state. So being conscious is an extrinsic property o f those 
mental states which are conscious” (1991, 16). As was earlier mentioned in passing, this 
being conscious o f  a higher-order thought introduces a thirJ-levd relationship between 
mental states.
’* Rosenthal (1997) stipulates that a property is intrinsic “ if something’s having it does not 
consist, even in part, in that thing’s bearing some relation to something else” (736). A 
property would be extrinsic otherwise.
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Rosenthal argues that generally a false dichotomy appears when one thinks that the 
only way to explain consciousness is in terms o f what is not mental or in terms of 
conscious states. The former is impossible; the latter is trivial. If one holds this 
dichotomous position, it looks like one must acquiesce to not having the ability to give a 
genuine explanation o f  consciousness at all. The best one can hope for is to render the 
phenomenon in terms o f  conceptual connections that hold among such primary notions as 
consciousness, mind, viewpoints, objectivity, person, perspective, and self. However, 
Rosenthal, himself, thinks this is a false dichotomy. He argues that we should explain 
consciousness in terms o f mental states that themselves are not conscious states (1997, 
735).
The gulf between creatures with consciousness and the nonmental components that 
makes them up can be bridged by an intermediate capacity o f creatures to draw upon 
nonconscious mental states (Rosenthal 1997, 749). The relationship between 
nonconscious mental states and nonmental states would be lower on a tier o f  explanation 
than the relation between conscious states and mental states. This allows one to sustain a 
naturalistic explanation o f  mind and yet allows an intermediate step to dispel an apparent 
un-intelligibility o f consciousness while still using mental terms. Yet, whatever the case 
about naturalism, Rosenthal cautions that no nontrivial, informative explanation o f state 
consciousness will be possible unless we reject the idea that all mental states are conscious 
(735).
3.3.5.2 Lvcan
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Lycan’s HOT is further away from Descartes than Rosenthal’s, for he does not 
build his “Inner-Sense” theory o f consciousness around the object o f a higher-order 
“thought” but around the object o f a higher-order “scanner” (or “monitor”). “The Inner- 
Sense theory has it that conscious awareness is the successful operation o f an internal 
scanner or monitor that outputs second-order representations o f first-order psychological 
states” (1997, 762). A monitor makes for consciousness when what it monitors is itself a 
psychological" state or event (765-66). In particular, Lycan’s HOT o f consciousness is 
concerned to draw a distinction between “conscious simpliciler" (or intransitive 
consciousness) and “consciousness of siicfi-anJ-such" (or transitive consciousness). The 
former is concerned with simply being awake as opposed to asleep or comatose; the latter 
is concerned with “perceiving such-and-such or aware of such-and-such''' (Lycan 2001).
3 .3.5.3 Mental Representations: Giizeldere’s Obiection
Giizeldere ( 1997a) summarizes contemporary materialist theories o f  mental 
representations as understanding mental representations to be states o f  the nervous 
system, which represent to the subject in whom they occur various objects in—in fact 
about—the subject’s environment and bodily states (793). He goes on to point out that the 
higher-order perception theories hold introspection as some form of “direct access” to 
one’s brain states, in terms o f the intrinsic, physical properties of those states. Lycan’s 
view is certainly no exception to this analysis, for he defines an internal monitor as “an
■’ By “psychological” here, Lycan is not assuming what he attempts to define; he merely 
means perceptions, memories, anticipatory organization, or combinations o f  these factors 
into learning. The monitoring o f all o f these—this is where consciousness would obtain.
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attention mechanism that presumably can be directed upon representational subsystems 
and stages o f same” (1997, 762).
Giizeldere qualifies his claim a bit, for even if not every representation is a state o f 
the nervous system, at least introspection is held to be such on one of two interpretations 
for the higher-order perceptions. Still, introspection can also be understood as where 
internal objects somehow share the properties o f the external objects o f which they 
resemble or are taken to resemble.
Giizeldere wants to argue that this is (what he calls) “the fallacy o f  the 
representational divide” (1997a, 796): either the properties o f the representation are taken 
to be the properties o f  the represented, where we identify what is in our head with the 
properties o f what we perceive outside of our head, or the properties o f the represented 
are taken by us to be properties o f the represented, where we somehow import the 
properties o f what is outside our head as the properties inside our head. Giizeldere asks 
rhetorically, “Why should we expect. . .  to find out all about the cup a subject sees by 
examining the neuro-properties o f the visual state that subject happens to have in looking 
at that cup?” (1997a, 798).
But there is an easy answer here: because the image is isomorphically outlined at 
the neural-level in some sensation brain area. A straightforward example is in the visual 
sense modality. It turns out that the V4 area neurons at the back o f the brain literally map 
out isomorphs o f external scenes. The relations between objects perceived and the 
representational brain structures are more than just representations at the receptor 
services, i.e., at the neuronal representation on the retina surface o f the eye. Ultimately, it
102
would appear that different modules in the brain act as homunctilr^ that maintain a 
scanning relation to other modules o f the brain. Although there is no singular homunculi 
o r single theater in which a homunculi sees everything, there are a multitude o f homunculi 
that holistically allow the scanning to take place. It is not the infinite regress o f requiring a 
yet second “internal eye” to account for the perception of what goes on external to our 
heads, as Giizeldere charges. (We see here an analogue to the earlier charge o f regress 
when positing an interpreter module in the brain.) It turns out that in a footnote, 
Giizeldere reveals that Lycan had corresponded to him about the V4 area being a literal 
first-order resemblance. Giizeldere essentially argues that since it doesn’t preserve all the 
properties that we perceive, "a topographical relation o f a very crude sort,” it does not 
lend any support to a classically empirical “mind’s eye” support for mental representation 
(Giizeldere 1997, 804). Apparently something can be in the head, materially incarnated as 
the topographic order on the brain’s neurons, but that does not get to count as mental 
representation because o f  one’s aesthetic feelings o f  the matter. Perhaps we should take 
the hint that Giizeldere will resist any defeasible criterion for establishing an empirical 
“mind’s eye” view o f mental representation.
In the end, most o f  Giizeldere’s arguments against HOTs o f  consciousness, 
whether higher-order perception or higher-order thought, hinge upon this very weak 
understanding of homuncular activity or upon the fact that no one can fill in the details o f 
neural science to explain the exact order o f representation or information structure o f how
“  'Homunculi ' is being used here for referring to active monitors, in this case a collection 
o f  the brain’s modular subsystems, that executes functions specified entirely in those 
formal terms described by cognitive science.
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thinking takes place in the brain. Essentially, Giizeldere’s arguments gain their strength 
either from our current ignorance o f  neuroscience or our too-easy acquiescence to his 
simplistic homuncular charge (1997a, 798, 799).
3 3.5.4 Supervisory Systems among Modules: Shallice’s Caution
Lycan’s position is nicely compatible with Shallice’s arguments concerning 
blindsight. Neuro-psychology studies o f  blindsight find that consciousness must be posited 
within the scientific investigation o f  this phenomenon. This is because the higher-order 
control systems are in conflict where the language system and episodic memory are not 
coordinated with the contingent scheduling o f motor activities. The conflict occurs 
because no single supervisory system, in Shallice’s view, coordinates all control systems 
simultaneously. Moreover, he maintains, there are a variety o f high-level systems, and to 
say that one system controls all the others is too strong a claim. He believes that equality 
o f  higher-level systems influences the activation o f schemata, each o f which, in its specific 
way, will, if selected, determine which modules will be operative and modulate their 
activities. Normally, however, the various control systems operate in an integrated way.
He believes that the process that corresponds to having a conscious experience is one that 
necessarily involves more than one o f  these control systems. One can therefore see why 
investigators could take any one o f  the different control systems or subsets o f them and 
produce plausible arguments about why the properties o f conscious experience map with 
what is happening in the particular control system that the investigator happens to be 
investigating (1997, 270).
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Ultimately, Shallice cautions that the word conscious cannot be unambiguously 
applied, for strong inputs to one conscious system could interfere with the smooth 
integration o f other systems. If, for example, the supervisory system was in conflict with 
attention scheduling, it would not be appropriate to say of people in the situation either 
that they are conscious o f  how they are acting or that they are not (1997, 271 ). Consistent 
with this, Lycan notes that “it should trouble no one that he or she has proper parts that 
are conscious.” What troubles some “is that he or you or I should contain subsystems that 
are conscious on their own though we know nothing of them, and whose conscious 
contents are not at all like ours” (1997, 765). A monitor functioning within one o f a 
person’s subordinate homunculi might be doing its special job for that homunculus rather 
than for the person himself; for example, it might be serving the homunculus’s event 
memory rather than the person’s own proprietary event memory (763).
Since these monitors are already admitted to be independently interacting, it 
becomes easy to see how the right hemisphere can be called conscious. Although it has 
less homunculi in action, by merit o f it being only half a brain, its intermonitoring activities 
are o f no exception to what would normally go on in a full brain.
3.3.5.5 Taking Sides: Why Lvcan’s HOT over Rosenthal’s HOT
First, Lycan’s view fits so nicely with module theory. We know, for example, that 
different components o f  visual processing are broken down into distinct processing areas 
and that different components of the visual system monitor one another. Since the 
morphology of vast interconnections in the visual system are not exceptions to the
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morphology of the brain in general, we are justified in thinking that such division and 
monitoring, “scanning” to invoke Lycan’s term, happens throughout the brain.
Second, Rosenthal is committed to both naturalism and a respect for evolutionary 
considerations. That much is agreeable with Lycan’s position. Rosenthal, however, thinks 
that the higher-order representations are not best thought o f as perceiving (or, better, 
scanning) some part or parts o f  the brain. Instead, he thinks the higher-order 
representations are thoughts. Rosenthal does not hold consciousness to be an intrinsic 
property, but a relational one. Consciousness is not a higher-order thought causing a 
lower-order mental state to be conscious, but the consciousness apparently emerges as the 
relation between a higher-order thought and a lower-order thought. One will feel only as 
comfortable with Rosenthal as one feels with emergent types of properties. But what is 
worse than the mere presence o f  some emergent property is that this emergent property 
must have influence. After all, Rosenthal holds that one conscious state can influence 
another. But not causally. So one is left wondering; But how?
Finally, one who is committed to fully naturalizing consciousness should be 
reticent to use the linguistic, yet ghostly baggage o f talk about “thought.” It makes perfect 
sense to say, “I shall meet you at sunrise,” for we know that the sun does not actually 
move about, and we can translate ’sunrise’ into a precise set o f statements which explain 
the (apparent) phenomenon. So far, it has been quite another matter when speaking about 
issues o f  mind, as when terms such as “mental,” “thought,” and “consciousness” are 
kicked around. I am just enough o f  a reductionist to want to minimize such language, and 
Lycan’s system is more amenable to this bias. Yet unlike the eliminative materialist, 1 do
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not think we need to throw out the traditional vocabulary o f mind any more than we need
to throw out, say, the traditional vocabulary o f  astronomy. The sun mc.v; the sun seis.
Planets circle the sun. We look up to see stars. The case is similar with consciousness, as
Crick and Koch (1997) write:
No neural theory o f  consciousness will explain everything about consciousness, at 
least not initially. W e will first attempt to construct a rough scaffold, explaining 
some of the dominant features, and hope that such an attempt will lead to more 
inclusive and refined models. (278)
Along with fitting so well with module theory, Lycan gives one a way to address 
consciousness with a minimum o f metaphysical scaffoling. So then-although 1 continue to 
draw from Rosenthal where useful, it is hoped this taking sides now will set limits on just 
how far Rosenthal’s notion o f  “thought” can be pressed into the service o f resolving the 
consciousness o f the right hemisphere.
3 3.6 Introspection
Introspection would be the highest form o f  consciousness within Higher-Order 
Theories, for it is consciousness recognizing its own processes. Since I want to claim that 
the right hemisphere is a person, I have interests in establishing what it would mean to say 
that the right hemisphere can exercise its consciousness introspectively.
3.3.6.1 Rosenthal: Introspection and Higher-Order Consciousness
Rosenthal notes that introspection involves more than a mental state being a 
conscious state. Introspection in his view is a kind o f  higher-order consciousness. It has a 
transitive component that one is conscious of—in this case conscious o f  one’s mental 
states. Introspection is a bit more focused than consciousness. Introspecting a mental state
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is deliberately and attentively focusing on that state whereas conscious acts need not be 
so. Consciousness requires no special act o f attention. As he writes, “Every introspective 
state is therefore a conscious state, but not conversely” (1997, 745).
Introspection, then, is a type o f higher-order thought or thinking. “A mental state 
is non-introspectively conscious when accompanied by a relevant higher-order thought; 
introspection occurs when there is a third-order thought that makes the second-order 
thought conscious” (Rosenthal 1997, 745). This is an accurate enough statement so long 
as we acknowledge that thought is still reckoned as a successful operation o f an internal 
scannner or monitor that outputs second-order representations o f  first-order psychological 
states.
3.3.6.2 Churchland: Introspection and First-Person Accounts
Churchland (1997) identifies another important factor o f  introspection—its inherent 
first-person view. He notes that what makes an account a first-person account does not 
depend on the content o f  an account. Instead, a person who gives a first-person account 
has learned to use content as the vehicle o f  spontaneous conceptualization in introspection 
and self-description. He writes, “Only familiarity o f  idiom and spontaneity o f conceptual 
response are required to make it a 'first person account’” (576). We might even become 
familiar with the operations o f the internal scanning process and thus be able to discuss 
first-person accounts in a whole different way. Churchland gives us a picture o f  how this 
might occur:
We all o f  us, as children, learned to use the framework o f current folk psychology 
in this role. But it is entirely possible for a person or culture to learn and use some 
other framework in that role, the framework o f cognitive neuroscience, perhaps.
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Given a deep and practiced familiarity with the developing idioms o f  cognitive 
neurobiology, we might learn to discriminate by introspection the coding vectors in 
our internal axonal pathways, the activation patterns across salient neural 
populations, and myriad other things besides. Should that ever happen, it would 
then be obvious to everyone who had made the conceptual shift that a completed 
cognitive neuroscience would constitute not a pinched and exclusionary picture o f 
human consciousness, one blind to the subjective dimension o f  self [. . .] Rather, it 
would be the vehicle o f  a grand reconstruction and expansion o f  our subjective 
consciousness. (576)
Whether it all comes to a “grand reconstruction” or not, at the very least it looks like one 
could in principle make sense o f introspective talk using a different vocabulary than what 
has traditionally been the case.
3.3.7 Two Challenges to Consciousness as One Thing 
1 have been discussing the essential features o f  consciousness, trying to establish 
consciousness as some one thing—or at least to establish that there is some one aspect o f 
consciousness to which I am referring. If there really is no singular thing, no Cartesian 
theater o f  mind as Dennett would say, then perhaps it is a multiplicity o f  processes. Is any 
talk o f  consciousness as one thing a reification, an abstraction singularized from a 
multitude of abstractions about various functions?
Or from another angle, if consciousness is really not one thing, then perhaps it is a 
mistake, as Wittgenstein would say, “to speak o f ‘turning my attention on to my own 
consciousness’ . . . .  This is surely the queerest thing there could be!” (Wittgenstein 1958, 
Sec. 412, 124e). Is it possible that beings could be all that we are physically, and yet there 
be no phenomenological tinges o f  consciousness within such “zombies”?
In sum, consciousness might be a plurality, or consciousness might not be at all. 
That consciousness is and is one thing must be defended against both these contenders.
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3.3.7.1 Challenges from Dennett: It’s More Than One Thing
Although Dennett’s position ultimately creates problems for understanding 
consciousness as one thing, his position on how the brain operates as a conscious mind is 
consistent with the general, Lycan-friendly position that has been developed up to now. 
W hatever other concepts we subsume into consciousness, it is also and perhaps most 
importantly an intentional system’: “We take an the intentional stance towards a system - 
a person, a bat, a computer - when we attribute rationality to the system and predict what 
the system will do given the beliefs and desires ascribed ” (Flanagan 1995, 186-187).
Dennett (1995) argues that “the way to explain the miraculous seeming powers of 
an intelligent intentional system is to decompose it into a hierarchically structured team of 
ever more stupid intentional systems, ultimately discharging all intelligence debts in a 
fabric o f  stupid mechanisms.” And Dennett himself accepts Lycan’s labeling him as a 
homuncular functionalist (240).
Dennett (1995) believes that consciousness is tied to one o f two senses he 
distinguishes for dubbing a creature “aware.” One sense o f  awareness’ is cashed out in 
terms o f  the creature’s behaviors while the other sense o f ‘awareness’ is cashed out in 
terms o f  a creature’s linguistic reports. The prior can apply merely to “honey bees and 
thermostats alike” ( 238) while, in addition, the latter can apply to beings like us, who “are 
speaking creatures (we have a sort o f print-out faculty), and—at least to a first
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approximation—that o f  which we are conscious is that o f  which we can tell, introspectively 
or retrospectively” (Dennett 1978, 152).-*
Prima fade, it looks as if only creatures that can speak would count as those that 
are aware in the important sense for consciousness, but it seems pretty straightforward 
that users o f sign-language, indeed users o f any communicative vehicle that could move 
propositional information back and forth, would count as a “speaking creatures” in 
Dennett’s view
Dennett argues vehemently against Cartesian materialism—thzx there is a central, 
physical place where phenomenal consciousness or a theater o f the mind all comes 
together (Dennett and Kinsbourne 1997, 141). The worry here is that the same old 
philosophical mistake is being made, even if the stuff o f mind has been negotiated. Take 
Descartes’ pineal gland and add more neurons, move it to the left side o f the head, and, 
surprise, once again we are playing the same philosophical game that Descartes played 
around 1641. In Cartesian materialism, one has discarded the Cartesian dualism where 
some singular part o f the brain mitigates the interaction o f two different substances, but 
one has not discarded the associated imagery o f  a central material place where it all comes 
together, a central locus in the brain (143).
Note, however, that Cartesian materialism is not quite the same as saying there is a 
functional place in the mind where all conscious events occur as a system; this latter view 
would be what Block titles Cartesian modularism (1997a, 178). Such a modularism fits
Originally he labeled these distinctions “computational-” and “public-” access, but he 
admits to redrawing these distinctions in different ways later in his career to account for 
various objections and suspicions on the part o f  his readers.
nicely with my Lycan-friendly position and provides good support for the position that the 
right hemisphere is conscious.
One might take a stance that it really is a confusion to think o f split-brain patients 
has having a split consciousness, at least on D ennett’s “Multiple Drafts” view o f the 
stream o f consciousness. Really, all one has done is further separate the several, already 
separate discriminatory and representational cerebral mechanisms concurrently operating 
in the human brain. There is no Cartesian theater o f  the mind where all o f  these 
discrimination mechanisms present their results. Discriminations are made only once 
(Dennett 1997, 84). The distributive content discriminations yield what we can take as a 
narrative stream o f consciousness, but it would be a mistake to suppose, argues Dennett, 
that there is a final single narrative, a special draft among the many drafts o f  discrimination 
that is the true consciousness.
I begin by claiming that no one can legitimately deny that the brain is a massively 
paralleled network device. There are indeed many simultaneous operations occurring 
among a terrifying complexity o f  neurons and other cellular-like structures. But how are 
we to interpret the continuity o f  memory? 1 do have many memories, and they give me a 
“vector” o f presentation; there is a sequence where it is recognized that some memories 
are chronologically prior to other memories. These memories are not isolated, but they are 
a unified collection.
The fact that there is a vectored collection o f  memories—somewhat discrete, 
somewhat interrelated—perhaps just is what we mean by a Self, or at the very least this is a 
necessary component o f  a self. (I directly address such issues in part three. Coherence o f
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Identity.) Dennett seems to be playing off the classic “Problem of the One and The Many,” 
when he says:
Look, there is all these different types o f memories, tactile, sensual, memories o f 
our imagination, event, memories o f our kinetic movements, etc., but it is just plain 
wrong-headed to presuppose that there must be some single representational state 
in the brain (smaller than the whole brain) where the results o f all the various 
discriminations are put into registration with each other. (1997a, 85)
A lot rides here on what we read into “state.” In as much as the brain has a module that
both encodes memories and encodes a vector for those memories—this would be akin to a
type o f linked list—perhaps this is just what we should claim: that there is a place (though
apparently not the same place) where various discriminations register with one another. If
so, one can abstract out the constituents o f the Self, which is of interest to both cognitive
science and philosophy.
One suspicion here, when 1 speak o f abstracting out the constituents o f the Self is
that 1 do not seem to be differentiating myself from Dennett’s position, for he would reply
that what 1 call ‘the S elf is actually an abstractum’’ which has been developed merely by
my taking an intentional stance toward some complex system (i.e, the brain). In this case,
the Self cannot be located at a concrete physical location, e.g., in the right hemisphere.
Still, Dennett (1987) holds that we “really do” have desires and beliefs just the way we
“really have” a center o f  gravity and the Earth has an Equator (53).
1 am not so sure what this position comes to. It seems very natural to say that my
beliefs, desires, intentions, etc. which 1 find within my Self cause me to act the way 1 do;
Other examples o f abstracta are perfect circles, straight lines, centers o f  gravity or other 
useful constructs involved in the explanation o f a specific natural phenomenon
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yet, to say the Earth’s equator causas something is a confusion. Clark (2001 ), recounting
Rudder-Baker (1994), makes a similar complaint against Dennett:
If beliefs are to have such causal efficacy they cannot be “merely stance- 
dependent,” but must instead be real features o f  the world, irrespective o f  anyone’s 
possible predictive strategies. One way out would be to treat causal efficacy as 
itself a stance-dependent feature But there is no sign that this is Dennett’s wish 
and his avowed realism about ordinary physical phenomena seem to point the other 
way. Rudder-Bakker thus accuses Dennett o f  widespread inconsistencies in his 
use o f the idea o f  beliefs, etc. as stance-dependent features. (Clark 2001, 58)
More generally, it is very unclear what Dennett means by calling the mental class of
abstracta “real.” However, in Part Three o f  this project, I shall put forth what 1 call
Individuation Theory. It will also state that the mind (and its associated properties like
beliefs, desires, etc) is real, but it avoids the problems that plague Dennett’s account.
The Self is that something that is easily lost in analysis when the vectored
component o f memories is ignored. Consciousness moves into personal identity when
careful investigations o f this vectored component are made. Common sense seems to
indicate that our experiences o f  events occur in the very same order that we experience
them occurring. For example, if I see a bird, a bee, and a tree, my seeing o f the bird
occurred before my seeing o f  the bee and the tree. But Dennett is not arguing with this
macroscopic duration o f our attention to psychological phenomena, but with the
microscopic duration.
When events are constricted to narrow time frames o f a few hundred milliseconds,
our presumption o f this clean vectored order o f subjective experience breaks down.
Dennett would point out that even on the macro-level there is constant editorial revision at
the duration between an event and a subjective remembrance o f when that event occurs.
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We tend to re-manufacture internally coherent, simplified renderings o f what are taken to 
be the most important elements (Dennett and Kinsbourne 1997, 169), However, at the 
micro-event level, different attributes of our experienced events are extracted by different 
neuro-facilities at different rates. Further, we respond differently about our content of 
experience, depending upon the relative timing o f  the inputs to our experience and the 
latency between that input and our reporting o f the experience.
Here is Dennett in a slogan; depending on when you ask delineates what you get 
One might get any number o f narratives, none o f which is the stream o f consciousness. 
Dennett writes, “Most important, the multiple drafts model avoids the tempting mistake of 
supposing that there must be a single narrative (the final or published draft) that is 
canonical—that represents the actual stream o f consciousness of the subject whether or 
not the experimenter (or even a subject) can gain access to it” (Dennett and Kinsborne 
1997, 144).
I must disagree here with Dennett and Kinsbourne. They are correct that looking 
for an actual thing, a final stream o f consciousness, is not helpful. But the stream of 
consciousness must be taken as what a mind is disposed to report about its introspective 
states at any given time. Now people most likely cannot report everything they were 
thinking at some moment, for some things will slip away just by merit o f their turning their 
attention to the act o f reporting.’*' If we mean anything more than the disposition to 
report, then we run into the various problems o f finding some magical theater, and
1 think this would stand as yet one more limit (in a pile o f many) on what can be learned 
by introspective methods o f  psychological investigation.
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Dennett has pointed out this is not helpful and, indeed, confusing. At any given time, the
mind has an introspective unity, and this may or may not correlate with recurring
information patterns moving around the brain during perception and experience. 1 need
take no stand on this here. Although one may have access to that unity partially, and even
inaccurately, as Dennett often loves to show, we regularly privilege what people report
about themselves, which is why the stream o f consciousness is best conceived as a
person’s disposition to account for his or her own unity o f thinking over time.
Flanagan (1997c) admits that consciousness is not a sensitive detector of the
“gappy” features o f brain consciousness, but he does not see this as a threat to the
objective stream-like character o f consciousness. Flanagan notes that the evolutionary
design o f consciousness has not been adequately developed in neuroscience, and he
reconsiders whether Dennett’s discussions o f cascading saccadic eye movements are some
sort o f  threat to there being a stream of consciousness. “In the blind spots in our visual
field,” Flanagan writes,
consciousness does not pick up all the information in the world. There are the 
visual blind spots, and there is much that we simply fail to consciously notice. But 
who would have thought otherwise? [. . .] The fact that there are things in the 
world we miss at each and every moment has no direct consequences for the 
stream-like quality o f  consciousness. We must be careful, as James says, not to 
infer gaps in the conscious stream from gaps in what we know about things in the 
world. (90)
Ideally, the collection o f  all propositions that the mind would acknowledge as true, the 
grand concatenation o f  all o f  these, just would be The Narrative, The Stream of 
Consciousness, or, as Dennett would hate to hear it, the True Version o f  conscious
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experience. We never get this completely, but it is always there in one dynamic form or 
another.
Up to now I have been discussing various essential features o f consciousness, and 
trying to establish consciousness as some one thing against Dennett’s Multiple Draft 
charges. 1 have found his complaints unconvincing. 1 now move to discuss whether 
consciousness might not be anything at all
3.3.7.2 Challenges from “Zombies” : It’s Less Than One Thing
Dennett and Kinsbourne ( 1997) argue that an event is spread over the brain in 
space and, therefore, in time and that the various drafts o f  the event should not be labeled 
some as consciousness, some as not; for, this would be arbitrary. While 1 have given 
reasons to reject this, Ned Block ( 1997a) asks a slightly different, though nagging 
question. Worrying about the special, qualitative phenomenal feel o f consciousness, he 
writes, “What if some of the brain representations of an event making up this spatio- 
temporal volume are phenomenally conscious whereas others are not?” (175)
Block goes on to note that it is //«//-arbitrary to label some events in the brain as 
conscious if there is something distinct about those brain events at the neuro-level that 
marks a difference between brain representations that are phenomenally conscious and 
those that are not. Block accuses Dennett and Kinsbourne as supposing that phenomenal 
consciousness just doesn’t exist but complains they never give an argument to that effect. 
Block also points out that the spectrum o f consciousness for these modules may not be 
purely phenomenal conscious or not, as there may be no definite answer as to when the 
module is actually phenomenally conscious or not (1997a, 175, 176).
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Block’s worries about phenomenal consciousness prompt consideration o f a very 
controversial aspect o f consciousness in general, one that often goes under the name 
qualia. By this is meant the distinctive feel o f our experiences, the “what-it’s-like” aspect.
In order to address this concern over phenomenal consciousness in the right 
hemisphere, 1 will first give a short, general survey about qualia. 1 will second, consider 
whether there might be (in principle) entities that are in every other way conscious like us, 
yet without phenomenal consciousness (qualia). My particular concern is that the right 
hemisphere has been suggested as possibly being an automaton by Nagel (1991 )’’, and as 
such might be an instantiation o f  what philosophers o f mind call a “Zombie.” The more 
general worry is that while I have been advocating consciousness as a special type o f 
higher-order thought, and have done this by cozying up to Lycan's internal scanner 
version, there is another side o f  the issue to be addressed; "what it's like" to be a mind in a 
certain state. If I hold that conscious mental states have a phenomenal feel to them, and 
that the right hemisphere has conscious mental states, then I must show that it's a least 
possible to account for qualia o f  a right hemisphere. If zombies have no conscious mental 
states, and it turns out that the right hemisphere is a zombie, then my overall position is
This is not Nagle’s own position, but only a worry on his part, for in complaining that 
the right hemisphere’s activities are too elaborate to be regarded merely as a collection of 
unconscious automatic responses, he assumes without argument that the right hemisphere 
is “too intentionally directed and too psychologically intelligible” (Nagel 1991, 435). I am 
addressing the worry without making such a convenient assumption.
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threatened. I now move to meet these concerns.
3.3.7 2.1 Consciousness and qualia
Operaiionalism's limits. An ineffective way to treat qualia is as operationalized
behaviors. One simply lawfully correlates internal physical activities with verbal accounts
o f the subject, and then eliminates any alleged middle-entities, or “ feels”, as fictional.
Bisiach (1997) finds this limiting, and tries to set the matter in a different light:
Although I would hardly describe myself as having inside experience o f the 
particles that constitute the complex physical system I am, I strongly oppose 
defining as “fictional” or “eliminable” the inside experience inherent in some states 
and processes o f  that system. This does not imply regarding that experience as a 
mysterious nonphysical accompaniment o f  those states and processes. That 
experience is my “point o f view.” That is the way it is. The bat, 1 presume has its 
own. Why on earth should they be “eliminated?” (237)
There is something it is like to have a point o f view. Humans, and presumably other
creatures with enough complexity (hence the reference to the bat), have certain inherent
components to some o f  their conscious states. Bisiach describes his position in a first-
person view, “wry point o f view.’” He is hardly a psychological introspectionist, but he
believes it methodologically fruitful to grant a phenomena! experience to the other, for this
presents “the only possibility we are given to learn indirectly about consciousness when
we study the more empirical and scientific aspects oriented o f  brain lesions” (238).
There is good reason to appreciate Bisiach’s distaste with a pure operationalism.
Clinical and experimental data, collected from patients suffering from spatial and unilateral
neglect and related orders, strongly suggest that conscious experience rests on
mechanisms distributed over brain circuits, even if this mechanism o f  distribution is very
poorly understood (Bisiach 1997, 250). Pure operational definitions—how the subject
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reports, or acts, in a given context, or some favored sum of such empirical measuring— 
give us “conflicting conclusions” when we refer to different operational definitions or 
when the corpus o f  empirical data varies (251 ). One result o f this is that a general 
skeptical view o f consciousness can arise.
Brains with qualia posit qualia to other brains. What is it, to take up Bisiach 
method, that 1 claim to be real o f myself on the basis o f my own first-person information?
1, Brint, claim with certainty that 1 have qualia, and 1 want to attribute these to other 
human beings Why do 1 do this? A little adjustment o f Block (1978) is helpful here:
“Since /  know that /  am a hrain-heaJed .system, and that I have qualia, /  know that brain­
headed systems can have qualia. So even though /  have no theory o f  qualia that explains 
how this is po.ssihle, /  have overwhelming reason to disregard whatever prima facie doubt 
there is about the qualia o f  brain-headed systems” (281) .’*
Nagel and Transcendentalism: Qualia can 7 he captured by physical facts.
Nagel’s pivotal article “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” has offered much grist for lovers o f 
qualia. Too much on White’s (1997) view, who identifies Nagel as holding a 
transcendental theory o f mind. Generally speaking, for a transcendentalist the feeling o f 
“what it is like to be in pain” (or some other conscious state) is not captured by physical or 
functional descriptions. Being in pain is exclusively a first-person fact and cannot be 
reduced to third-person facts, no matter how intricate or rigorous the details of neuro­
physiology are. As White claims, “For the transcendentalist, mention o f  the subject’s
’* Quoted in Güzeldere 1997b, 40-41; each "we" changed to "I"
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physical states brings us no closer to what the subject feels than does mention o f  the 
subject’s functional states” (697).
I end up taking a position counter to Nagel’s transcendentalism, for I claim that 
there is at least in principle some collection o f  third-person descriptions presumably 
mapping facts in the physical world that could give us an explanation o f  the qualitative 
character o f experience.
Distinctions a la Ned Block. Earlier, 1 reviewed one o f Pinker’s senses o f 
consciousness, namely in terms o f consciousness having access to information. The 
“access-” / “phenomenal-” consciousness distinction is an important one I also have 
already noted that Ned Block likewise (and much earlier than Pinker) draws a distinction 
between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness (or “qualia”). In addition. 
Block also draws a related distinction when he lays out two different conceptions o f the 
mind, the “computational” and the “biological.”
The first conception, the computational, holds that all activities o f  the mind, 
including consciousness can be captured with notions of information processing, 
computation, and function in the system (Flanagan 1997a, 360). Block points out that this 
often goes under the guise o f  functionalism, that the mind is just a local abstraction that 
allows for multiple realizations. According to the functionalist, there might be multiple 
realizations of how our mind gets implemented, just as there can be multiple realizations o f 
how a computer is implemented.
The second conception, the biological, does not see multiple realization as a 
neutral matter for phenomenal consciousness or consciousness in general. If phenomenal
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consciousness and access consciousness are identical, but we have just not had the science 
to see it, then this would make the functionalist correct. But the biological advocates 
worry that the realization stuff does matter, and there could be, indeed probably would be, 
in this view, divergence between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness.
Functionalist responses. The functionalist is going to claim that if one has the 
highest quality o f  access consciousness, then he or she would indeed have phenomenal 
consciousness. Thus, there is some argument that there could not be, for example, a blind 
sight person who had the highest quality access to information in his access consciousness 
and lacked phenomenal consciousness (Block 1997c, 386). Block worries that the 
possibility o f  there being one type o f “Zombie” or another could get around this 
functionalist view. I now move to consider zombies.
3.3.7.2.2 Zombies
Among the several problems of consciousness is a specific one concerning the 
qualitative character o f  our experiences: How can there be something it is like to be a 
mere physical system? The problem also applies to the split-brain patient when we ask, “Is 
there something it is like to be a split-brain consciousness*’” Why should one think a 
Sperry-isolated right hemisphere is conscious in the phenomenal sense? Would it make 
sense to call the Sperry-isolated, right hemisphere a zombie?
A ‘zom bie’ is a class o f “creatures which have information processing that is the 
same as ours but which have no phenomenal consciousness” (Block 1997c, 379). Zombies 
can also be parceled out based upon their “being mentally dead in one respect or another.” 
These “different respects give rise to different zombies” (387).
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When Thomas Nagel suggests that the right hemisphere might be an automaton
(Nagel 1991, 435), he is apparently concerned that it functions as an information-
processing device that, unless otherwise tied into the whole brain system, exists without
phenomenal consciousness, which is tantamount to it being a zombie. There are two
responses one could give here.
The first is that such a view is armchair cognitive science at its worst. Block's
wave-off gives a nice summary o f  this:
We know so little about the scientific nature o f  phenomenal consciousness and its 
function that we cannot judge whether the same function could be performed by an 
ersatz’^  phenomenal consciousness module—that is, whether an ersatz phenomenal 
consciousness module could inject its representations with ersatz conscious 
content that would affect information processing the same way as real conscious 
content. There is much o f  interest to be said about this idea and its relation to 
other ideas that have been mentioned in the literature, but I have other fish to fry, 
so I leave the matter for another time. (379)
More generally, since we know so little in cognitive science about how phenomenal
consciousness might be explained, we should not too readily decide what is unexplainable.
The second response is that our deep ignorance o f the scientific nature o f  qualia
seduces us into thinking that we are conceiving something possible -  in this case, zombies
— that is in fact not possible were all the data available.
I should now like to take a moment to discuss how a particular type o f  explanation
operates in science and to show just how that type o f  explanation allows for zombie
thought experiments to make trouble.
29 Meaning “substitute” or “synthetic.” The word usually suggests inferior quality.
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Generally, when we give explanations in science, we are reducing one set o f 
phenomena to another. A standard example is reducing that otherwise clear, cold flowing 
substance called “water” to H ,0. So perhaps we can likewise reduce qualia to some brain 
state—for example, pain to c-fiber firings (or, more generally, qualia X = functional state 
F). In that case, we are seduced into thinking that the following two statements come 
under the same type o f  theoretic reduction:
1 Water = H^O 
2. Pain = C-fiber firings 
O f course this is not the case. Levine (1997) details how the theoretic explanations o f 1 
and 2 differ:
If we consider the apparent contingency that attaches to (2), we notice that it 
works in both directions: it is equally conceivable that there should exist a pain 
without the firing ofC-fibers, and the firing ofC-fibers without pain. However, the 
apparent contingency o f ( l )  only works in one direction. While it is conceivable 
that something other than HjO should manifest the superficial macro properties o f  
water, as Kripke suggests, it is not conceivable, I contend, that HjO should fail to 
manifest these properties (assuming, o f course, that we keep the rest of chemistry 
constant). This difference between the two cases reflects an important 
epistemological difference between the purported reductions o f  water to H ,0  and 
pain to the firing ofC-fibers: namely, that the chemical theory o f  water explains 
what needs to be explained, whereas a physicalist theory o f  qualia still "leaves 
something out." It is because the qualitative character itself is left unexplained by 
the physicalist or functionalist theory that it remains conceivable that a creature 
should occupy the relevant physical or functional state and yet not experience 
qualitative character. (548)
Zombies are just an instance in which we have conceived o f something without the
relevant quality o f  experience and yet with the relevant functional states.
We can grant that H,0 (and its interactions with other molecules) can explain the
superficial macroproperties o f  water. The way we can tell this explanation has been
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accomplished is to see whether what we know about the macro-properties o f water (its
clearness, temperature, viscosity, for example) are (epistemologically) necessitated by
what we know about the chemical structure o f H^O, “that is, whether we can see why,
given the facts cited in the reduction, things must be the way they seem on the surface”
(549). The chemical theory, o f which H^ O and its interactions are a part, accomplishes this,
but functional theories seemingly do not Absent and inverted qualia arguments also use
this disanalogy as leverage against physical or functional accounts (549).
Qualia, however, has not been as conveniently explained by a functional state.
Perhaps qualia could ht explained by a functional state. In that case, we would find it as
inconceivable that functional state F does not explain a capacity for some qualia capacity
as we do find it inconceivable that H20 does not explain the macroproperties o f water.
Levine details what it would be like to have such a theory:
No matter how rich the information processing or the neurophysiological story 
gets, it still seems quite coherent to imagine that all that should be going on 
without there being anything it's like to undergo the states in question. Yet, if the 
physical or functional story really explained the qualitative character, it would not 
be so clearly imaginable that the qualia should be missing. For we would say to 
ourselves something like the following: Suppose creature X satisfied functional (or 
physical) description F. I understand—from my functional (or physical) theory o f  
consciousness—what it is about instantiating F that is responsible for its being a 
conscious experience. So how could X occupy a state with those very features and 
yet not be having a conscious experience? [ . .  . ] The element o f necessity is 
there[,] for it is clear that if citing the relevant underlying mechanisms really does 
explain how the psychological capacity in question is instantiated, then it would be 
inconceivable that some creature should possess these mechanisms and yet lack the 
capacity. If not, if we could conceive o f  a situation in which a creature possessed 
the relevant underlying mechanisms and yet didn't possess the capacity in question, 
then I would claim that we haven't adequately explained the presence o f the 
capacity by reference to those mechanisms. For we are still left wondering what 
distinguishes the actual situation, in which the creature possesses the capacity, 
from those situations in which it (he or she) does not. (549-50)
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Again, we do not have a functional theory o f  mind. Does this mean that Zombies can 
never be precluded?
One could insist that no amount o f neurophysiological information can produce an 
explanation for qualia, sticking to one’s guns that the conception o f  zombies hy definiiion 
precludes their being brought under third-person accounts As a point o f  logic, therefore, 
they cannot be precluded unless some internal contradictions were shown among the 
concepts making up a zombie (e.g., “ information,” “physical,” “consciousness”, etc.). I 
shall not take this route, so although there might not be any zombies in the actual world, 
they appear to remain ever-present conceptual threats to a complete physical or functional 
view o f mind. However, such a conceptual threat can be minimized.
Consider just what one is conceiving about zombies. Zombies would not be 
scientifically detectable, nor explainable by properties o f the physical world. Nor would 
they be logically necessary for scientific explanation, and they could not serve as empirical 
counterexamples to any experiments. Moreover, unlike the conceivability o f “frictionless 
surfaces” or “idealized orbits”, zombies do not advance empirical inquiry by simplifying 
models. Furthermore, it is important to note that what is (allegedly) conceivable need 
prove nothing about real situations, for what we can or cannot intuitively imagine does not 
preclude (or include) what might happen. Conceiving o f X does not necessitate that X is 
possible.
A classic example o f this was evident in Cantor and Russell’s views on set theory. 
Van Cleve (1998) summarizes:
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Dare we assume that intuition is infallible? Standing in the way o f  this assumption 
is the apparent fact that what one person sees to be true or possible another may 
later show to be false or impossible. [....] Cantor supposedly saw that the 
fundamental axiom o f his theory o f sets -  that for any predicate P there is a set 
whose members are just those things that satisfy P -  was not only possible but 
true. But Russell later showed that this principle leads to contradiction. Since 
Russell’s proof was itself based on intuition, we may say that the fundamental 
obstacle to assuming that all intuitions are true is that intuitions sometimes conflict 
(242).
One is justified in conceiving something only if there are no outstanding defeaters for that 
conception. And by ‘defeater’ is meant “a reason for thinking a proposition false despite 
one’s intuition o f  its truth” (243). Cantor would have an outstanding defeater once 
Russell’s proof was available; thus. Cantor’s conception about the fundamental axiom of 
set theory would be no longer justified were he to see Russell’s proof.(243)
Drawing on van Cleve’s example, the application for someone’s conceiving that 
zombies are possible is straightforward. The advancement o f  cognitive science in 
explaining more and more functions o f  thought is a cumulative-case defeater for the 
position that physical or functional theories cannot explain consciousness. This is 
tantamount saying that the case for zombies grows weaker (for human conscious mental 
states, at least, which is all the right-hemisphere investigator need worry about) with each 
physical-to-conscious-mental-state correlation. As a practical matter the physical and 
behavioral aspects o f other organisms are precisely the sorts o f  evidence that we use every 
day when we attribute consciousness to others. Since the conceivability o f  zombies is 
inconclusive for showing physical or functional explanations o f  consciousness to be
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impossible, 1 will maintain that otherwise acceptable empirical criterion for detecting the 
presence o f consciousness in the right hemisphere are allowable.
3.4 Applying the Essentials: The Right Hemisphere
3.4.1 Introduction
In this section I am concerned with specifically addressing the subject o f the 
consciousness o f  the right hemisphere by applying many of the essentials o f consciousness 
that were identified in the previous section.
According to Corballis (1993), Eccles argues ' that the right hemisphere in contrast 
with the left is a mere ‘computer’ comparable to the brains o f lower animals. However, 
Zangwell is scornful o f  this claim describing this view as 'little more than a desperate 
rearguard action to save the existence and indivisibility o f the soul”’ (212).
Not taking such a computer-versus-soul dichotomy, I have instead argued that 
there is a range along the full spectrum o f  functionality for the brain. Consciousness can 
come in degrees. The detection o f consciousness in the right hemisphere will certainly be 
no easier than the detection o f this in an otherwise normal patient. Anesthesiologists, even 
with the help o f EEG or median frequency machines, have been unable to identify a clear 
boundary between consciousness and unconsciousness. Consciousness is clearly more than 
the sum of behaviors normally attributed to a person who is said to  be conscious. As an 
example of this, there have been focused accounts of patients under general anesthesia 
revealing that many times the patient appeared to be totally unconscious but was 
terrifyingly aware o f  the full surgical procedure being performed! (Güzeldere 1997b, 46).
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At the very weakest, one must keep an open mind that the right hemisphere could 
be, analogically speaking, “along for the ride” with no way to influence events and no way 
to indicate its particular intentions about matters at hand. Yet we need not worry about 
the weak case, as there is much more evidence for consciousness o f  the right hemisphere 
than this.
3 .4.2 Comparison to Armstrong’s Truck Driver Degree o f Consciousness
Degrees o f  consciousness have often been debated from a common example, first
put forth by Armstrong:
My own favorite is the case o f the long-distance truck driver. It has the advantage 
that many people have experienced the phenomenon. After driving for long periods 
at night, it is possible to "come to" and realize that for some time past one has 
been driving without being aware o f  what one has been doing. The coming-to is an 
alarming experience. It is natural to describe what went on before one came to by 
saying that during that time one lacked consciousness. Vet it seems clear that, in 
the two senses o f  the word ["minimal" and "perceptual"] consciousness is present. 
There was mental activity, and as part o f  that mental activity, there was perception. 
That is to say, there was minimal consciousness and perceptual consciousness. If 
there is an inclination to doubt this, then consider the extraordinary sophistication 
o f the activities successfully undertaken during the period o f  "unconsciousness." 
(1997, 723)
In Armstrong’s case o f the long-distance trucker, we have a mind that recognizes various
things over the course o f semi-conscious driving and that performs extraordinarily
sophisticated activities: keeping the car on the road, steadying the accelerator, perhaps
using the brake or clutch.
Were not these acts purposeful? Above all, how is it possible to drive a car for 
kilometers along a road if one cannot perceive that road? One must be able to see 
where one is going, in order to adjust appropriately. It would have to be admitted, 
at the very least, that in such a case, eyes and brain have to be stimulated in just the 
same way as they are in ordinary cases o f  perception. (723).
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Armstong’s truck driver case is probably the most informative (otherwise normal) example 
o f how a right hemisphere need maintain its own degraded ability to recognize objects in 
the experimental context.
In its awareness o f objects in its visual space, the right hemisphere does recognize 
events that happen, and, similar to the truck driver case, these events are not always 
straightforwardly apparent to memory. Does the right hemisphere live solely in the 
present?
It turns out the evidence is against this position, since the right hemisphere can, 
after the fact, draw pictures of things it has selected (like a pipe), and since it can point to 
what was earlier grabbed under the experimental apparatus table. One cannot argue, 
therefore, that the right hemisphere was either unconscious as or only as conscious as the 
long-distance truck driver. The right hemisphere can identify more o f its immediate past 
than either o f these; the right hemisphere is, therefore, conscious to a more significant 
degree. In fact Armstrong notes that the truck driver lacks introspective consciousness, 
but, as 1 show, the right hemisphere does not have this lack.
1 have considered modularism from both the perspectives o f  cognition and 
consciousness. I now move to consider what talk o f modules within isolated hemispheres 
would come to in terms o f consciousness.
3.4.3 Cartesian Modularism; Trivial And Left Prejudiced Versions
Short o f  being a Berkeley disciple, anyone familiar with the brain could agree upon 
a trivial version o f  Cartesian modularism, since I hold that the brain is the module o f our 
body that maintains our consciousness. In this case Descartes’ speculation about the pineal
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gland has been extended to the whole brain; it is the same idea, but the scale is different. 
Instead o f a small collection o f  neurons that control the interaction between the brain and 
consciousness, we just invoke the whole system that does so. O f course, that is what 
makes this version o f  Cartesian modularism trivial; it does not account for some o f the 
parts o f the brain having nothing to do with consciousness, such as areas in the lower 
brain that merely monitor metabolic and respiratory system.
The most convenient place to draw a line for some special module (or set thereof) 
is at the left hemisphere. It has many o f  the analytic abilities we find so valuable for certain 
favored modes o f  reasoning. And it talks! Perhaps a political metaphor is called for: 
whoever controls the media controls the society—in this case the society o f  modules that 
count for being a self.
But such convenience is illusory. This is too rough a way o f putting things. Even if 
the left hemisphere is sufficient for consciousness, it is not necessary. 1 have noted that 
some isolated right hemispheres can also talk, both o f  the Sperry-isolated variety and 
those left in place after a hemispherectomy. Van Gulick’s caution is right: “Conscious 
states differ from unconscious ones in the processes that are involved, not in where they 
occur” (1997a, 181). Too many investigators have been taken in by the public relations o f 
the left hemisphere during Sperry-type experiments, thinking that its relative dominance in 
communication makes it the locus o f consciousness.
3 .4.4 Hypnotic Analgesia and Right Hemisphere Patients 
Block (1997c) notes that Rey (1983, 1988) and W hite (1987) have argued that 
some of our own subsystems, such as the two hemispheres o f  the brain, might themselves
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be separately phenomenally conscious. This would correlate with experimental data on 
patients who undergo hypnotic analgesia, the results o f which can be compared favorably 
to the right hemisphere’s consciousness.
Hypnotic analgesia is a procedure under which a patient’s access to pain is 
blocked by hypnosis. Typically, the patient has his arm stuck in a swirling pool o f  cold 
water and is often asked to give a ranking of the pain. Naturally, after some time has 
passed, normal patients will increase their pain indications while the patients under 
hypnosis will not. A question arises: Are the persons conscious o f  the pain in the sense o f 
phenomenal consciousness, but not conscious o f the pain in the sense of access 
consciousness? That is, do they perhaps have the phenomenal experience o f pain but are 
unable to access this experience in reason and action?
These subjects do have the psycho-physiological indications that normally 
accompany pain, such as an increase in blood pressure and heart rate. The comparison to 
split-brain patients, however, comes up when hidden observer techniques are applied in 
which the hypnotist tries to make contact with a “part” o f the person who apparently 
knows about the pain (Block 1997c, 406). As Block writes, “The hidden observer often 
describes the pain as excruciating and also describes the time course of the pain in a way 
that fits the stimulation” (406).
The hidden observer attests to what I have earlier identified as phenomenal 
properties, in this case specifically, pain. There are tw o ways to think about this. The first 
way is that there are essentially different persons (strong sense) or perhaps just different 
consciousnesses (weaker sense), both o f  which are sharing some part o f the body. The
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second way to think o f  this is that there is just one system, namely the person, who has 
some sort o f disassociation problem.
On the first view, there are independently functioning modules that are not 
dominating the control behavior, but which the patient can report on under these specific 
hypnotic circumstances. On the second view, there is a disassociation, but a question 
immediately arises about how one could have a disassociation without there being 
independent modules reporting in. Put differently, what would it mean to say that there is 
a so-called executive system that is only partially active?
The first view is straightforwardly amenable to Lycan’s position of internal 
scanning, so no additional analysis need be offered. The second view demands taking a 
position on a partially active executive system.
Let me render such a position now. A partially active executive system is a set o f 
independently functioning modules that are not functionally equivalent to the otherwise 
normal computational structure for consciousness (whatever that happens to be). This is 
apparently the case under hypnosis. However, outside o f hypnosis, the modules are once 
again functionally reorganized; the input and output channels for respective modules gain 
full information access to one another. This allows the proper computational state to re- 
instantiate and thus for consciousness to obtain once again in the patient. This is hardly a 
novel phenomenon, as the difference between sleeping and waking states likewise changes 
the functional organization o f internal brain monitoring as, for instance, when our 
memories o f dreams are only fragmentary and often only stay with us for short time after 
waking. The first view is preferable over the second view for the simple reason that
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radical surgical modification to the corpus callosum is at least as effective in re-routing 
and otherwise functionally reorganizing the input and output channels for respective 
modules as any hypnotic analgesia procedure would be.
In the Sperry-isolated right hemisphere o f split-brain cases, we see the two major 
modules o f  the brain disconnected because o f  a corpus callosum cut and because o f the 
experimental conditions. Certainly this counts as a radical functional reorganization o f  
inputs and outputs. Yet the case for the right hemisphere being conscious is far stronger 
than in hypnotic and analgesia, for the right hemisphere has access to and is therefore able 
to guide parts o f  the body. It also has a memory for what it has done in the recent past. 
Furthermore, The less possibility there is for re-integration o f  modular access to mutual 
information flow, the more likely it is (or will be) that there are different persons or 
consciousnesses. Hypnotic analgesia does allow such reintegration-i.e., when the patient 
fully awakens. However, the surgical modification to the corpus callosum precludes mere 
disassociation in split-brain patients, since that modification does not allow for complete 
module re-integration to occur, much less so to occur under Sperry-type experimental 
conditions. Thus, under such conditions, most likely there are different persons or 
consciousnesses, and not just disassociation.
3.4.5 Handed Competition Indicates an Aware Consciousness 
In Goldman's (1997) account o f the referential aspects o f  consciousness, we can 
see that the right hemisphere clearly is conscious because it is aware o f  the objects that it 
points to in reference to the experimenter's interrogations. It is aware o f where to point, 
and it is aware o f  the object it uses to accomplish pointing—the left hand.
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Earlier in discussing block-stacking experiments, it was seen that split-brain 
patients can have competition between the two hands when stacking blocks. Since the 
limb movements were not random, and since they were regularly manipulating objects to 
complete a task, attributing consciousness to the right hemisphere is warranted. The right 
hemisphere has beliefs about where the blocks are, and it desires to change their 
configuration to that which the experimenter requests. Such an action is correctly 
understood as an action o f  an independently minded entity—more generally, o f a 
functioning consciousness.
3.4.6 Nagel and Puccetti: The Same Error on Duality
Functional reorganization is a pivotal issue in analysis o f the right hemisphere’s 
consciousness. Nagel (1991) and Puccetti (1973) make the same error in their analysis o f 
the information exchange among the hemisphere connections o f  a normal brain.
Nagel ( 1991 ) thinks that i f  there really are two minds in split-brain patients, then 
we should have concluded “on anatomical grounds that everyone has two minds,” but we 
just do not notice it “except in these odd cases because most pairs o f minds in a single 
body run in perfect parallel due to the direct communication between the hemispheres 
which provide their anatomical base” (438). Nagel does not think we have two parallel 
minds.
Puccetti, on the other hand, thinks that normal people are indeed composed o f two 
distinct conscious entities and that the right hemisphere is aware o f  this from very early in 
life because o f  hearing speech emanating from a common body, speech that it has not 
generated.
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In their particular views on duality o f  mind both writers erroneously assume that 
the neuro-net would be (IMagel) or already is (Puccetti) operating as functionally distinct, if 
respectively, the two hemispheres were found to be or are found to be independently 
conscious. Nagel thinks positing the right hemisphere as conscious would lead us to posit 
that we always were operating with functionally distinct minds. Puccetti thinks, as a matter 
o f fact, that we always have been operating with functionally distinct minds and should, 
therefore, posit that each hemisphere (hence the right hemisphere) is conscious.
Both views fail because they have not recognized that the right hemisphere’s 
independent consciousness is created by the experimental conditions. The functional 
separation is what causes an independent consciousness to come about in the right 
hemisphere. Braude ( 1991 ), in an aside from analyzing what researchers could hope to 
learn from MPD patients, has a similar view. He notes that the surgical procedure which 
leads to split-brain phenomena “is the clear analog to the trauma which leads to the 
development o f alternate personalities” (142). Just as the alternate personality is formed 
by a contingent set o f  circumstances, so too is the second-mind o f  the split-brain patient 
formed by the circumstances of a Sperry-type experiment. 1 shall further address Braude 
below as 1 make a specific objection to Puccetti. 1 will then move to counter Nagel.
1. Contra Puccetti, the anatomical distribution o f tasks is not a proper basis 
for claiming that humans always maintain a duality o f mind, as when Puccetti claims,
“even in the normal, cerebrally intact human being there must be two persons, though 
before the era o f commissurotomy experiments we had no way o f  knowing this” (Puccetti,
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351) On this view, humans have two independent, conscious hemispheres operating within 
their skull. There are two responses immediately available.
First, as Braude (1991) argues, appeals to split-brain experiments in arguments for 
the claim that the predissociative patient has two minds rests on a dubious assumption, 
what he calls the principle o f “Compositional Reversibility” (CR). Although there are 
several version o f  CR, the most noncommittal rendering is that “predissociative functional 
divisions o f the self are necessary for the occurrence o f  postdissociative functional 
divisions” (139). These divisions may be either (alleged) personality characteristics o f the 
predissociative persons or (alleged) submerged token personalities. Braude gives several 
arguments why both o f these interpretations fail due to their tacit reliance on CR, but one 
is especially germane for my purpose here. I analyze it as follows:
When people observe various forms o f multiple personality, then they think they 
have uncovered an aspect o f predissociative mental functioning. Or it might be that they 
have merely created the phenomena, and that there were no such pre-existing aspects 
within the predissociative patient. Now if they have uncovered an aspect o f predissociative 
mental functioning, then they have either uncovered types o f personality characteristics o f 
the predissociative person (e.g. aggressive, angry, etc.) or they have uncovered submerged 
token personalities o f  the predissociative person (i.e., some distinct, predissociative 
component personality)
It is wrong that they have uncovered types o f personality characteristics of the 
predissociative person, because this would commit one to an “absurdly inflated inventory 
o f original personality components” (Braude 1991, 137). For any given type of
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personality component found in a dissociated persons, there would have to have already 
existed one o f that type suited specifically to dealing with a traumatic event. But there are 
an unlimited genre o f  such events—murder o f  parents by a gun, by an axe, by poison, etc; 
"or murder o f siblings, and another for in-laws, or next-door neighbors, or friends in St. 
Louis, and another for total strangers” (137), all of which would demand a likewise 
unlimited inventory o f  personality components, which is absurd.
Furthermore, it is wrong that they have uncovered submerged token personalities 
because things do not always divide or split into their historical components A table or a 
board, for example, can be broken in half with an axe, "but it would be a mistake to 
conclude that the original object resulted initially from the uniting o f  those two halves” 
(Braude 1991). This would likewise be a mistake for assessing an initial number o f 
predissociative token personalities.
Thus, overall in the case of MPDs, it is wrong to think that one has uncovered a 
predissociative mental functioning. Moreover, and relevant to our point, many observers 
o f MPD have created the phenomena, when in fact there were no such pre-existing aspects 
within the predissociative patient.
This problem o f creating the phenomena is applicable to Puccetti’s views o f  split- 
brain patients as well. Just as it turns out that the functional divisions might result in 
genuinely new alters in MPD patients (as opposed to submerged personalities), so it might 
turn out that “a person can be made to have two minds, or that a person can be made to be 
two persons.”(142). Braude then shows Puccetti s own entrapment by CR:
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Assuming it makes sense to attribute two minds to one person, why not say that 
both postoperative minds are new? Analogously, in cell division (or in slicing a 
flatworm), one gets two new cells (or worms), neither o f  which existed as such 
before. There is simply no problem o f having to decide which o f the two worms 
(or cells) is new. Puccetti quite obviously commits the same error as those who 
argued from the complexity o f  the postdissociative self to the complexity o f the 
predissociative self [....] To show that cerebrally intact individuals have two minds, 
one must argue that two minds are required to explain the apparent disunities o f 
normal mental phenomena. (1997, 723)
The tacit application o f  the fallacious CR principle is clear. Puccetti holds that pre­
commissurotomy functional divisions o f  the self are necessary for the occurrence o f post­
commissurotomy functional divisions o f  the self. Yet Puccetti is tacitly operating with a 
revamped version o f  the token CR principle, and since the CR principle is a flawed, 
Puccetti s position is likewise flawed.
Second, although Puccetti would contend that the empirical data o f split-brain 
experiments also supports his position, this corpus is up for grabs if another theory of 
identity can incorporate the data without remainder and yet avoid appeal to CR In part 
three, Coherence o f  Identity, I will develop just such a theory.
2. Contra Nagel, the dichotomy or multiplicity o f consciousness comes about only 
because a separation o f  neuro-processing occurs without adequate information exchange 
among all or a sufficient number o f  modules. Normally, the corpus collasum^" functions as 
the unifying element that allows but a single mind within humans. It functions to unify the 
brain’s entire neuro-network.” In unifying that neuro-network, it unifies consciousness.
“  Along with the other minor collasal structures mentioned in the discussion o f brain 
anatomy.
” This is loosely stated, since lower brain functions (within, for example, the Medulla 
Oblongata, Pons, etc.) and cerebellum functions do not appear to be functionally linked by
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(Nagel also resists the view that one can actually count the number o f  minds within a 
patient during a Sperry-type experiment. I shall address this later.)
Exactly how much information exchange must occur for there to  be a unified 
consciousness seems in principle to be an empirical matter. However, even apart from the 
intractable technical difficulties, the ethics o f  cutting one neuro-pathway away at a time to 
systematically explore such an exchange would be horrendously out o f  bounds. Still, 
perhaps a non-evasive, controlled shutdown o f  the pathway would be possible—somewhat 
akin to the way a complete, single hemisphere can be anesthetized by a W ada procedure, 
in which a patient has a full recovery after the procedure. If individual neurons could be 
selectively and combinatorically anesthetized, perhaps then the relationship between 
information exchange and the creation o f  a second consciousness could be rigorously, 
safely, and ethically investigated.
3.4.7 Phase-Lock Argument 
Finally, we can argue that the right hemisphere is conscious based upon 
continuing, phased-locked unity o f its modules. Since the right hemisphere is not 
disconnected from the phased pulses o f  the thalamus, the modules within the right 
hemisphere maintain their ability to synchronize communication. Thus, they correlate 
information within and between the different subsystems—recall the 40 Hz waves that 
underlie the visual system—that are still operant in that hemisphere. This synchronization, 
or something along the lines of phase-locked synchronization, seems very promising for 
explaining what binds together the separate modules needed for producing consciousness.
this apparatus.
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The right hemisphere still has this type o f  synchronization; hence, one is as justified to 
claim it conscious as one would otherwise be when such synchronization is present in a 
normal, fully connected brain.
3.4.8 Rosenthal: Creature Consciousness vs. State Consciousness 
The right hemisphere is not in a coma, nor is it in REM sleep or somehow 
oblivious to its perceptual engagement with the world. It hears sounds; it sees information 
under the test conditions. Here, then, it can be said that the right hemisphere has at least 
' creature consciousness” as David Rosenthal puts it. But this doesn’t seem to be the 
mystery in split-brain cases. Instead, the question is, does the right hemisphere possess 
"state consciousness”? (Rosenthal suggests such terminology.) Here, I am asking about 
types of mental states. Perhaps 1 am asking about computational states, or those hidden 
influences that can (allegedly) be brought out by psychoanalysis, and whether the right 
hemisphere has phenomenological awareness o f these state conscious aspects. It is here, in 
state consciousness, that inquiry must be made.
3 .4.9 Lycan: Inner-Sense Theory o f Consciousness 
As I noted earlier, Lycan’s theory holds that conscious awareness is the successful 
operation o f an internal scanner. This internal scanner outputs what he calls second-order 
representations o f  first-order psychological states. By first-order states, Lycan merely 
means the sensory properties that represent features o f physical objects. According to him, 
for example, a color presented in a visual perception is the represented color o f a physical 
object. The second-order states are what results when internal attentional mechanisms are 
directed at such first-order (or other lower-order) psychological states. Ultimately, these
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monitors are not subject to Dennett’s charge o f  Cartesian materialism, which is the view 
that there is a physically realized spatial or temporal turnstile in the brain where all o f the 
integrations come together to exhibit something to consciousness
The brain is a distributive mechanism, as was seen in the first part o f  this 
investigation into split-brain patients. The internal monitoring system, therefore, can 
monitor different components o f brain processes. In the case o f the split-brain patient, this 
internal monitoring occurs in the right hemisphere. There is, indeed, an attention 
mechanism that is directed to bond the representational subsystem and stages o f the right 
hemisphere. The mechanism allows the right hemisphere to point to objects in its 
environment, gives recollection o f what it pointed to under the conditions o f the 
experiment, and generally functions as an internal monitor would be expected to function 
in the inner-sense theory as Lycan lays it out.
Lycan’s position on the inner-sense theory conveniently explains why it is that the 
right hemisphere is able to operate as a consciousness. These internal monitors are 
distributed among the parallel processing o f the brain and, although we split the neuro­
connections along the corpus callosum, the distributed nature o f  internal monitoring is still 
able to coordinate the functioning subset o f  subordinate homunculi, in this case 
subordinate modules, o f an overall self. The system need not be the same single, special 
place where it all comes together, even if there is some functional place where it comes 
together as a coordinated, functioning subset.
3.4.10 Memory Vector Argument
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Lulled in the countless chambers o f the brain, our thouf^hts are linked by 
many a hidden chain: awake but one, and in, what myriads rise!
— Alexander Pope
I earlier discussed Dennett’s Multiple Drafts view on stream o f consciousness. 1 
argued that a memory vector approach was necessary to account for a self and that the 
stream o f consciousness must be identified by what a mind is disposed to report about its 
introspective states at any given time. While the right hemisphere cannot speak, it can 
report, can answer yes or no questions based upon propositions representative o f its own 
introspective dispositions. Hence, one could ask thumbs-up or thumbs-down questions o f 
the right hemisphere: Did you choose the shovel'i’ Did you indicate thus-and-such? Have 
you recently seen a snow scene? Have you recently seen either word A or word B?—where 
words such as “stairway” or “keychain” were represented to the right hemisphere. Since 
the right hemisphere can give an aided report o f the memory vector o f  its introspective 
states, again there is justification to think that it qualifies as conscious and maintains a 
stream o f consciousness as it has been understood in prior discussions.
3.4.11 Right Hemisphere’s Ability at Introspection 
Does the right hemisphere have the ability to perform introspection? Answering 
this would require first that, under the conditions o f a Sperry-type experiment, the right 
hemisphere be given a choice among options: let it look at what it chooses. Later in the 
experiment, the right hemisphere could be instructed to remember what was seen and to 
indicate so by pointing. Finally, the right hemisphere could be asked, “A moment ago, you
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were trying to recall something. Point to what you were trying to recall.” ’^ Here, then, one 
would expect the right hemisphere to point to an object—say, a pipe.
Note how at that moment we would not merely be asking what the right 
hemisphere earlier smv in the experiment. Instead, we were asking what the right 
hemisphere earlier remembered seeing; we are asking it to remember what was earlier 
recalled. Therefore, if the right hemisphere can perform this task, can perform second- 
order recall, we have good evidence o f introspection, for it has used content as the vehicle 
o f spontaneous conceptualization in self-description.
3.4.12 Establishing Consciousness for the Right Hemisphere: Local vs. Extended View 
There are two options one might take in establishing whether the right hemisphere 
is conscious. The first option might be to look at the brain’s information structures and 
processes over time (neuro-firings and seritonin exchange, for example) and determine if 
one can correlate those data with behaviors in the course o f an experiment where such 
behaviors were as good as some otherwise known standard—for example, if they are as 
good as an eleven-year-old would perform. If such a correlation can be made, then the 
right hemisphere would correctly be dubbed conscious. Call this the local view.
The second option might be to claim that the consciousness o f  the right 
hemisphere is such that there is an essential (i.e., empirically unfalsified) relation between
This is somewhat misleading as stated, for in Sperry-type experiments, the patient is 
informed what task is to be followed before hand, and then behaviors are noted while the 
Sperry-type experimental conditions obtain. There is no direct “asking” o f the right 
hemisphere. A nonverbal pointing procedure is almost always used for communicating 
with the hemispheres individually; thus, a similar procedure would have to be in place for 
requesting and subsequently noting right hemisphere recall.
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the right hemisphere’s being in given neural states at a certain time and the right 
hemisphere’s social environment beyond the skull. Call this the extended view. Here, then, 
we would say that even if we had several right hemisphere patients that had, per 
impossible, the exact neural activity occurring over a given time within the skull o f  a 
patient, some might be judged as conscious and some might not be, for there might be 
differences among third parties for when a person is considered conscious. In this case, we 
would be moving beyond the local view, where the consciousness o f patient X is 
exclusively tied to certain structures and processes within the brain. In the extended view, 
any other individual, patient Y, even if an operational duplicate o f X, need not be called 
conscious.
3 .4.13 Social Component and Right-Hemisphere-Only Patients
The local view appears easiest, at least if there were some uncontroversial standard 
o f comparison o f  which quantitative measures could be applied. Fool’s gold is not gold, 
however, even if everyone in town says it is and uses it as a monetary unit o f exchange.
But unlike for consciousness, there are uncontroversial quantitative measures for noting 
the difference between the two; hence, each kind o f material can be readily identified. 
Differences abound on what consciousness is and the criterion for detecting it.
We do not have a rigorous physics o f mind nor even a software model that can 
adequately mimic a human mind’s information flow. Thus neither natural science nor 
studies in information structure currently allow us to give a local explanation o f why 
human minds arise as they do from brains. Perhaps they will; but not at the moment. So,
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unlike such devices which can distinguish fool's gold vs. natural gold, we must rely on 
some other device for distinguishing consciousness from "fake" consciousness.
Given this situation, therefore, one cannot totally ignore the social component for 
identifying consciousness. After all, the patient’s life is not suddenly considered lost by 
the experimenter or others present in the room when the conditions o f  a Sperry-type 
experiment obtain. When the right hemisphere is doing its Sperry-type experiment 
activities, or, perhaps when, in surgery, the left hemisphere is put to sleep and inquiries are 
routinely made o f the right hemisphere about what is being held in the left hand, everyone 
around the patient recognizes who the patient is and behaves as if there has been no 
sudden change o f social connection. Glover (1988) has alluded to a similar situation in his 
work on the “ I.” Patients who have had their left hemisphere removed are indeed 
recognized in their social fabric when they return from the procedure. Whether this social 
connection is sufficient for holding them to be the same persons (as opposed to their being 
conscious) is an issue that is addressed later. But their social fabric must be counted as 
evidence toward their being conscious. Overall, then, 1 favor the extended view over the 
local view. Patients under Sperry-type experimental set-ups and even hemispherectomy 
patients are communicated to and are given standard social interaction behaviors by third 
parties when in the presence o f  these patients. I have already taken a position on worries 
about zom bies-that they are inconclusive for showing physical or functional explanations 
o f consciousness to be impossible—but 1 now can make a bit stronger claim: that social 
behaviors preclude the right hemisphere being accounted a mere automaton. The right 
hemisphere is conscious.
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3.4.14 Qualia and the Right Hemisphere 
I noted earlier from Block that some believe the realization o f  “stuff’ does matter, 
and that a functionalist view o f the mind, and in this case, o f  the right hemisphere, might 
not be a neutral matter in terms o f  qualia. In a slogan: Not just structure, but also stuff! 
However, I find this view unconvincing, for if there were some difference that would 
result in different qualia for systems that were made o f different stuff then there would 
have to be some causal component; something, someplace, would have to cause the qualia 
in the two cases to be different. If  there were such a component, then a different 
information structure, a different functional configuration, would obtain. A difference in 
qualia, therefore, would be a difference in function (or subflinctional component) o f mind. 
Here is a counter slogan: Stuff that matters, matters causally!
One might worry that while the causal structure could be the same, any difference 
in qualia could yet be explained merely in terms of differences o f  material stuff. However, 
far before appealing to differences in material stuff, one who makes such an argument is 
lead to take an unwise position on causal influences.
1. Suppose a has material configuration X. Suppose b has material configuration 
Y
2. Now let X cause event El,  and V cause event E2; furthermore, stipulate it turns 
out that El and E2 have the same type of causal structure
3. Moreover, stipulate that qualia Q1 is “what it’s like two seconds after taking a 
bite o f  an orange, and qualia Q2 is “what it’s like two seconds after taking a bite o f 
a dill pickle.”
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On my view, it should be the case that Q1 differs not from Q2, since they have the 
same type o f  original casual influences from E l and E2, and since two things with the 
same type o f  causal influences will have the same type o f  effects.
However, per the worry, Q l  does differ from Q2. One might seek here to blame 
the “stu ff’, the material configuration o f a and b ( 1 ), but one must first move back 
through issues o f  causal influence (2). So one denies either that Q l and Q2 have the same 
type o f  casual influences or that two things with the same type o f  causal influences will 
have the same types o f effects . Now by stipulation in (3) one cannot deny Q l and Q2 
have the same type o f original casual influences; so, one is forced to deny that two things 
with the same type of original causal influences will have the same types o f effects. This 
means one accepts the following as possible: two things could have the same type o f  
causal influences, and yet have different effects.
Yet even if this is possible, which 1 doubt, we regularly observe correlations 
between like causal influences and like effects. Since qualia are not well understood, and 
since brain investigation is only at its genesis, it seems unwarranted, even ad hoc, to hold 
that causal influences can be the same in the face o f differences o f  effect regarding qualia.
Another worry also presents itself. Sometimes the strength o f  argument for qualia 
is based upon these mysterious phenomena not being epistemically accessible. One can 
know all the third-person facts, but not know what it is like. But the Wada procedure 
seems to give us one way to close this gap, for one can recall “what it is like” affer 
recovery or even “what it is like” as the procedure takes hold and during its height. While 
one cannot become a Bat, anyone with two hemispheres can become a split-brain patient
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and introspect before, during, and after the Wada-procedure event. Hence, any qualia 
arguments against knowing what it’s like to be a conscious right hemisphere loses its bite. 
The Wada patient will positively indicate holding objects after the fact. Once again, the 
right hemisphere is best accounted as conscious.
In summary, I have shown that worries over qualia in regards to issues of 
causation and third-person accessibility do not impede my overall project’s goal o f 
showing the right-hemisphere to be conscious. I would like to make a short observation 
about the status o f the right hemisphere as regarding lawful regularities o f its behaviors 
under Sperry-type experimental conditions.
3.4.15 Right Hemisphere and Rational Regularities
Georges Rey (1997) points out that although psychology is not a fully developed
science with fully developed laws, it does loosely have a set o f  laws that could be known
as rational regularities. He describes these regularities as
a creature’s states whereby they instantiate the steps o f  inductive, deductive, and 
practical reasoning. So far, the best explanation o f  such remarkable capacities 
seems to be one that postulates mental processes in the animals whereby they are 
able to perform at least rudimentary inductions and deductions, and are able to 
base their behavior upon some one or other form o f practical reasoning. (463)
I have been arguing that the right hemisphere exhibits such rational regularities and far
more than on just a rudimentary level. Again, we see that the pointing and communicating
behaviors o f  the right hemisphere under Sperry-type experimental conditions are at least
equal to that o f a young child. Certainly the mental acuities o f  a young child are testable,
so the right-hemisphere’s abilities should likewise be testable. Thus, I now move to
discuss a modified version o f the Turing Test which I think can accomplish this task.
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3.5 The Identification o f a Person: A Modified Turing Test
/  tend to view animals, especially furry animals, as conscious~not plants, not 
inanimate crystals, not computers. This might he called "the cuddly-ness 
criterion. "
— Carl Prihram
3.5,1 Introduction
This section considers the determination o f some criterion for counting how many
consciousnesses there are in a patient. Perry (1976) explains that there are two uses o f  the
word criterion in discussions o f personal identity. One concerns the unity relations
between simultaneous events or, perhaps, nonsimultaneous person-stages But the other is
more true to  the root meaning behind the word, which is “way o f knowing” (11). This is
the sense in which the word is used for this project. Perry summarizes:
We might discover that person-stages are stages o f the same person not by 
observing directly that the unity relation holds between them, but by inferring this 
from the holding o f another relation between them. That other relation would be 
our evidence for the unity relation’s holding. Now some philosophers believe that 
there can be such evidence which has a privileged status, which is somehow 
“conceptually guaranteed” to  be, if not infallible, at least reliable, and use the word 
“criterion” for such evidence. (11)
It was noted earlier that one cannot totally ignore the social component of 
consciousness for determining number o f  persons within a patient. I now argue that a 
modified form o f  the Turing Test can be constructed that leverages this social component 
into a legitimate criterion, in Perry’s second sense o f the word, for identifying a 
consciousness. In as much as a person is a consciousness over time, this modified test can 
also be used as a criterion for counting persons. Before that, however, I shall discuss how 
counting consciousnesses is possible.
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3 .5.2 Understanding Versus Counting 
One might worry that since we really have little idea o f  what consciousness is, we 
cannot have much hope for identifying how many consciousnesses there happen to be in a 
split-brain patient. But in reply, one does not have to understand the essence o f  the 
phenomenon in order to count or identify that phenomenon. For example, in the 1600s, 
one may have taken a very thin wire and attached it to a kite and flown that kite on a dark, 
stormy night. Every time electricity hit the kite, the crazy experimenter would certainly be 
able to count painful instances o f  electricity without being able to understand exactly what 
electricity is. Likewise, one can be optimistic about counting consciousnesses even if we 
cannot exactly identify what consciousness is. And this is what one can reasonably expect 
out o f a properly modified Turing Test.
Even if we have come to some agreement on the idea o f  consciousness, there is yet 
a deeper worry. The very idea o f  counting consciousness (and subsequently persons) has 
met with resistance from Thomas Nagel in his pivotal article, “Brain Bisection and the 
Unity o f  Consciousness” (1991). He holds that “the idea o f  a single person, a single 
subject o f  experience and action” (432) is in difficulties, and that this difficulty has 
emerged because o f a too optimistic stance in seeking a physiological understanding o f  the 
mind. Furthermore, he holds that “the idea of the unity o f a person” is one “whose validity 
may be called into question with the help o f recent discoveries about the functional duality 
o f the cerebral cortex”(433).
Nagel’s argument can be summarized as follows: If we are to understand whether 
there are one or two minds in split brain patients, then we must already have “some idea
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what an ordinary person is one o f' (435). Moreover, split-brain patients show us that we 
do not have an idea of what an ordinary persons is. Thus, understanding just how many 
minds these split-brain patients have eludes us.
Clearly his conclusion is incompatible with my whole project. I will proceed by 
showing Nagel’s argument for the second premiss is flawed. My conclusion will be that 
our ordinary concept o f a person as somehow one is consistent with the data we observe 
of split-brain patients under Sperry-type conditions, and that we do in fact have access to 
procedures which allow us to count persons.
Nagel suggests that there are five ways to interpret the experimental data with a 
view toward attributing a mind to the patients under observation. He argues “that each o f 
these interpretations is unacceptable for one reason or another” (435). The fifth o f these 
interpretations -  namely, that split-brain patients “have one normal mind most o f the time, 
while the hemispheres are functioning in parallel, but two minds are elicited by the 
experimental situations which yield the interesting results” (435) -  is the position taken in 
my overall project, and is the sole one I need to address. It turns out that Nagel’s three 
reasons for finding this interpretation unacceptable are wanting.
First, Nagel holds that “in fact it [a Sperry-type experimental situation] produces 
no anatomical changes [in the patient] and merely elicits a noteworthy set o f symptoms” 
(438). This is not right. To the contrary, any change in neural synapse configuration or in 
neural-chemical exchanges is a change in anatomy, since it is a physical change in the 
micro-structure o f the brain. Moreover, concurrent visual reflex action, and more 
generally, proprioceptive awareness, for examples, result in neural-chemical exchange, and
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probably^^ even minor synapse re-configuration. Thus, against Nagel’s claim, there is 
change in anatomy after all.
Second, Nagle claims that “there is nothing about the experimental situation that 
might be expected to produce a fundamental internal change in the patient” (438). But 
there are now good empirical reasons to think this claim wrong. Synapse connection and 
neuro-chemical flow jointly control information flow among the various modules and brain 
pathways. Such information flow leads one to expect, for it is often correlated with, 
changes in thought patterns o f the patient. The hemisphere isolation by means o f  various 
Sperry-experimental set-ups modifies synapse connections and rates o f neuro-chemical 
flow . Thus we have every expectation to think that fundamental internal changes in the 
patient are occurring after all. Nagel can hardly be blamed for his position on this matter, 
however, for non-invasive brain scanning procedures were unavailable and the results o f 
what parts o f the brain correlate with what sensory information modalities were unknown 
to him at the time o f his analysis.
Finally, Nagel asserts the following:
During the time o f  the experiments the patient is functioning largely as if he were a 
single individual: in his posture, in the following instructions about where to focus 
his eyes, in the whole range o f trivial behavior control involved in situating himself 
in relation to the experimenter and the experimental apparatus. The two halves of 
his brain cooperate completely except in regard to those very special inputs that 
reach them separately and differently (438).
Nagel has not appreciated that proprioceptive movement is controlled by areas lower in
the brain, areas which have not been split by Sperry-type experimental conditions, but
"  These reflexes can be sped up by training, which means more (and/or more efficient) 
synapse pathways have been formed.
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which are still mutually accessible to both upper hemispheres. Because of this, Nagel is 
incorrect in thinking that the hemispheres “cooperate completely” in regards to 
proprioceptive activity, since this system, now considered a part o f  the haptic, or touch 
system, normally functions automatically -  that is, without conscious guidance (Azar 
2002 ).
What actually happens is this. Signals from vestibular hair cells that serve as 
mechano-receptors within the inner ear are "passed along the vestibular nerve, part o f 
cranial nerve VIH” (NAN 2002) Although a few axons^^ do project directly to the 
cerebellum, it turns out most o f  these neurons synapse in the vestibular nuclei o f  the 
medulla. Furthermore, neurons o f  the vestibular nuclei project to the spinal cord, 
cerebellum, medulla and pons — again, all areas lower in the brain. This vestibulo system is 
also present in ocular reflex action, for it "helps maintain a steady retinal image if the head 
suddenly moves as in walking, o r running, or orienting to a stimulus. You can see the 
effect o f  the vestibulo-ocular reflex, by suddenly moving the head with an external force. 
While looking at a distant object, notice how the world ‘jumps’ when you hit yourself up 
on the side o f the head!" (NAN 2002)
Since this posturing and behavioral control (regarding the patient’s relation to the 
experimental apparatus) is an automatic response, the two hemispheres, therefore, do not 
“cooperate completely”in their proprioception. In fact, neither hemisphere monitors this 
any more than a normal person, which is to say rarely if ever at the conscious level.
The axon is the generally longer part o f  the nerve fiber that generally conducts impulses 
away from the cell body o f a neuron.
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Overall, then, Nagel's reasoning does not show that the fifth interpretation o f  the 
experimental data (whereby two minds are elicited by the experimental situation) is 
unacceptable. Therefore, his more threatening position that there is no number o f  minds to
A x o n
Figure 8 Sketch o f  nerve cell showing axon and other features (Restak 
1995, 38)
be counted in split-brain patients is undermined. We may proceed, therefore, unimpeded 
in constructing a criterion for counting minds in split-brain patients. That criterion shall be 
a modified Turing test.
3.5.3 What Is the Turing Test?
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The origin o f the Turing Test actually flows out o f what A. N. Turing called ‘The 
Imitation Game.’ It seems that everyone tells his or her own slightly different version o f 
the Turing Test, even Turing himself. The outlines are pretty clear, however. The Turing 
Test is a special application o f  behaviors for identifying some candidate system as a 
genuine thinker (no matter what its internal construction). Clark (2001 ) gives a pithy 
summary:
Turing proposed a test [. . .] that involved a human interrogator trying to spot 
(from verbal responses) whether a hidden conversant was a human or a machine. 
Any system capable o f  fooling the interrogator in ongoing, open-ended 
conversation, Turing proposed, should be counted as an intelligent agent. 
Sustained, top-level verbal behavior, if this is right, is a sufficient test for the 
presence o f real intelligence. (2 1 )
In its original form, Turing had a game in which an interrogator was to determine over
conversation via teletype whether he was talking to a man or a woman. Sitting in yet two
other, separate rooms were a man and a woman with their own teletype machines who
were returning answers. The man was allowed to give any answer in order to deceive the
interrogator while the woman was advised to tell the truth. After setting up this scenario,
Turing suggested a change in players: “We now ask the question, ‘What will happen when
a machine takes the part o f  [one o f  the humans] in this game?’ Will the interrogator decide
wrongly as often when the game is played like this as he does when the game is played
between a man and a woman? These questions replace our original. Can machines
think?” ’ (Turing 1950, 434).
The idea here is for the human interrogator to determine which o f the other two
players is a computer and which is a human. (See Diagram.) The interrogator is permitted
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to ask any question, and the computer is permitted to give any answer necessary to fool 
the interrogator. This procedure is repeated with people o f  various backgrounds 
occupying the position o f  both interrogator and answerer. “I f  the number o f successful 
identifications o f the computer is not significantly greater than the ‘guessing frequency’ o f
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Figure 9 A standard setup for a turing test. (Adapted from Macro vu 2002) 
fifty percent, it is to be concluded that the computer can think” (Copeland 1993, 38).
Could a modified Turning Test be constructed for identifying consciousness in 
isolated hemispheres? What would a Turing Test look like that presents the hemispheres 
to an unbiased observer—i.e., to one not already aware that a hemispherectomy patient or 
Sperry-isolated, single hemisphere is at the other end o f an exchange of communication?
3.5.4 A Hypothetical Modified Turing Test Setup
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Constructing a Turing test for a Sperry-isolated left hemisphere would be 
somewhat o f  a standard exercise. The left hemisphere can talk, thus a voice-to-text 
translator would be useful to carry the otherwise traditional input-to-output 
communication route via teletype. Interviewing the left hemisphere in a Turing test 
context would be very similar to interviewing a person with a particular set o f  mental 
handicaps. Both interrogators and control subjects (i.e., otherwise normal humans) would 
assume their traditional roles. But since the issue o f the left hemisphere being conscious is 
not nearly as controversial as the right hemisphere being conscious, the set-up developed 
from here out will have the conditions o f a Sperry-isolated right hemisphere in the 
forefront.
Consistent with the traditional test, there are no unusual objectives. A modified 
Turing Test is still considered a special application o f  behaviors for identifying some 
candidate system as a genuine thinking person. The internal construction is not supposed 
to be at issue, and it isn't -  or, it is far less an issue when using half a brain as a conversant 
than when using a computer (This shall be discussed in a bit more detail later in the 
section.)
There would have to be some modifications, however. A human interrogator will 
not be able to judge whether a right hemisphere is conscious based upon verbal responses 
originating from the test subject, as Turing first proposed, for the right hemisphere rarely 
is able to speak. So any right hemisphere which is able to convince an interrogator in 
open-ended conversation (mediated thru teletype, or similar device) will have to rely on 
some system o f  selection cues to indicate its responses.
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But the right hemisphere is hardly without any communication resources. It is well 
known that under Sperry-type conditions, the right hemisphere can receive instructions 
and answer queries. The interrogators would have to be informed on what was 
conceptually thinkable by an isolated hemisphere, but would introduce no undue bias into 
the test, since, to use a parallel example, very young children are often tested within 
conceptual boundaries, and the results o f  their mental acuity are correlated with 
pre-understood expectations. Therefore, comparable procedural boundaries for the 
interrogators who participate in the modified Turing test could be arranged after both the 
abilities and the limits o f Sperry-isolated right hemispheres were identified for 
implementation into the set-up.
This attention to conceptual limits might very well demand that there are different 
sets o f control subjects for comparison o f  different abilities. For example, if the right 
hemisphere functions only as well as a two-year-old in line drawing skills, then only 
two-year-olds should be in the control group for the performance o f that particular 
modality. On the other hand, if the modality of evaluation moves to facial recognition, and 
the abilities o f  a right hemisphere operate at a full adult level o f  cognitive maturity, then 
adults should be immediately rotated into the control group. This could be done in real 
time if the set-up and information exchange routing between hemispheres, control 
subjects, and interrogators was planned with sufficient care.
Even with the known conceptual boundaries in place, interrogators still have very 
wide latitude to communicate with Sperry-isolated right hemispheres. Questions o f a Yes 
or No nature could be asked o f objects and situations. Digital pads could relay drawings of
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objects, for example, in ways similar to the methods that Sperry himself used. He would 
often flash two different figures to the isolated hemispheres. When "the subject is asked to 
draw what he saw using the left hand out of sight, he regularly reproduces the figure seen 
on the left half o f the field" (Sperry 1967, 58). Interrogators in the modified Turing test 
would be able to make a full range o f  requests o f  the right hemisphere (and other subjects, 
o f course, all being behind the veil o f  the test set-up) so as to compare its drawings to 
other subjects in the testing context. After all, it is desirable that this modified Turing test 
be able to evaluate the widest possible behavioral modalities.
In the end, and consistent with the traditional Turing test, the idea here is for the 
human interrogator to determine which among the players is a Sperry-isolated hemisphere 
and which is an otherwise normal human. The interrogator is permitted to ask any 
question and the right hemisphere is permitted to give any answer if feels appropriate in 
order to convince the interrogator o f  it being conscious. This procedure is repeated with 
people o f various backgrounds occupying the position o f  both interrogator and answerer 
If the number o f unsuccessful attributions o f consciousness to the right hemisphere is not 
significantly greater than the guessing frequency o f  fifty percent, it is to be concluded that 
the Sperry-isolated hemisphere is indeed a person.
3 .5 .5 Objections and Replies to Use o f  the Turing Test 
Although several different objections can be brought against the Turing Test, each 
can be resolved when this modified version is applied to the right hemisphere.
First, one charge against the standard Turing Test is that the dissimilarities 
between computers and humans are too great to apply the Turing Test as a criterion for
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consciousness. For example, Descartes gave two reasons why a human replica would fail 
to pass for an actual human being. For one, it would be incapable o f  the creative use o f 
language that even the “men o f  lowest grade o f  intellect” enjoy. For another reason, as a 
mechanical device, it could do only what it was constructed to do and would not have the 
flexibility to respond intelligently to new or unanticipated situations (Corballis 1993, 8). 
Yet another reason for complaint o f  dissimilarity is the difference between simulated 
thought and actual thought. And there is a whole line o f discussion regarding Searle’s 
thought experiment o f the Chinese Room, which is often invoked in complaint.
In reply, the dissimilarities disappear when the object o f  the test is a right 
hemisphere. Clearly this standard Chinese Room objection to the Turing Test—that these 
hemispheres are only simulated minds—will not do. The split-brain patient stands clear o f  
the charge o f having non-organic hardware, for at the other end o f  the communication line 
is actual brain matter operating within a functioning human being. Potential language 
acquisition and intelligent response under experimental conditions also leave Descartes’ 
objections unmotivated.
Second, the Turing Test is limited just like any other criterion that is based upon 
empirical evidence: it can never completely establish its case, and its data surely do not 
constitute what is a mind. There are two replies to be made here.
1. The Turing Test does not pretend to be an operationalist definition of mind. No 
logical and conceptual links have been set up between some concept being defined and 
certain operations; and, certainly, no satisfaction o f the operations is alleged to provide
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necessary and sufficient conditions for the application o f  some concept, in this case what is
“conscious.” Moor (2001) further exonerates Turing o f  this charge o f operationalism:
First, Turing never says he is giving an operational definition nor does he discuss 
operational definitions in his article. Second, Turing clearly doesn't take his test to 
be a necessary condition for intelligence, for he admits that a machine might have 
intelligence but not imitate well. After he raises the question, "May not machines 
carry out something which ought to be described as thinking but which is very 
different from what a man does?", he replies, "This objection is a very strong one, 
but at least we can say that i f  nevertheless, a machine can be constructed to play 
the imitation game satisfactorily, we need not be troubled by this objection"
(Turing 1950, 435). Third, though Turing is focused on the sufficiency o f  the 
Turing Test and not its necessity, he never says the sufficiency is a matter o f  logic, 
conceptual, or definitional certainty. There is no evidence for understanding Turing 
as giving an operational definition nor is there any need to do so. (82)
Likewise, the modified version o f  the Turing Test does not allege to operationalize
consciousness, merely to justify that consciousness is present in a right hemisphere.
2. Both the standard and modified Turing Test help set boundaries for determining
if there are any counter-example types o f  behaviors o f what is under consideration for
being a “minded” being. If it turns out there is no appreciable empirical distinction that can
be drawn between by a human inquirer and the object o f  his or her inquiry, whether that
object be the right hemisphere o f  a split-brain human, or even (someday) a machine, then a
conservative stance is called for. Innocence, a pivotal value in Western thought, has
always been given the benefit o f  a doubt in its various justice systems; likewise should
consciousness, the highest property o f  minded, biological systems, be given the benefit o f
a doubt in various epistemic criteria.
Third, the Turing Test is sometimes accused o f essentially being the classical
“analogy o f  other minds” position dressed up for contemporary tastes. The interrogator
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cannot get into the mind o f  the other, so whatever is going on there—teletype behaviors be 
damned—the conclusion that the other players are conscious cannot be maintained. Several 
different replies are possible at this point, but the complaint hinges on knowing what it’s 
“really” like and identifying some other mind’s mental states as being o f the same type as 
my mental states. Let me address these in turn.
1. Granted, when applied to a right-hemisphere patient, a modified Turing Test 
cannot give us the what it is like—the qualia o f being a one hemisphere entity. Indeed, even 
under the conditions o f the split-brain experiments, the patient normally cannot 
introspectively tell us what it is like any more than we can introspectively tell one another 
what it is like to have raw feels. (Keep in mind, however, the Wada procedure exception 
to this noted earlier; even without surgery, non-split-brain patients can come to know 
what it’s like.) The right-hemisphere’s position in terms o f  expressing qualia via the 
Turing test is no worse than otherwise normal people trying to express qualia to one 
another.
The Turing Test gives us an insight into our own third-person approaches to 
consciousness. We generally make observations about other beings that we take 
uncontroversially to be conscious. What the Turing Test does is put a criterion on the 
table, so to speak, showing us at least one set of sufficient criteria that we intuitively use 
to identify conscious entities.
The Turing Test does not tell us what consciousness is ontologically. Neither is it a 
necessary criterion for us to detect consciousness, for people were making claims about 
what was and was not conscious long before the existence o f Turing. Even given these
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caveats, it is still an attractive method; it gives us warrant (see next point) for classifying 
things as conscious or not.
2. We have earlier noted that the Turing Test is not an operational definition o f 
mind, nor in its modified form, o f  consciousness over time (i.e., of personhood.) It is 
merely a rigorous test that, if a machine so passes, allows us to attribute mindedness to the 
machine, now with good inductive grounds. M oor (2001 ) explains, “We would not have 
certainty in such a judgment and we might revise our judgment in light o f  new evidence, 
but we would have sufficiently good evidence to infer that the machine was intelligent” 
(82). Likewise, there is evidence for its application toward establishing consciousness in 
the right hemisphere. Perhaps in interaction with a broad set of human interrogators, the 
warrant for thinking that the right hemisphere is conscious will be negligible, even 
countermanded. But that is the nature o f inductive testing If a cross-section o f people, 
themselves minded beings, find insufficient or no reason to account the right hemisphere 
as being conscious over time, then a new analysis o f just what to make o f  the right 
hemisphere’s state o f mind (or not) is called for. But such testing has not been initiated, 
much less has a “nay” position been established. And even now, with but the prima facia 
evidence we do have o f the right hemisphere’s consciousness over the course of a Sperry- 
experiment, some scientists feel compelled to label the right hemisphere as an independent 
mind with its own consciousness.
Fourth, since the Turing Test applies to machines, which are composed of merely 
non-organic, non-thinking human artifacts, it is only by design that a very complex 
conglomeration o f such devices fools us. Such devices do not enter into social
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relationships by their own initiative—“No mind if by design.” Some of the objections in 
Searle (1980) expressed within his Chinese Room argument carry this idea. In reply, 
Georges Rey (1997) notes that our ordinary notion o f  consciousness can give us 
contradictory intuitions when it is applied or described from a bottom-up view as opposed 
to a top-down view. If one imagines first a non-biological machine and then a program 
that would implement its various mental abilities, we are disinclined to regard it as 
conscious. This would be the bottom-up view. In contrast, if we discover that close 
friends or we ourselves are Just machines, we would reach the opposite verdict, thinking 
that they are conscious after all, even though they are machines. In this case, we would be 
proceeding from a top-down view o f consciousness (478).
3 .5.6 Conclusions
Let me summarize on this modified Turing test. Perhaps it is an understatement to 
note that we are not in a position scientifically to reduce consciousness to mere 
neurological activity, to mere “meat machines” as it is sometimes crassly put. Maybe we 
are not in said position because we cannot be. The very fact o f  reduction in science 
normally carves off the subjective experience and excludes those experiences, by 
definition, from what count as the “real” phenomena. As Searle (1997b) fairly notes, 
“Where the phenomena that interest us most are the subjective experiences themselves, 
there is no way to carve anything o f f ’ (456). The idea o f  modifying a Turing Test is 
merely to identify when we encounter a consciousness. Clearly the right hemisphere is not 
composed o f  human artifacts, even if it does have something like design behind it-that is, 
if the idea o f  surgical intervention is stretched unduly far as a way o f “redesigning” brain
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structure. Yet such a debate on where design begins is moot. In the end, there is no need 
to  produce or justify a reductive explanation for consciousness nor even to take a stand on 
the nature o f mind (more properly, consciousness) at all—other than that there is such a 
thing to be found occasionally in the world.”  The modified version o f a Turing Test seeks 
only to establish that the right hemisphere is indeed conscious. It seeks only to lay out 
controlled conditions for when an identification o f consciousness is warranted, and it does 
this by appreciating the social interaction that commonly occurs when minds otherwise 
confront one another under various circumstances.
35 An Eliminative Materialist would cry foul at this point, but I shall let this pass without 
redress.
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4 COHERENCE OF IDENTITY
Without the ego the episodes o f a life can seem like a heap o f  stones.
~  John Glover
4.1 Introduction
4.1 I “Person” : A Tentative Definition 
While this project is generally concerned with the split-brain phenomenon, it is also 
more particularly concerned with what it is to be a person—that is, what is it to be "an 
intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself the same 
thinking thing in different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness, 
which is . . . essential to it" (Locke 1979, 335). It is widely acknowledged that by 
"consciousness" Locke actually meant "memory" (Noonan 1991, 54). But Locke's 
definition can be usefully hijacked by reloading the term not only with its legitimate 
passenger, memory, but with Lycan's new passenger, higher-order monitoring. On this 
modified position, then, one may loosely and yet accurately speak o f a person as a 
consciousness over time.
Although Locke's prose is pleasing, the worry about personhood is deeper than 
producing a tidy definition that includes all o f  the favored essentials. Definitions can vary, 
depending upon the arena o f  discourse. Philosophy might approach the issue in one way, 
science in another. Ultimately, however, it is desirable that the different approaches agree, 
or at least that they be consistent with one another so that one may speak o f  a coherence 
o f  personal identity. It is disconcerting when both philosophy and science force one to
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abandon common sense notions o f  the self. But radical positions are not necessarily wrong 
positions, so the merits o f  some o f the newer views o f  mind must be carefully considered.
4.1.2 Sketching the Issues
Three issues seem important for analyzing split-brain patients and their functions as 
persons under Sperry-type experimental conditions; identification o f a person, 
individuation o f  a person, and the inward perspective o f  a person. Although I shall be 
especially concerned only with that last two o f these, 1 will nevertheless offer a quick 
sketch o f all o f  them in what immediately follows below.
First, there is the identification o f a person. Typically persons have consciousness 
o f  the self. To claim, “ A self is someone,” is a trivial claim. Yet to claim, “A self is some 
one,” in the numerical sense, some unity—that is not at all a trivial claim. But what gives 
the self its unity, and can this unity be compromised and there still be a self? Who gets to 
make the claim that “this is a self but that is not”? And just what is a “se lf’? Is it only a 
body? Is it a “mind” as distinct from a body? Certainly a person may believe, for example, 
that his unity consists in having the same body, or the same memory, or some such 
“essential.” This is natural enough, for such beliefs are pervasive. But philosophers and 
scientists have offered arguments contrary to such beliefs, and one is often in the position 
o f  having to choose between existentially strong intuitions and empirically well-grounded 
arguments. This problem is suggestive of first-person versus third-person perspectives on 
personal identity
Second, there is individuation of a person. Perhaps considerations o f  being a 
person do not demand the unity that has been naturally assumed. Neurological
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investigations and psychological studies challenge any easy assumption o f  unity. Earlier, it 
was noted that the brain can be divided, either physically (e.g., by surgery) or artificially 
(by a Wada procedure) The surprising result o f  such a division is what appears prima 
facie to be a division in consciousness, or if not a division in consciousness, then a 
doubling or even a creation o f  consciousness. The options o f dividing, doubling, or 
creating consciousness are really at issue in viewing the mind as a potential emporium. If 
the brain can be divided into 2 cognitively functional modules, perhaps it can be further 
modularized into yielding 3, 4 or n number o f cognitively functional modules; thus, 
perhaps consciousness can be divided (our doubled or created) so as to yield 3, 4 or n 
consciousnesses. But divided into what—fragmented persons or new persons, or perhaps 
into something merely resembling persons? Again, these are issues to be explored, and at 
least tentative explanations can be made.
Finally, there is the inward perspective. It is often surprising for one to come to 
understand that “the self I am, is not the self I was.” But it is even more radical for one to 
misunderstand or be outright wrong about the boundaries o f one’s own inward 
perspective. In two ways, one’s belief about one’s own unity could be wrong. First, this 
admission could simply mean the weaker, “I’ve changed.” Events happen, and persons 
find themselves with different dispositions and characteristics. For example, one might 
have had a disposition to retreat from spiders, but then got over it. Or one might have 
been a loving person, but after a military stint become uncharacteristically cruel. These are 
interesting and surprising psychological changes. But a second, stronger and more 
troublesome admission is “I am not the person I thought I was; in fact. I’m separate and
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distinct from the person whom I thought 1 was.” With either admission, the issue of 
memory and its role in personal identity becomes paramount.
4.2 The Individuation of a Person
"She's not me. " "I'm not her. "
- Sara and Rebecca, age 10 and identical twins, upon being asked 
how they tell them.selves apart.
4.2 I Introduction
Whatever other problems split-brain patients present to a philosophical account of 
mind and personhood, two classic questions o f  personal identity immediately arise. First, 
what are the criteria for the numerical distinctness o f persons who have the same general 
description? Rorty (1976) reports that this is sometimes known as the "problem of 
individuation" (2). Second, there is a concern over individual identification, "what sorts of 
characteristics identify a person as essentially the person she is, such that if those 
characteristics were changed, she would be a significantly different person, though she 
might still be differentiated and re-identified as the same?" (2). In the investigation o f 
split-brain patients, the first problem, that o f individuation, is of primary importance for 
my project (although one cannot separate the second problem, that o f identification, from 
any analysis.)
The main thesis o f  my project has been that the right hemisphere o f  the brain has 
its own, independent conscious states over the course o f  Sperry-type experimental 
conditions. I would now like to defend an ancillary thesis as well-namely, that under 
Sperry-type experimental conditions the right hemisphere is a person. This reasoning for
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this is as follows: ( 1 ) Anything that has conscious mental states over time has a unity of 
consciousness. (2) That thing which is identified as having a unity o f conscious is a subject 
o f  mentality. Moreover, (3) since a person just is a subject o f unified consciousness over 
time, and (4) since the right hemisphere has now been shown to have conscious mental 
states; this is why, in the end, it must also be accounted a person.
Premiss (1) merely acknowledges the temporal component o f the Sperry-type 
experimental conditions, for there is a significant duration of time under which the 
right-hemisphere independently operates. Premiss (3) is a commonly held definition of 
person, while premiss (4) is what has been defended thus far in the project. This leaves (2) 
as the key premiss needing defense. In order to defend (2), I must show how we can speak 
meaningfully o f a single subject o f  mentality (that being the patient who sits down to begin 
a Sperry-type experiment) initially fissioning into two subjects o f mentality and then 
subsequently re-fusing back into a single subject o f  mentality. To this end, I offer up a 
theoretical structure which allows us to discuss the fissioning and re-fusing o f  some 
subject o f mentality over the course o f  a Sperry-type experiment, and thus allows me to 
affirm (2) in support o f my overall goal of accounting the right hemisphere as a person.
An Investigation o f  split-brain phenomena will present its own set o f  puzzles 
regarding how the personal identity o f the split-brain patient should be interpreted given 
the phenomena observed under Sperry-type experiments. How convenient it would be if 
there were some theoretical apparatus available with both a controlling concept and a 
subsequent theoretical structure developed from this concept that would illuminate how a 
single mind fissions and subsequently re-fuses over the course of Sperry-type experiments.
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In this section I argue that there is indeed such a structure available, which I dub 
‘Individuation Theory ' Yet I can make a case for such a structure only after I have first 
framed ‘Knot Theory' and ‘Hole Theory' within an even more general structure called 
‘Disturbance Theory'. To this end, 1 first briefly identify Disturbance Theory. Next I 
sketch out a short history and application o f Knot Theory, and subsequently relate it to 
Hole Theory. I next formally reinterpret the semantics o f  Hole Theory to yield 
Individuation Theory. Such a reinterpretation is desirable because the original brain-mind 
relationship is difficult to understand, but Individuation Theory draws on the detailed 
theoretical structure of Hole Theory, and thus makes inferences about the brain-mind 
relationship much more efficient than they would be if we reasoned about them only as 
raw phenomenon.
4.2.2 Disturbances
It turns out that Knot Theory and Hole Theory, or rather their primitive objects— 
i.e., “knots” and “holes”—can fall under a more general and related notion, namely that of 
a “disturbance.” Toomas Karmo (1977) introduced the notion of a disturbance as an 
object or entity found in some other object, “not in the sense in which a letter may be 
found in an envelope, or a biscuit in a tin, but in the sense in which a knot may be in a 
rope, a wrinkle in a carpet, a hole in a perennial order, or a bulge in a cylinder” (147). 
Moreover, knots and holes can be directly perceived as related, for the crossed structure 
o f a knot serves as a host to holes.
This schema for noting the desirability o f Individuation theory was suggested to me by 
(Swoyer 2002).
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4.2.3 Knot Theory
Sailors, weavers, fisherman, surgeons, mountain climbers, not to mention Boy 
Scouts—all o f these, whether for earning money, saving lives, or just saving face at a 
campout, are playing with the encarnalized entities o f Knot Theory. Knots appear cross- 
culturally, both as aesthetic items in artwork and as parts o f  religious ceremonies and, 
obviously, as practical appliances for keeping things connected in the world.
There are hundreds o f diverse types o f knots, and mathematicians, for recreational, 
and more recently, for professional and practical purposes, have been concerned with 
doing mathematical research on these common structures. Mathematical research uses the 
basic rules o f logic and a host o f tools to assemble a priori components in order to 
describe an otherwise obscure structure. “Occasionally the fog lifts just enough to reveal 
unsuspected links between disparate elements” (Peterson 1992). Only a decade ago, few 
mathematicians would have guessed that the study o f knots would join together several 
areas o f mathematical research. But recent studies in Knot Theory have connected various 
mathematical specialties, showing domain specific problems to be different facets o f a 
more general problem.
Given the length o f tenure for other ideas in mathematics. Knot Theory is relatively 
young. The genesis for the systematic study o f knots came more than a century ago when 
chemist William Thompson (who became known as Lord Kelvin) became dissatisfied with 
the then current theory that atoms were hard spheres held together by mysterious forces. 
Instead, he imagined “atoms as minute, donut-shaped vortices o f  swirling fluid embedded 
in a pervasive space-filling medium called the ether” (Peterson 1992). He further
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speculated that these vortices were bound together by forming tiny knots. Later, a 
Scottish chemist, Peter Tait, began cataloging knots and ultimately created a crude table 
where he classified each knot by the number o f  times its strands crossed. Tate and some of 
his associates spent a number o f  years on the project, and in the end they were responsible 
for giving birth to a new field o f  mathematical relationships (Skerrett 1994).
From a formal mathematical standpoint, knots are “one dimensional curves sitting 
in three-dimensional space that begin and end at the same point and never intersect 
themselves” (Skerrett 1994). Linked rings such as the Olympic insignia are considered 
knots. Shoestrings, bowties, and large balls o f string, however, are not knots under this 
technical definition. As De Witt Sumners, a Florida State mathematician explains, “if a 
knotted string has loose ends, it’s really not a knot, since you can always slide a free end 
around and eventually, if you have the time and patience, get back to a nice, untangled 
line” (Skerrett 1994).
The key o f Knot Theory is finding a classification system sufficient to differentiate 
each and every knot by using a single label. Knots are difficult to classify because a single 
knot can be twisted and rearranged into what appears to be a different shape, yet by 
extended rules o f topology classification, it remains essentially the same. Mathematicians 
have proposed different methods for knot characterization—for example, imagining them 
as tubes in tight configurations that give a distinct ratio o f volume to surface area. 
University o f Iowa mathematician Jonathan K. Simon explains that “such methods 
potentially offer a practical approach to knot classification” and “lead us to understand and 
predict how different knot types behave in real physical situations” (Peterson 1996).
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It turns out that knots turn up across all manner o f different areas in mathematics. 
Developments in Knot Theory have provided valuable insights to chemistry, physics, and 
biology and have allowed researchers to form deep connections between problems o f  
characterizing knots and problems within otherwise disparate areas o f mathematics and 
science.
Thanks to these newly recognized connections. Knot Theory is now emerging as a 
powerful tool for solving a broad array o f  problems, ‘i t  explains how tightly coiled DNA 
manages to replicate inside cells. It is helping to find the very structure o f [quantum] 
space. Knot theory is aiding the search for effect antibacterial and anticancer drugs, and it 
may make computer networks more reliable and efficient” (Skerrett 1994). Furthermore, it 
is expected that the applications will continue to expand even further as the theory 
becomes more intricate and the knot theorists turn their attention to other real-world 
problems. This is considered quite an exciting turn out for a branch o f mathematics that 
was once relegated to and derided as “recreational doodling for terminally bored 
topologists” (Skerrett 1994). Mathematician Albert Thaler writes, “it is so satisfying to see 
all this mathematics that we’ve had sitting on the shelf for 25 or 50 years now being put to 
use in a stunning variety o f  disciplines” (Skerrett 1994).
Sometimes the applications o f  Knot Theory come about when physicists find direct 
connections and similar problems between descriptions o f physical phenomena in 
comparison with the structures o f Knot Theory. The most exciting developments are in 
quantum mechanics and in molecular biology.
In 1984, Vaughn E. R. Jones at the University o f California, Berkeley, found a 
connection between Knot Theory and mathematical techniques that undergird quantum
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mechanics. His particular breakthrough came when he discovered a powerful new method 
for labeling knots. “Much to everyone’s surprise, his startling new approach shared 
equations with quantum physics and statistical mechanics, the study o f systems with a 
massive number o f components” (Skerrett 1994). Lewis Kaufmann, a mathematician from 
the University of Illinois at Chicago, who is widely credited with exploring the connection 
between Knot Theory and the physical sciences, writes that “the discovery that Jones 
made linking statistical mechanics and knot invariants [formulas that describe knots] 
immediately got people wondering how close this relationship was and where else it might 
lead” (Skerrett 1994). Two other physicists. Carlo Rovelli and Lee Smolin, were doing 
work on the fabric o f  space and noticed that a new translation o f  Einstein’s equations bore 
an uncanny resemblance to equations drawn from Knot Theory. Rovelli suggested building 
the new translation’s equations with different knot polynomial equations that described 
specific types of knots. This went some way toward unifying a theory o f  quantum gravity 
with general relativity and quantum mechanics (Skerrett 1994).
Another application o f  Knot Theory is in molecular biology. Lipkin notes that 
“within the watery world o f living cells DNA molecules do a torturous dance. First the 
chainlike strands wind themselves into helices. Then they bend and twist again, folding 
into gnarled supercoils” (Lipkin 1994) Many are familiar with the structure that resembles 
a tangled braid, but in fact the DNA supercoil has been interpreted as a type o f  knot that 
ties itself up according “to rules governing its geometry and electrical forces acting on it 
from the liquid surroundings” ( 1994). The loops and links o f the DNA chain pose serious 
problems for the enzymes that copy DNA and manipulate its genetic information. Also, it 
is currently thought that Knot Theory will provide the crucial topological analysis for
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understanding these enzymes. Summers believes that Knot Theory “ lets you decide the 
enzymes’ reaction mechanism” (Skerrett 1994). Avner Friedman speaks to many 
mathematicians’ optimism when he writes, “ Knot Theory is really the next chapter o f the 
DNA story” (Skerrett 1994).
While Knot Theory has been reinvigorated by practical application, this should not 
imply that practical concerns are always tantamount. John Sullivan and associates at the 
University o f M innesota’s Geometry Center want to know “what happens when you 
distribute a negative charge evenly around the computer drawn knot. ‘1 can’t imagine 
what practical use this might have,’ he says. ‘But mathematicians have great faith that if 
you find something that exhibits really interesting patterns, it will eventually have some 
application.'" (Skerrett 1994). Perhaps Hole Theory, a corollary system to Knot Theory 
started out just as an exercise in noting interesting patterns.
1 have spent time discussing knot theory because it is a structure that has found 
many applications across a wide range o f sciences for describing features we encounter in 
the world. Since Hole Theory is a corollary system to Knot Theory, this warrants us to 
think it likewise would describe certain features we encounter in the word. Indeed, it 
does. 1 now move to discuss Hole Theory, which will offer its formal structure as a base 
for reinterpretation into Individuation Theory.
4.2.4 Hole Theory
Currently the most extended and rigorous treatment o f holes is found in Roberto 
Casati and Achille Varzi’s Holes and Other Superficialities 0^95).  A few months before 
beginning this joint project, Casati was making a presentation on perception in Geneva. 
During the meetings there, holes were sometimes mentioned as problematic objects o f
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perception. At the same time Varzi was “struggling with truth-value gaps and other
harassing semantic nonentities, and was starting to develop a hyper-realistic attitude
towards them” (Casati and Varzi, ix). Soon enough, Casati and Varzi met during a lecture
on the logic o f ordinary objects, where holes and other immaterial objects were accounted
as troublesome entities. At this point they decided it would be “natural to join our efforts
and face this neglected side o f reality once and for all”(ix).
People’s naive reasoning about space and things that occupy space involves
reasoning about holes and holed objects. People avoid holes when walking, place things in
and through holes, quantify them by measurement. They enlarge holes, fill them up, and
compare them with one another. “What exactly holes are, or even whether such dubious
entities do indeed exist, these are o f course questions one eventually needs to address in
order to make good sense o f such forms o f  reasoning” (Varzi 1996, I).
In the poem or poem-like philosophy o f Parmenides, he writes “There is” as his
first sentence, and in the same line o f that poem a second existential sentence—namely,
“There is no not-being” (Cleve 1973, 528). Typically this has been rendered, “There is no
nothing.” So when one considers holes, it would not do to say they are made o f  nothing or
that they are token instances of nothing. If one is unwilling to accept as meaningful
utterances that “holes are token instances o f  nothing,” then the burden is on anyone who
would step up to identify just what holes are.
Casati and Varzi “argue that to say that there are holes is not a mere façon de
parler [manner o f  speaking].” Nor are holes properties, but a special type o f  particular
called superficial particulars:
They are dependent particulars: they cannot exist alone; they need a host at the 
surface o f  which they find a place to be. They are not abstractions but individuals,
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although they are not made o f anything but space. [ .. .] They are immaterial 
bodies, located at the surfaces o f their hosts and provided with some very primitive 
properties. (6)
The conceptual framework o f  holes allows its described elements to have, within limits, a 
mereological structure. Holes can move, fuse into one another, and even split. Holes “can 
be causally responsible for, or causally subject to, several different phenomena.” Holes 
also can be bom, develop, and even die. As a pithy but paradoxical sounding synopsis o f 
their whole project, Casati and Varzi claim, “A hole is there where something isn’t” (7).
At first encounter, one gains a feeling in the face o f  such talk similar to what Aristotle 
apparently felt when considering Parmenides’ philosophy—’’But, obviously, to think in this 
way in real life verges on insanity” (Cleve 1973, 524).
While not quite insanity, there is good reason to see why their position creates 
dismay for the traditional card-carrying materialists. One of the chapters in Casati and 
Varzi’s Holes is titled “Immaterial Bodies, ” which is just what holes are. Holes are either 
outright immaterial bodies (cavities) or else pairs o f  immaterial bodies (hollows and 
perforating tunnels). They are “made o f space only, without having to be identical to any 
region o f space, and they live an intrinsically parasitic life” (37).
Casati and Varzi come to this position because two earlier theories o f  holes show 
themselves to be inadequate upon careful scrutiny. The first o f the two earlier theories 
holds that holes are superficial parts o f their hosts. But this position is dismissed because, 
as Willem (1995) summarizes, “it is too reductive and ties a hole too closely to its host, 
for the hole would then share too many properties with the surface o f the host ” (316).
After all, surfaces are two-dimensional geometrical abstractions (gained through 
perspective), but yet still “parts o f the objects o f which they [surfaces] are boundaries”
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(Casati and Varzi 1995, 11-12). Willem continues his summary o f  the second theory and 
its problems:
Theory 2, defended by Stephanie and David Lewis, is that holes should be 
identified with hole-linings. Casati and Varzi spend rather more time dismissing 
this theory, since it has been ably defended in the literature. They review the 
objections to which the Lewises’ reply, but put the heaviest emphasis on the fact 
that [such a ] theory would require a radical change in the meaning of certain 
predicates, e.g. “surrounds” would mean is identical with, “inside” would turn out 
to be ambiguous, particularly when what is inside one hole is another hole, and 
“enlarge” would sometimes have to mean make smaller. Finally, since hole-linings 
are themselves only potential parts o f their hosts, we have a far fuzzier conception 
o f their identity criteria than we have o f the identity criteria o f holes, which are 
often highly salient. (316)
In light o f these problems, Casati and Varzi conclude that in as much as one lacks
“complete clarity about the onto-logical status o f potential parts,” one ought to “avoid
ontological commitment to them, and the whole project o f  explaining away holes by
reference to hole-linings becomes at least suspicious” (30).
Frank Jackson offers a more radical alternative by proposing “not to identify holes
with hole-linings, but to avoid all reference to holes by translating all hole statements into
statements about hole-surrounds” (Willem 1995, 316). It turns out, however, that the
hole-surrounds position falls prey to the same problems as the hole-linings position.
In the end, Casati and Varzi dub holes ontologically parasitic entities. While holes
have an ontological dependence on their hosts, holes are nevertheless real entities. In a
separate discussion (Varzi 1996), holes are distinguished from the purely conceptual (de
dicto) dependence. Consider the sentence, “Every sister has a sibling.” While there cannot
exists sisters without siblings, it is false to say “o f any sister that she could not have
existed as an only child.” Holes, in contrast, “cannot exist except as a hole in something.
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so it suffers from a form of truly de re dependence” (3). Because o f this ontological 
dependence, there are no holes simplicUer, holehood is a relational property (3).
As a relational property, we can lay out a binary relation to  express this primitive 
intuition o f a hole being a parasitic entity: “Hxy” will stand for “x is a hole in (or through) 
y." From this notation, Casati and Varzi are able to lay down axioms to describe the 
constraints o f  host-hole relationships.
4 .2.5 Reinterpreting a Formal System of Disturbances 
As noted, the controlling concept o f  a "knot" and the theoretical structure that has 
been built around that controlling concept has illuminated how objects behave in the 
physical world. A theoretical apparatus already available was later found to be quite 
helpful in explaining interactions that had hitherto puzzled scientists. The case for the 
controlling concept o f  “hole” need be no different.
Hole Theory is a much more intricate calculus than prepositional logic calculus, 
but it has the essential four components o f an axiomatic system. There are formal noiions 
o f vocabulary along with definitions and axioms that allow theorems to be inferred.”
The most significant consequence o f  strict formalization is not a consequence that 
follows from the syntactical structure o f  a calculus with its various shuffling o f  variables 
and operations; rather, it is from the possibility of an interpretation. As a rule, a number of 
interpretations can be offered for a given calculus; moreover, there are often a number o f 
interpretations for a formal calculus that can lead to applications in completely different 
areas o f discourse. This was noted for several scientific applications using Knot Theory. 
Not surprisingly, the calculi o f Hole Theory offer the same opportunity.
”  Those unfamiliar with axiom systems may consult Appendix A for a short review.
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Since holes are types o f  disturbances, and since minds can be taken, pro tempore, 
as types o f disturbances, it seems a natural move to reinterpret the formal system o f holes 
with the semantic terms o f  mind. Varzi (1996) writes that “countenancing holes calls for 
some explicit theory (i.e. set o f  principles) about these entities—their identity conditions, 
their part-whole relations, their patterns o f  interaction with the environment” (2). Anyone 
concerned with personal identity faces the same problems when countenancing minds.
What is required o f an interpretation is that there be a group o f terms o f the theory 
that can be given ordinary language meanings that can then be reliably applied 
independently o f the theory. The only demand is that any relevant relations among the 
meanings o f these terms, or among the meanings of the special (non-ordinary) terms o f the 
theory, or between meanings o f  special terms and ordinary terms, be expressed explicitly 
as meaning postulates or axioms o f  the theory. It does not matter that some of these 
ordinary terms are more or less theoretical terms of ordinary language in the sense that 
they have meanings that are not given purely ostensively—after all, one does not point to a 
mind. There is no obligation to reduce all the terms o f every formal system to terms that 
can be explained ostensively. On that position, what would speculative metaphysics be? 
Where would Number Theory develop? Whatever else we learned from cliché logical 
positivism, the answers clearly are not “nothing” and “nowhere” .
However, since it is human beings who are being investigated here, it is reasonable 
to suppose that at least some terms, ultimately, must be related to terms that are ostensive 
in the sense that they can be interpreted according to semantic rules o f  the sort that allow 
us to interpret “brain,” “body,” and “connected” as objects o f  everyday experience. This 
supposition, however, is certainly not necessary to an understanding o f formal systems, or
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o f the activity o f analyzing personal identity Indeed, to insist on it would be distracting 
and would draw attention away from simpler and more relevant matters, such as: How is 
such and such a theoretical term, say “mind,” related to other terms, say “encarnalizes,” in 
the formal system? How are these related to the terms o f  ordinary discourse, such as 
“body” and “brain”? The later question may be asked quite independently o f whether those 
terms of ordinary discourse to which it refers are relatively ostensive ones or relatively 
theoretical ones.
One o f the key advantages o f the formal approach is that the same calculus can be 
part o f a number o f systems; the form can be separated from the content, and the form 
common to two distinct systems o f similar structure can be treated as a thing in itself and 
studied independently. Such a study is generally what applied mathematics leverages from 
pure mathematics in order to predict and explain events in the world. At some level, then, 
perhaps this is the same leverage a philosophy o f  individuation is applying to a particular 
calculus o f disturbances, to Hole Theory. If so, it works just fine, for the purposes o f 
speaking o f a subject o f  mentality.
4.2.6 Individuation Theory
Consider yet again the lessons gained from Knot Theory. There, one looked for 
common notions evidenced among common structures o f knots. These notions were then 
axiomatized for application to another area. Knots, being special disturbances, yielded 
fruitful insights for applications in physics, chemistry, and biology.
The notion o f  a disturbance was earlier noted as connoting an object or entity 
found in some other object, not in the sense o f  one object spatially within another, but in 
the sense o f an object located ‘through-in’ another, to coin an odd preposition. The
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examples o f disturbances hitherto under consideration have been “a knot is in a rope” and 
“a hole in a doughnut.” But there is yet another fruitful application for the notion of 
disturbance; “a mind in a brain.” By producing a formalized structure that can account for 
this last kind o f  disturbance, one can skirt an otherwise troublesome dichotomy that has 
arisen in discussions o f  personal identity.
Shoemaker (2000) identifies two traditionally opposed ways o f  understanding 
personal identity. The old way, that o f determining “whether identity o f  a person over time 
requires identity o f  substance, has a musty smell to it” (478). It has been kicked around 
since the time o f  Descartes, and later with Butler and Reid, and even before that, if one 
considers the prevalence o f the term in medieval discussions o f the soul. The more 
contemporary way takes a view in opposition. Locke, for example, denies that the identity 
o f  a person over an interval o f time requires the same substance that thinks within the 
person throughout that interval. And Hume thinks that talk of any substance at all is 
misguided, “unless our 'perceptions' themselves count as substances” (Cooney 2000, 479). 
Parfit is the most well known contemporary example o f  this latter camp.
As Casati and Varzi spoke of holes, one may likewise speak o f  minds. Minds are 
not objects just in a manner of speaking, but they are a special type o f  particular, a 
“superficial particular.” Like their cousin “disturbances,” they do not exist alone, but need 
a host, a brain, at which they find their place o f being. Some brain encarnalizes a mind; a 
mind is located “in” or “through” (thus, “through-in”) a brain. It is common to say that a 
mind is in a brain. Minds are not abstractions, yet, as types o f disturbances, they are 
immaterial bodies encarnalized in brains, but immaterial bodies with identifiable properties 
nonetheless. When they are understood as superficial particulars, one then has a way of
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individuating minds, and this allows one to skirt the troublesome dichotomy that 
Shoemaker outlines.
The advantages o f both ways o f  understanding personal identity are retained while 
the disadvantages are avoided. On the one hand, one may talk o f individuating minds by 
attending to their ontological, mereological, and topological relationships to brains. On the 
other hand, one may avoid the radical reductionism often inherent in such discussions 
about mind by pointing out how there can be a parasitic but nevertheless real superficial 
entity that over time is sustained as a metaphysical complement to the brain.
Ultimately, it can be seen that the members o f the metaphysical class minds are 
subject, albeit in a constrained way, to a mereological structure. Moreover, it also can be 
seen that Just as does their cousin disturbances, holes, minds too “can move, fuse into one 
another, split. They can be causally responsible for, or casually subject to, several diferent 
phenomena. They can be bom, develop, die” (Casati and Varzi 1995, 7), which is just 
what is happening to a split-brain patient under the conditions o f  a Sperry-type 
experiment.
So, just as for their most basic relation Casati and Varzi claimed that “ {holes} {are 
located in/through} {hosts},” one may likewise lay down a reinterpretation for yet another 
type of disturbance: “ {minds} {are encarnalized by/through/in} {brains}.” This allows a 
full axiomatic system o f Individuation Theory to be formed. (This system with some 
supporting commentary is presented in Appendix B.)
4.2.7 Conclusions
Framed as an axiomatic system. Individuation Theory is supposed to help us in 
organizing our thoughts by allowing us to see the full implications o f  the intuitive positions
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we happen to hold about persons and minds. Furthermore, in my project’s specific 
investigation into split-brain patients. Individuation Theory shows that some o f our 
commonly held notions about the mind entail that split brain/split-mind phenomena are 
something that we should expect to see. While one might initially suspect that these 
phenomena are so far out as to be unaddressable by our common notions. Individuation 
Theory has predictive value in showing us that this is not the case after all. The mind 
(along with associated mental properties) is “real” when viewed as a superficial particular, 
and real in the sense that otherwise more familiar disturbances such as holes and knots are 
real. At the very least, holes and knots (and other types o f superficial particulars) can have 
causal effects on the world, while mathematical points, perfect circles, equators and the 
like-things Dennett dubs abstracta-do not seem to have this ability. Furthermore 
superficial particulars can be given a concrete physical location. Dennett’s abstracta 
cannot. Hence, when we understand the mind as a dynamic convoluted three-dimensional 
superficial particular. Individuation Theory handles complaints that Dennett’s ftizzy 
version of realism cannot, and is to be preferred at least on this basis.
Apart from whatever else can be said about Individuation Theory, it still commits 
me to the thesis that human beings are wholly physical entities; whereby, humans are best 
described in terms o f  a specially partitioned set o f properties. The first set o f properties 
are those associated with the language o f  the natural sciences (especially physics). The 
second set o f properties are associated with the language o f psychology (cf. beliefs, 
desires, consciousness, intention, etc). My desire to talk o f immaterial bodies as 
encarnalized through-in material structures makes me a property dualist. Now there are 
several types o f property dualists, but a broad distinction can be drawn in terms o f  weak
186
and strong versions.
A ‘w eak’ property dualist holds that there is a dualism of theories rather than a
dualism o f ontology or metaphysics. Cunningham (2000) summarizes:
If  mental properties are emergent in the same sense that color, solidity, and the 
properties o f water are emergent, then they can be completely accounted for by 
physical theories. They are a special, complex version o f physical properties, and 
their difference is captured by theories at a higher level o f generalization than 
theories about atoms or electrons or neutrons. On this interpretation, mental’ 
properties still belong within the framework o f the natural physical world and 
might be seen on analogy with economic properties or aesthetic properties. [. . .] 
The Dualism is really a dualism o f theories rather than a dualism o f ontology or 
metaphysics [..] (34)
A strong’ property dualist holds that mental properties are something nonphysical, 
a set o f metaphysically unique properties which are, in Chalmers (1996) words, 
“fundamentally new features o f the world” (125).
So on the one hand, 1 can say that I am a weak property dualist, since 1 hold that 
these special entities, these superficial particulars are a very nice way o f talking about the 
dynamic information structure that constitutes our mind. On the other hand, 1 am tempted 
to say more than how this is just a nice, organized way o f  talking. For example, in talking 
about one type o f  “disturbance”, I really do think there are holes, that they are real, 
sometimes even dynamic patterns in the world. So are knots, and perhaps a host o f  other 
disturbances. Yet since we do not have a very good handle on disturbances yet, and since 
minds are taken here as a type o f  disturbance, it is, therefore, hardly surprising that we do 
not have a good handle on just what a mind is. In light o f  this, I have presented
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Individuation Theory as something better than what has been currently available.
4.3 Spectrums of Individuation: From Blindsight to Multiple Personality Disorder
4.3.1 Introduction
Several points in Individuation Theory would indicate that there can be more than 
one mind in a single brain. Ontology theorem 1.3 (see Appendix B) indicates that minds 
do not encarnalize one another, although they can have minds as proper parts. This is 
investigated with some detail in the Mereology component. As is generally indicated there, 
minds can have parts and can bear part-whole relations to one another. O f course, if minds 
can have proper parts, the exact relations between minds and mind parts, and also between 
minds and brain/brain parts must be outlined. This is among the most important roles o f 
the basic axioms o f the Mereological component.
Since several o f the Mereological Axioms entail theorems (e.g., 2.1, 2.6) that 
would allow multiple minds in a single brain, a brain o f which could be formed under 
different mereological conditions (e.g., T2.9, 2.10), it is appropriate to discuss multiple 
personality (or “Dissociative Identity Disorder”), fugues, and other such phenomena in 
regards to split-brain patients. To this end, the controversy over multiple personality 
disorder is first discussed. Then other phenomena that introduce similar worries about 
individuation are addressed—namely, blindsight, doubling, emotive disparities, separation 
of consciousness, and, finally, multiple personality
4.3.2 Professional Controversy over MPD
Multiple personality D isorder (M PD) is currently a controversial area in 
psychology. That this is the case can be seen in the very history o f  classification for the
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(alleged) disorder. Psychiatrists and psychologists use the Diagnostic d- Statistical
Manual o f Mental Disorders (DSM) to provide a framework for labeling various
psychological disorders. The International Code of Diseases (ICD), an international
classification o f  all medically accepted diseases and disorders, also uses its terminology.
Originally, MFD was a subsection o f “Hysterical Dissociative Disorder” and did
not have its own diagnostic code number. But in the third edition o f  DSM, enough mental
health workers were recognizing MFD in their clinical practices often enough to legitimate
giving MFD a diagnostic code number and some defined characteristics. As Dennett
summarizes the third edition’s claims:
The accolade o f “official diagnosis” was granted in 1980, with an entry in the 
clinician’s handbook, DSM-III: ‘Multiple Personality. 1. The existence within an 
individual o f  two or more distinct personalities, each o f  which is dominant at a 
particular time. 2. The personality that is dominant at any particular time 
determines the individual’s behavior. 3. Each individual personality is complex and 
integrated with its own unique behavior patterns and social relationships. ’
Typically there is said to exist a “host ” personality, and several alternative 
personalities or “alters.” Usually, though not always, these personalities call 
themselves by different names. They may talk with different accents, dress by 
choice in different clothes, frequent different locales. (Humphrey, N., and D. C. 
Dennett. 1989)
Eventually a backlash began against this stance. There had always been worry that such a
disease was, only a “candidate phenomena” (Humphrey, N., and D. C. Dennett. 1989) and
not a real psychological disorder. When the committee o f experts met to decide what
disorders should or should not be listed in DSM IV (and subsequently in ICD-10), there
was internal debate between treatment therapists and academy researchers. Ralph Allison
(2001 ) offers some political analysis o f  the debate:
The teachers could not agree that MFD could be an accurate label for anyone. The 
treaters on the committee did not know how to explain that in practice, if not in 
theory, their patients acted as if  they had other personalities. The teachers decided 
that the patients had the major mental problem o f believing that they had more than
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one personality. The goal o f  therapy should not be integrating the various 
personalities, but getting the patients over their false belief (delusion) that they had 
other personalities at all [....] So the patients still had a problem, but it was 
redefined as a different problem than the one their therapists were treating them 
for. Instead of therapists trying to integrate “alters” into an original personality, 
they should now focus their attention on the patients “delusion” that they did not 
have a single identity.
It finally turned out that the International Code o f  Diseases, edition 9, did not 
accept DSM IV as the official sub-section on Mental Disorders, but merely listed 
Dissociative Identity Disorder as a synonym for MPD. Allison makes the ironic 
observation, “So, in the world outside the USA, MPD still exists. Only in the USA have 
all multiples been told they have a false belief that they have alters running their bodies.”
As MPD is a controversial claim about brains and minds, it is best to first introduce 
phenomena that are not so significant but which present similar issues for individuation. 
Perhaps then some rather conservative observations about multiple minds within certain 
patients with mental illness can yield informative analysis for some split-brain phenomena.
4.3.3 Blindsight
The blindsight phenomenon allows people to perform tasks they claim they cannot 
see. Indeed, this appears to be the case. For example, a person may have a brain lesion 
that does not allow him or her to consciously process visual input. If one were to say to 
such a person, “Please stick an envelope in a horizontal or vertical slot,” this person would 
honestly reply that he or she could not see the slot from his or her angle o f observation.
But when one tells the blindsight person to merely “guess” when placing the envelope, he 
or she will perform the task accurately, or at least above the rate o f chance.
This raises a question: why do we presume there is still one patient under these 
conditions? It seems that one could make a move analogous to split-brain phenomena and
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say that there is another person there, with a very rudimentary mind that can actually 
perceive what is going on. It just happens that one person and another person do not 
know they co-exist together. So we have a very simple mental entity that can do simple 
tasks, but the brain o f the original patient is not aware o f  this other simple entity.
Somehow we think that in the blindsight case there is a failure o f a single patient to 
perform a task becauase o f brain damage. But we do not think that in the split-brain case 
there is just one patient, or at least we are highly tempted to think there are two patients. 
Yet, why are there alleged to be two patients in split-brain cases while only one in 
blindsight cases?
Perhaps in the split-brain case the empirical feedback is sufficient, for we can
actually query the hemispheres on what they just saw or did. They can either draw pictures
or report orally. But in blindsight cases, when we query the patient on what has occurred,
we get only a single, albeit inaccurate, response (or professed ignorance of any response).
If split-brain patients did not give us feedback upon query, we might not be so quick to
presume double consciousness. In both blindsight and split-brain cases, the patient gives
verbal reports that do not accurately describe what the body o f the patent is actually
doing. But verbal reports are not enough, when only the left hemisphere controls
speaking. So we rely on other means, such as facial or written signals, either using
unspoken behaviors, or drawings or waving of hands for agreement or disagreement. The
right hemisphere will in fact do these sorts o f things when disagreeing with the verbal
reports o f  the left hemisphere, as two examples show:
[I]  If a concealed object is placed in the left hand and the person is asked to guess 
what it is, wrong guesses will elicit an annoyed frown, since the right hemisphere, 
which received the tactile information, also hears the answers. If the speaking 
hemisphere should guess correctly, the result is a smile. [2] A smell fed to the right
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nostril (which stimulates the right hemisphere) will elicit a verbal denial that the 
subject smells anything, but if asked to point with the left hand at a corresponding 
object he will succeed in picking out e.g. a clove o f  garlic, protesting all the while 
that he smells absolutely nothing, so how can he possibly point to what he smells. 
If the smell is an unpleasant one like that o f rotten eggs, these denials will be 
accompanied by wrinklings o f the nose and mouth, and guttural exclamations o f 
disgust. (Nagel 1991, 434)
The blindsight cases are considered one person, because there are not intra-body 
communications that would otherwise indicate such disagreement, but in split-brain 
patients, we do have such intra-body communication disagreements, thus counting as 
further evidence for their being two streams of consciousness within these patients while 
they are under Sperry-type conditions.
4.3 4 Doubling
Doubling is the development o f a “barrier” where a person can substantially isolate 
two incompatible modes o f life. For example, one might be a Nazi doctor or government- 
funded torturer in the afternoon, but a loving father in the evening. How can these 
dichotomous forms o f life coexist in one person? Unlike multiple personality patients, 
these people do not have compartmentalized amnesia, but simply do not dwell upon their 
professional self when living as a “ordinary self’ (Glover 1988, 23).
4.3.5 Emotional Dichotomy 
In the case o f split-brain patients who, on the one hand, do not have cognitive 
access between hemispheres, yet on the other hand do have emotional access between 
hemispheres, one is left with the problem of determining whether this is two people or one 
person, even if one ignores how the patient performs on standard perceptual tests (such as 
when the patient merely manipulates objects or recovers pieces o f words). If two beings 
were to share the exact same emotional state-that is, they share a state that obtains from
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the exact same stimulus—this might stand alone as evidence that the patient is one person. 
Parallels to this might be seen in multiple personality patients where some subset o f the 
personalities is angered at the same event that the patient has had to endure. Standard 
cases o f fission would not be able to address this problem of emotions. The two fission 
subjects, although they would be experiencing the same type of emotion, would not be 
experiencing the same token emotion. They would be perceiving some given event (the 
one that caused the emotion in question) from slightly different perspectives, e.g., one 
subject would be standing slightly to the left the other to the right. But in the case o f the 
split-brain patient, we have both hemispheres experiencing the same token emotion. 
Perceptual input to the hemispheres is shared before transfer. (Probably by means o f the 
interior commissure.)
4.3.6 Multiple Personality
Earlier, in part two, we argued that the corpus callosum normally functions as the 
unifying element o f a single mind within humans and is sufficient for unifying the entire 
brain’s network activity, thus unifying consciousness. This is still true even in multiple 
personality subjects, for subjects do not suddenly lose their ability to recognize that a face 
is present, to add, or to sort geometric shapes when a new personality phases in. Any 
separation of consciousness is discrete along a timeline and not simultaneous as in a 
Sperry-type experiment.
What arguments are there that claim there is no such thing as multiple personality? 
Perhaps the following is an example: an actor can certainly behave like he is four or five 
different people, although he still knows none o f  the personas are actually who he is. An
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actor seems analogous to the multiple personality case. Knowing that one has multiple 
personalities precludes one from actually being a multiple personality.
This is a critical empirical question. How many people biow that they are multiples 
apart from being told by an external source? Can one autonomously discover that he or 
she is a multiple or must it be revealed by an outside observer? So then the first issue is 
knowing (or not) that one is multiple 1 suspect that genuine multiples do not know they 
are so just from a first-person perspective, but must build up a collection o f third-person 
cues to this hypothesis.
Another issue, can multiples voluntarily switch their personalities even after being 
informed o f their being a multiple’’ True multiples involuntarily switch back and forth. 
They cannot actively control the process, or at least the original person cannot control the 
process, for if they could, they would be no different than professional actors who “forget 
themselves”, as it were, within a role.^“ But it seems to be the case that other non-original 
persons within the body can “hand-off’ to other non-original persons within the patient.
I think analogous claims can be made regarding split-brain patients. Under the 
conditions of Sperry-type experiments, the patients do not seem to recognize that there is 
a parallel consciousness operating within the same body. One difference between the split- 
brain patient and the multiple personality patient is that in the split-brain patient there is no 
“original person”, since both hemispheres stay conscious during the Sperry-induced 
circumstances. One does not have the luxury o f  using a chronological criterion to identify
One caveat here is that sufferers o f MPD might be able to initiate a switch by voluntarily 
placing themselves in the kind o f situations that bring on high enough levels o f  stress to 
cause a shift to another alter. This would a passive type o f control.
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some original person. In contrast, it is common in sexual abuse cases to identify the 
original person as the one present at the impetus o f  the abusive act.
O f course one might be tempted to assume that the left hemisphere is the original 
person, since it is the one that maintains linguistic ability and uses it to communicate to the 
researcher But this would be using an arbitrary criterion to determine the original person. 
One could just as well use facial identification abilities, which is normally a strength of the 
right hemisphere.
4.4 The Inward Perspective
4.4.1 Memory
"hollowing the surgery, each hemisphere also has thereafter its own 
separate chain o f  memories that are rendered inaccessible to the recall 
processes o f the other. "
(R. W. Sperry 1967)
4.4.1.1 Introduction
Traditional uses o f memory in analysis o f  personal identity seem to lean on a 
misclassification o f this faculty. 1 first review a typical classification o f memory, show 
where this fails, and present a more useful description o f  one key component o f memory. 
Second, I apply this component to an analysis o f  self-identity in animals and then of 
personal identity in right-hemisphere patients. Finally, I end by modifying a Lockean view 
o f memory as essential for personal identity and apply that to a description o f the right 
hemisphere’s personal identity.
4.4.1.2 The Identity and Classification of Memory
In order for a thinking thing to consider itself as itself in different times and places, 
it must have a memory, a way o f retaining and retrieving its past experiences. When
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experiences influence subsequent behavior, a person is said to be remembering something. 
So, too, is the operation o f memory essential for learning. As Squire notes, “Learning is 
the process o f  acquiring new information while memory refers to the persistence of 
learning in a state that can be revealed at a later time” (Gazzaniga, Ivry, and Mangun 
1998, 247) Memory is the outcome of learning. Practice results in a cumulative effect on 
memory leading to skillful performance. The ordered behavior o f  a thinking thing requires 
memory, and remembering is a prerequisite to reasoning, for the ability to solve a problem 
demands that one recognize a problem exists, and this means depending on memory.
Memory is also the crucial element in personal identity. John Locke’s view, for 
example, was especially committed to memory alone as being the essential element for 
identity o f persons over time. Yet as Noonan (1991) points out, our notion o f memory is 
very wide;
I can be said to remember my 7 times table, or that Columbus sailed the ocean blue 
in 1492, or that I am due to take my son to a football match next Saturday. This is 
factual memory, retention o f previously acquired knowledge. 1 can also be said to 
remember how to pilot a plane or to do a handstand. This is retention o f previously 
acquired abilities. But there is also the memory of events witnessed or participated 
in, typically reported in the form. ‘T remember X’s F-ing’ (as opposed to the 
typical report o f factual memory: “I remember that x F-ed’), and, as a special case 
o f such event-memory, there is the memory o f one’s own experiences and actions, 
which one will report in first-person memory claims. (11)
While important for its caution against memory as a singular faculty, Noonan’s taxonomy
o f memory is not as helpful as it might appear. Under which o f these classifications would
the short-term or, better, “buffer memories” for the various sense modalities fall? It is
unclear.
4.4.1.3 Buffered Memory for Sense Modalities and Introspection
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Consider, for example, the visual memory system. While the auditory system 
maintains a sensory memory bandwidth o f  about 10 seconds, this is far longer than visual 
memory, and most likely because listeners must maintain enough information to 
understand a speaker who articulates to them a complex sentence (Gazzaniga, Ivry, and 
Mangun 1998, 254). Consider the case o f  reading standard English texts. When doing so, 
the eyes move from right to left, dropping a line as the page progresses. When one learns 
to read, one has a factual memory that the eyes move from left to right and drop a line 
Eventually, however, this becomes an automatic action. Thus, one retains a fact about 
reading, develops and retains an ability to move the eyes appropriately, and then comes to 
ignore the factual and ability component only to find that the relevant eye movements have 
been retained by an event memory. As any elementary school teacher will attest, this 
movement from learning to read to auto-action reading does not happen all at once, nor 
sometimes, as in the case of dyslexia, in a consistent fashion. N oonan’s taxonomy of 
discrete memory types, therefore, seems more a convenient way o f talking about memory 
than an accurate description o f how a brain’s underlying control structures come to 
produce memory.
As noted, the auditory system and the visual system have different bandwidths.
One might then begin to worry about the bandwidth o f personal identity. It seems easy 
enough to ask oneself what one thought a few seconds ago, but it is far more difficult to 
ask what was on one’s mind 20, 30, or 40 seconds ago. There can be introspective 
memory as well. One can recall, “A moment ago I was wondering whether I went to the 
store yesterday or the day before, but now I’m playing tennis.” Just as in the sensory 
memory case, experiments can be set up to ask what persons remember hearing or seeing.
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one can likewise reasonably posit that there would be neural substructures that support the 
memory o f immediate introspective actions o f  consciousness, so these, too, would have 
some bandwidth detectable by empirical procedures. From such a presence o f bandwidth, 
limits would likewise be noted concerning just how many introspective acts could be 
maintained in what might be dubbed buffered introspective memory.
4.4.1.4 Self-Image in Animals and Humans
Ned Block (1997c) defines self-consciousness as the possession o f the concept o f  
the self and the ability to use this concept in thinking about one’s self (389). By invoking 
the phrase “one’s se lf” Block is actually moving within the discourse o f personal identity 
and not speaking o f  Just consciousness proper (as was analyzed earlier in part two). 
Although he speaks o f  experiments on animal consciousness, there is a tacit demand for 
positing a buffered introspective memory.
As he reports, some o f the experiments on animal self-consciousness involve 
placing animals in front o f mirrors with an ear painted with a florescent spot. Higher 
primates are known to show interest and recognition when they see themselves in mirrors. 
Other animals treat mirror images as strangers. Chimpanzees between the ages o f 7 and 15 
will try to clean the spot o ff as babies will under similar conditions after about the last half 
o f their second year (Block 1997c, 389).
Animals that are bothered by the mirror presentation must keep a particular view 
of themselves in consciousness over time. When this body-image memory is inconsistent 
with what is seen, the observed behaviors are not surprising. What is important to take 
away here is that there is indeed a continuity o f  memory o f the self. In this case there is an 
immediately buffered introspective memory o f  what the self should look like in contrast to
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what the self does look like. Occasionally, humans are caught in a very unpleasing and 
more amplified contrast between these tw o poles when, for example, someone wakes up 
after a number o f  years of being in a coma and looks into a mirror.
4.4.1.5 Longer-Term Memory
The relation o f  a buffered introspective memory would have similar functional 
interactions with a longer-term introspective memory just as buffered sense modality 
memory has functional interactions with longer-term memory. In fact, Francis Crick and 
Christoph Koch (1997) argue that long-term episodic memory is not essential for 
consciousness since there are patients with brain damage who, while they cannot lay down 
new episodic memories, nevertheless appear in all other relevant aspects to be fully 
conscious (279).
Long-term episodic memory is a pivotal issue when we move to discuss whether 
the right hemisphere is a person or not. It appears as if one has the ideas o f a mental 
natural kind called a self, and that there is one o f  these special kinds present (or not) 
within the split-brain patient. At first glance, it might appear that the left hemisphere has a 
self but the right hemisphere does not, since the right hemisphere does not command the 
longer-term introspective abilities o f the left hemisphere. But there is no monadic, 
independent essential self, only a question o f  longer- or shorter-term buffered 
introspective memory bandwidth. The idea o f  a hemisphere’s personal identity, therefore, 
is a merely a question o f degree—namely, the degree o f introspective bandwidth and, o f  
course, any additional information that has been transferred from this buffered 
introspective information into longer-term memory. Since it is not the case that all 
buffered data gets passed-on to longer-term memory, one can rule out what is called
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‘psychological connectedness’ as essential to personal identity just on the basis o f what is 
known about retention alone, and without recourse to a separate argument of retrieval.
4.4.1.6 A Neo-Lockean Position Using Newer Memory Models
As a general claim, memory for skills and procedures, semantic memory, 
perceptual presentations sensory registration, and working memory can all be shown by 
cognitive theory and neuroscientific evidence to be separate but interacting parts o f the 
brain. The brain indeed has multiple cognitive and neuro-systems that support these 
different aspects o f memory (Gazzaniga, Ivry, and Mangun 1998, 287).
Locke holds that personal identity is tied to memory, so one must carefully 
consider which among the various distinctions o f memory are relevant to maintaining 
personal identity. Unfortunately, this has not been done, and Locke’s position comes off 
as much weaker than it actually is. But if Locke’s position is reconsidered in light of 
contemporary research into memory, such as by noting the presence o f a buffered 
introspective memory, some o f  the key questions o f personal identity can be addressed 
anew.
When, one may ask, is personal identity compromised*^ A specific example; How 
much amnesia, whether retrograde o r anterograde, ”  actually distinguishes a new or 
different personal identity? Memory is not equally distributed throughout the brain, but 
various substructures “form systems that support and enable rather specific memory
”  ‘Anterograde’ amnesia - Inability to  remember ongoing events after the incidence o f 
trauma or the onset o f the disease that caused the amnesia. ‘Retrograde’ amnesia - 
Inability to remember events that occurred before the incidence o f  trauma or the onset o f 
the disease that caused the amnesia. (Adapted from Stedman’s Medical Dictionary, 27th 
ed.)
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processes” (Gazzaniga, Ivry, and Mangun 1998, 288). One o f  the more important
distinctions is drawn between declarative and procedural memory:
Procedural memory in humans is related to the knowledge o f  rules o f action and 
procedures, which can become quite automatic with repetition. When one studies a 
learning curve o f some task, we can see that performance is improved (either by 
less errors or quicker responses, or by a combination o f  both) with the number o f 
repetitions o f  that task. Having a lot or little "practice" with certain task is 
procedural knowledge. Nonassociative learning and most classical conditionings 
produce procedural memory. Declarative memory involves explicit information 
about facts. To remember one's telephone number, o r the names of the parts o f  the 
neuron, does not require a set o f  rules or procedures, it is explicit and involves 
associations with other events. To put it colloquially, declarative memory is what 
we know consciously, and procedural memory is what we perform unconsciously 
[. . . .] Although this division o f  memory seems arbitrary at first, it is very useful in 
neuroscience since each type o f  memory probably has different types o f neural 
substrates. For instance, the hippocampus and temporal cortex seem to be involved 
in the formation of declarative memory, but not o f procedural memory. Whereas 
certain nuclei o f the cerebellum and spinal chord seem to be necessary for 
procedural memories to form, but do not intervene in declarative memory. Due to 
this anatomical organization, declarative memory is said to be controlled by higher 
brain mechanisms, while procedural memory appears to depend on lower regions 
and systems.(Gutierrez and Ormsby 2002 )
Here then suggests another way o f engaging the Lockean view o f memory with 
more modern distinctions. As regarding how memory contributes to what precisely forms 
our personal identity, would the reference be to declarative memory or procedural 
memory? Again, studies on people with amnesia reveal that they do not lose all o f their 
memory. Even if such patients lose (or lose access to) large stores o f  explicit memory, 
they do not lose the memory o f how to  use a fork, how to sit down or stand, and so forth. 
If one were going to quantify the information that we have in memory, declarative 
memory would seemingly have far less information about the world than procedural 
memory. But it is difficult to see how one could quantify memories into discrete natural 
kinds, for there seems to be overlap and cooperation among various types of memory in 
performing actions.
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This, o f course, leads one to ask the question, ‘just how much (even on a duly 
modified memory criterion) would be required, were clear quantification procedures 
available for memory, to maintain one’s personal identity?’ It turns out this is yet another 
personal identity question with a musty smell to it. There is merely the degree o f  active 
and transferred information from the introspective buffer. Just as there is from sensory 
modality buffers.
4.4.1.7 Pointing. Memory and the Right Hemisphere's Personal Identitv
While the left hemisphere as the advantage o f  speech, I would like to note just how 
important the mere act o f pointing is for evidencing that the right hemisphere is a person. 
Pointing (or making deictic gestures’) “is defined as drawing another party's attention to 
an out-of-reach object by locating the object in space for the other party” (deWall 2001 ). 
Now all through Sperry experiments, and at the request o f the experimenter, the right 
hemisphere both locates various objects and indicates options And as deWall further 
notes, “there is no point to pointing unless you understand that the other hasn't seen what 
you have seen, which involves realizing that not everyone has the same information” 
(DeWall 2001 ). Thus, the right hemisphere seems to have access to the procedural 
memories o f how to use pointing to communicate. Furthermore, there is a recognition o f 
the presence o f another in the room, that this other party has desires, and that these desires 
are about a set o f information that may or may not be available to the right hemisphere. 
This shows an operant declarative memory, for the hemisphere has stored and retrieved 
the fact the moderator is in the room, making requests; that requests are generally , 
followed, etc.
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This pointing ability could be further leveraged to show that and how the right- 
hemisphere maintains an image o f  itself. Consider tw o hypothetical experiments. A set of 
placards could be flashed (using standard Sperry-type procedures) where each placard is a 
different face. In one experiment, the right hemisphere could be asked to point out which 
face is its own. In another related experiment, the right hemisphere could be asked to 
point out which bodies in the room (among patient, moderator, and others who serve as 
control bodies) are bodies which carry the faces seen up on the placard. Since the right 
hemisphere is known to be superior in face recognition, the results o f these experiments 
would be telling for establishing that the right hemisphere maintains an implicit memory 
template o f  yet one more component o f  personal identity.
4.4.2 Self Ego, and "I"
"'rhe Self which is reflexively referred to is synthesized in that very act o f  
reflexive self-reference "
- (Nozick 1981)
'‘Any fixed categorization o f the Self is a big goof. ”
- (Ginsberg 1963)
4.4.2.1 Introduction
This section addresses issues o f  personal identity that loosely concern the Self the 
Ego, and the first-person inward consideration o f  the subject as a subject- an “I”. 1 am less 
concerned to argue a position here as to show how varying notions of Self Ego, and “ I” 
play out regarding the status o f the right-hemisphere. Tow ard the end o f this section I 
explain why these notions clarify little as regards the status o f  the right hemisphere’s 
consciousness o f  itself over time.
4 4.2.2 Brain Versus Metaphysical Ego
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Traditionally it has been thought that the “I” refers to what Glover (1988) calls a 
metaphysical ego, a paradigm example being what Descartes had in mind when he 
discussed the self. But investigations into the brain eroded this view. Glover notes, “There 
is a lot we do not yet know about the brain, but compared to its potential explanatory 
power, that o f  the metaphysical ego looks dim” (97).
4.4.2.3 The Self 's Considered Parts
Descartes held that “when I consider the mind, or myself in so far as I am merely a 
thinking thing, I am unable to  distinguish any parts within myself. I understand myself to 
be something quite single and complete” (Cottingham, StoothofF, and Murdoch 1985, 59), 
Perhaps Descartes was unable to conceptualize himself as having parts, but it does not 
seem outright inconceivable. Cannot a person imagine the self in temporal parts? It would 
seem so. For example, upon reading a lengthy diary at the end o f  one’s life, a person might 
find that he or she cannot understand the mindset he or she was in at 21 now that he or 
she is 91 It is as if, and perhaps as so, he or she is a different person. He or she might 
ponder, “I know that it should be me; I can remember times after being 21 and times 
before being 21, but for that year o f my life, I cannot understand why anyone would think 
that way o f  things, much less that I did.” Here, the 91-year-old literally has a part, in the 
sense o f  temporal segment, which he or she distinguishes within the self. Descartes 
apparently thought being unable to imagine consciousness divided into parts meant that 
consciousness cannot be divided into parts, but considerations o f  temporal parts o f  the 
self is evidence to the contrary.
4.4.2.4 A Hemisphere’s External Part
204
Suppose under the conditions o f  a split-brain experiment, the patient is told,
“There are now two o f  you.” Now, if speaking to the left hemisphere, one might say, “Do 
you realize that at this moment there is someone who has had all the experiences you have 
had, who you have depended upon for your whole life, and that someone is now 
independent from you? That person is like a less-intelligent, dim-witted version o f 
yourself” How would the left hemisphere take this? Would it deny that there could be 
such a person? Might it act surprised that it still felt so complete even without having this 
other person available? Perhaps the context is such that the left hemisphere does not need 
the other person for its current activities. It will, therefore, not be disconcerted under the 
condition o f  the experiment. The left hemisphere might see things differently if the right 
hemisphere remained split off for hours or days on end, for it would recognize an 
otherwise unexplainable, severe limitation on its abilities.
Glover (1988) uses the phrase “structural beliefs” to describe beliefs about beliefs. 
For example, one might have the belief that evidence and experiment should be used to 
establish the truth o f  some position. (This is why science is so valuable.) Suppose 
someone were to deny this. Here, there would be a difference in the structure o f beliefs 
concerning evidence and experiment (156). Analogously, the left hemisphere might have a 
structure o f  belief that it is independent and that there is no second person that lends (or 
has lent) it any support. This is why confabulation seems so interesting in the split-brain 
patient. There appears to be an underlying structure of belief that I am the same person 1 
was moments ago. Would it be possible to convince the left hemisphere that indeed this 
structural belief is false? Perhaps it would be just as difficult as convincing the post-fugue 
state person (who has lived a separate life for years) that s/he had a life which s/he
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currently does not remember. And whether the person is within the fugue or external to it 
in his or her “normal track” life, trying to convince the person of the predicament might be 
too fantastic for the person to ever really believe, even if he or she sees the 
incontrovertible evidence He or she might claim, "Even if it’s true, I can’t make sense o f 
it.” It would not be hard to see the left hemisphere giving a similar response.
One could try the same tactic with the right hemisphere, although it is far less 
verbal, and on a practical level one could not expect to get very far, given its conceptual 
limitations. It would most often be akin to convincing a 2- or 3-year-old o f something 
beyond its level of comprehension. Recall, however, that patients abilities vary widely
Glover (1988) holds that unity o f consciousness is required for being a single 
person. He is, however, open to unity o f consciousness as being a question o f degree This 
would give a pragmatic twist to how he might handle the analysis o f split-brain patients: a 
requirement for a certain unity o f  consciousness is merely that “it may be less misleading 
to think o f  split-brain patients as two people. He admits, however, that he is wary o f  being 
too rigid, for “in the case o f temporary brief divisions, it may raise fewer problems to think 
o f one person than o f two” (61 ). But Glover does suggest some conceptual distinctions 
that can be developed for giving more than just pragmatic help. He notes that the logic o f 
identity is an all-or-nothing affair, but the logic o f  survival is a matter o f degree (102).
Here is how this conceptual distinction might be developed. One’s survival is 
cashed-out in terms o f whether one’s plans will be carried out, whether a survivor will be 
influenced by the memories o f the past, and so on. There are so-called links that are 
preserved, with links apparently being close family resemblances o f sets o f  attributes o f 
persons as these persons come and go over time. In split-brain cases, perhaps this question
206
is not how many persons there are under the conditions o f  the experiment, but how many 
survivors there are under the conditions o f the experiment. Person seems too close to the 
idea o f  an ego, and talking in terms o f  an ego forces one to frame the issue in terms o f 
identity. In the long run, an ego is a person where a survivor is a token o f that person; 
thus, one might talk o f  the split-brain patients as still having one ego.
Yet one could take a short-mn view. Here, one is tempted to view the ego as the 
token survivor o f a person, for it is hard to relinquish that there is this moment-by-moment 
presence o f  an ego. Granted, one can incorporate talk about a metaphysical ego if a 
survivor is viewed as distinct from a person. Still, perhaps the whole issue o f  an ego is a 
confusion, so one should really commit only to speaking o f  a survivor Medical 
technology’s discoveries about the human brain would allow survivor talk to be far less 
problematic than ego. Talk o f  a metaphysical ego no longer comes as natural as it did 
when a Cartesian view o f  human beings seemed so common sensical.
The application o f  this way o f speaking does help somewhat in dealing with the 
right hemisphere. A new survivor comes into being, but not a new person. The right 
hemisphere is the same person, yet an independent survivor emerges when the patient is 
placed under Sperry-type conditions.
Ultimately, it is unclear whether distinguishing a token survivor from a person 
further clarifies the status o f  the right hemisphere’s consciousness of itself over time. This 
may be because adequate empirical criterion for distinguishing the notions o f Self Ego, 
and “ I” have not been forthcoming, and because common intuitions regarding these three 
terms are just too vague to  allow us to leverage fine distinctions.
4.4.2.5 James as Closing W ord: The Continuitv o f What Precedes
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Finally, William James noted that within each personal consciousness, thought is 
essentially continuous. James describes it as without breach, crack, or division. He does 
admit that there can be interruptions and time gaps in thought. But even where there are 
time gaps, consciousness feels as if it belongs together with the consciousness that 
preceded it; that is, there is this awareness where the consciousness now is another part of 
the same self (James 1997, 74).
So, in the quest to defend the right hemisphere as a person, one very important 
element o f consciousness is seen as here-this feeling as if it belongs with what preceded. 
For under the conditions o f  Sperry-type experiments, the right hemisphere recognizes that 
it has not been torn from the room or thrown into unknown circumstances while the 
experiment proceeds. Furthermore, all o f the behaviors o f  the body that are controlled by 
the right hemisphere indicate no panic or confusion. Indeed, this is a further surprising fact 
about the Sperry-type experiments, for one might expect that the changes from one 
moment to another within the qualia o f its consciousness would throw one or the other 
hemisphere awry. But as is seen by the examiners, the left hemisphere is only very 
occasionally aggravated, and the right hemisphere is as serene as if nothing special has 
happened at all. Perhaps it is this very serenity o f  response that has lured some 
investigators into arguing that it is not conscious, but this is quite the wrong way to see 
this behavior. That very serenity is a sign of the otherwise continuous and natural feeling 
o f being connected with what has preceded.
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5 CONCLUSION
In this paper I have tried to defend that the two hemispheres exhibit consciousness 
and personhood while the patient operates under the conditions o f  a Sperry-type 
experiment. 1 have been particularly concerned to show this to be the case for the right 
hemisphere. To that effect, I have argued that the right hemisphere has functionally 
distinct modules o f cognition and sentience o f the sort detailed by our most current 
theories in cognitive science. Moreover, practically all o f the behavioral outputs for all 
modes o f communication available to the right hemisphere (keeping in mind that speech is 
not one o f these modes) are best explained by there being a superset o f  modules that 
maintain a degree o f consciousness under Sperry-type experimental conditions. Such 
consciousness was outlined in terms o f higher order monitoring relations between 
modules.
I further defended an ancillary thesis that under said conditions the right 
hemisphere is a person. I argued that anything that has conscious mental states over time 
has a unity o f consciousness; furthermore, that which is identified as having a unity o f 
conscious is a subject o f  mentality. But since 1 defined a person just as a subject o f  unified 
consciousness over time, and since the right hemisphere was shown by the main thesis to 
have conscious mental states, 1 was able to conclude it must also be accounted a person. 
My argument would likewise apply to the left hemisphere. In addition to this, I argued that 
we can speak meaningfully o f  a single subject o f mentality initially fissioning into two 
subjects o f mentality and then subsequently re-fusing back into a single subject o f  
mentality without sacrificing our standard views o f how our minds are related to  our 
brains. To effect such an argument, I offered up Individuation Theory as a theoretical
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structure which could more reasonably account for Split-brain phenomena than any o f the 
currently available contenders.
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APPENDIX A
A glance at formal systems. A formal system consists o f  two parts: a calculus (a 
syntax), and an interpretation (a semantic)/" Although semantic systems can be given a 
formal interpretation, it is generally the case, even in a strict formal system, that the 
interpretation is treated more or less casually and informally. However, the interpretation 
is typically what provides the connection between the syntactical structure of the calculus 
and the real world. Thus, the interpretation is o f the greatest importance in attempting to 
understand the connection, for instance between geometry and physical space; or, for the 
purposes herein, between personal individuation and the phenomena one encounters in 
dealing with human beings, whether split-brain patients or otherwise normal subjects.
The calculus o f a formal system consists of the part o f  the formal system that can 
be dealt with by syntax alone. Although the calculus is quite literally (and purposely) 
meaningless without an accompanying interpretation, it is generally much easier to 
describe the syntax than the semantics, and probably for this reason the calculi o f formal 
systems have received more attention than their interpretations.
Propositional logic is a well-known and accessible formal system. Like other 
calculi, it can be broken down into four parts: vocabulary, formation rules, axioms, and 
rules of inference. Each o f these are discussed in turn, although not rigorously. The idea is 
to give just enough flavor o f a simpler formal calculus to appreciate what a
^"Concerning my position here on formal systems and interpretations, I have benefitted 
greatly from Henry Kyburg’s Philosophy o f Science: A Formal Approach (New York: 
Macmillan, 1968).
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reinterpretation o f  Hole Theory to Individuation Theory offers for explaining some key 
split-brain phenomena.
The vocabulary o f a formal system consists of all those signs that are used in 
writing the statements o f the system, except those signs that are introduced explicitly by 
definition. There are the signs that stand for sentences. A, B, C, D . . , and there are signs 
that stand for logical constants, ~,v,&, ->, <->, which stand for the natural language 
intuitions (or something close to them) o f  “not,” “or,” “and,” “only i f ” and “if and only 
i f ” respectively One can also define other symbols in terms o f combinations of these 
symbols. For example, one might define a special type o f “or” relation that allows only one 
o f two sentences to be true but not both o f  them. Thus, while “A v B” would not do the 
job, we could define “A * B” as “(A v B) & ~(A & B)” so as to have a convenient way o f 
talking about this special type o f  relation. One can even define definitions in terms o f 
definitions, e.g., “A # C” as “(A * B) & (B * C). Here, definitions have been grouped into 
the vocabulary, but Copi (1973) gives a reminder that “the use o f  defined terms is, from 
the point o f view o f  logic, a matter o f  convenience only. Theoretically, every proposition 
that contains defined terms can be translated into one that contains only undefined ones by 
replacing each occurrence o f the defined term by the sequence o f  undefined terms which 
was used to define it” ( 154-55). Essentially it is less clumsy to manipulate “A * B” than 
“(A v B) & -(A  & B)”, and facts like this capture the whole point o f  using definitions.
The formation rules tell us how to  construct the meaningful or well-formed 
expressions o f the object language (that is, o f  the calculus) whose syntax we are 
describing. Here, one would specify that the signs that stand for sentences count as well- 
formed (i.e., allowable) formulas, as would combinations o f these along with the logical 
constants. Thus, “A”, “~A”, A & B”, or even “(A & B) v A” would all be considered
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well-formed formula. The other logical constants would follow a similar pattern. Any and 
only expressions that follow these rules o f  combination from the vocabulary are allowed.
The axioms o f  any system consist o f  a set o f statements in the object language o f 
that system. Syntactically, they are an arbitrary set o f statements; semantically, they are 
generally a set o f  statements assumed to be true, from which (pragmatically) important 
statements o f the system can be deduced. Generally, they are taken to  be the most obvious 
or at least the immediately graspable o f relationships within a formal calculus. In the 
propositional calculus, rules such as (A v A) -> A, or (A v B) -> (B v A) have an intuitive 
veracity that is felt by competent speakers o f  English. For example, “ If  you're human or 
you're human, then you're human.” Or again, “If you're an animal or you're warm-blooded, 
then you're warm-blooded or you're an animal.”
Finally, the rules of inference allow deductions constructed by means o f chaining 
together immediate, logically cogent connections that have ultimately been drawn from the 
axioms and the vocabulary. For example, one might make a “meta-statement about how 
well-formed statements in the calculus operate. A meta-statement such as “From well- 
formed formulas o f  the form X and (X -> Y), Y may be inferred” would be one among 
rules o f inference. It is essential that the rules o f inference never allow a resulting formula 
(or theorem) and its negation (e.g., “x & ~x”) to be derivable from the axioms o f the 
calculus; that is, one wants the calculus to be free from contradiction.
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APPENDIX B 
INDIVIDUATION THEORY 
Interpretive Mapping:
The reinterpretation o f Hole Theory as Individuation Theory uses the following schema:
Hole Mind
"Walls” Boundaries
Hosts
Verb form ... encarnalizes ...
Noun form Brains (or Brain structures)
is located a t ... ... is encarnalized through-in
Surface structure
1. Ontology
The main thesis is that a mind is an immaterial body encarnalized through-in the structure 
(or some structure) o f a material object. The ontological basis is concerned with the 
general dependence o f a mind on its brain.
Notation
N i l  Hxy = X is a mind in (i.e., through-in) y.
This is our primitive relation. We need a binary relation to express the basic 
intuition that minds are dependent entities. A mind is always encarnalized through- 
in some object.
Definition
Dl l. Hx =df 3yHxy
We write ‘Hx’ for “x is a mind”. Since every mind is ontologically dependent on its 
brain, being a mind is defined as being a mind in (i.e. through-in) something.
Basic Axiom
A l l  Hxy ► ~Hy.
The brain o f  a mind is not a mind.
Some Theorems
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T 1.1 Hxy -*■ ~Hyx.
Being a mind in (through-in) is an asymmetric relation: a mind cannot encamalize 
its own brain.
T I2  ~Hxx
Being a mind in (or through-in) is an irreflexive relation: a mind cannot encamalize 
itself.
T1.3 Hx ~3yHyx
Minds do not have minds; they cannot encamalize one another (though they can 
have minds as proper parts).
T1 4 3xHx 3x-Hx
Minds cannot be the only things around. [[Comment: A denial o f Berkeley’s 
position, thus allowing for physicalism.]
2. Mereology
As immaterial bodies, minds have parts and can bear part-whole relations to one another 
(though not to their brains). The main principles concerning these relations can be 
formulated within the framework o f  classical extensional mereology supplemented with 
some specific axioms on the behavior o f the ontological relation H.
Notation
N2.1 X < y = X is a part o f  y.
This is one o f many possible mereological primitives: a reflexive, anti-symmetric, 
transitive relation (i.e., a partial ordering), according to classical mereology.
Definitions
D2.1 X < y =df. X < y -X = y.
X < y ’ means 'x is a proper part o f y” ; i.e., x is a part o f  y other than y itself. This
is a transitive and asymmetric (hence irreflexive) relation.
D2.2 X o y =df. 3z(z < x ^ z < y).
X o y ’ means “x overlaps y” ; i.e., x and y have some parts in common. This is a
reflexive and symmetric (but not transitive) relation.
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D2.3 ^ x A x  =df. izAy(y = z 3w(Aw ^ y ° v/)).
‘J^xAx’ stands for “the fusion o f  all x such that Ax.” The existence o f such an
object is always assumed in classical mereology, provided there is some x such that 
Ax We do not assume it unless otherwise specified.
D2.4 X u  y =df. ^w (w  < x v w < y)
X u  y ’ stands for “the union o f  x and y,” i.e., the smallest thing whose parts are 
either parts o f x or parts o f y. This is an idempotent, commutative, distributive
operation.
D2.5 X n  y =df. Y]w(w < x w < y).
X n  y’ stands for “the intersection o f x and y,” i.e., the largest thing whose parts 
are both parts of x and parts o f  y. This too is an idempotent, commutative, 
distributive operation, though one that is defined only if x ° y
D2.6 X - y =df. ^w (w  < x ^ ~w ° y).
X - y ’ stands for “the difference o f x and y,” i.e., the largest thing contained in x 
that has no part in common with y
D2.7 X < y =df. Hx x < y.
X < y’ means “x is a mind-part o f y,” i.e., a mind that is a part o f y. This is a 
partial ordering, like <; it applies only when y is itself a (part of a) mind.
D 28 X < y =df. x < y ~x = y
X -< y ’ means ‘x is a proper mind-part of y,” i.e., a mind that is a proper part o f  y. 
This is a transitive, asymmetric, irreflexive relation, like <
Basic Axioms
A2.1 Hxy *• ~x 0  y.
No mind overlaps its own brain (though the sum o f  a mind and its brain may be a 
legitimate brain for different minds: e.g. the sum o f  a human y and its mind x -  if 
such a sum exists -  will not be a brain o f x, but it will be a brain o f a mind that 
may be hidden inside y). [[Comment: a multiple personality claim: allows hidden 
minds where a mind and brain can sponsor other minds.]]
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A2.2 H xy ^  H xz ► 3 w (w  < y n z ^ Hxw).
Any two brain structures o f  a mind have a common proper part that entirely 
encarnates the mind.
A2.3 [Hxy v Hzy] ->■ V w(w ^ x u  z -► Hwy)
Any brain o f a mind entirely encarnates all common mind-parts o f any sum 
involving that mind.
A2.4 Hxy ' ^ y ^ z ^ x o z v  Hxz
Any object [e.g. the central nervous system] that includes the brain o f a mind is a 
brain o f  that mind, unless its parts also include parts o f that very mind.
A2.5 Hxy ^ Hzw x ° z > y ° w
Overlapping minds have overlapping brain structures. (However, two minds may 
well occupy the same region, or part o f the same region, without sharing any 
common parts. Minds are immaterial, and can penetrate one another; mereological 
overlapping is not implied by spatial co-localization.) [[Comment: Allows multiple 
personality to obtain]]
A2.6 Hx > 3 z(z < x)
No mind is atomic (though minds need not have proper mind-parts; otherwise 
every mind would correspond to a collection o f  infinitely many, gradually 
submerged minds
Some Theorems
T2.1 Hxy ~x < y
Minds are not parts o f their brains (although the brain o f  a mind may have different 
minds as parts) {A 2.1}
T2.2 Hxy ► ~x < y.
Minds are not mind-parts o f  their brains (although they can be mind-parts o f  parts 
o f  minds) [A 2.1}
T2.3 Hxy ->■ -y  < x.
The brain o f a mind is not part o f it. {A 2.1}
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T2.4 Hxy < z~> ~Hz
The brain o f  a mind is not part of any mind. {A l. 1 + A2.4 - A2.5}. This is a 
generalization o f  the ontological axiom ( A l l )  and o f  the thesis that a mind cannot 
encamalize anything (T1.3).
T2.5 Hxy ^ Hxz y ° z.
Any two brain structures o f the same mind are overlapping; i.e., a mind cannot 
have two discrete brains {A2.2}. [[Comment; ‘the networked theorem’ Affirms a 
brain as single, networked device]]
T2.6 Hxy >■ 3z(z < y -H xz).
Not every part o f a mind’s brain is a brain o f  the mind (though [one o f these parts] 
could encamalize a different mind) {A2.2}
T2.7 Hxy ► 3z(z <y Hxz).
Encarnalizing a mind is having some proper part that entirely encarnates the mind 
{A2.2}.
T2.8 Hxy > Vz(z < x Hzy).
Encarnalizing a mind is encarnalizing any proper parts o f the mind that are minds 
themselves {A 2.3}. (Note that the same does not hold relative to < )
T2.9 Hxy Hxz *■ Hx(y u z).
The union o f any tw o brains which happen to encamalize a mind is itself a brain of 
that mind {A2.1 + A 2 .4}.
T2.10 Hxy ^ Hxz ► Hx(y n  z).
The intersection o f  any two brains which happen to encamalize a mind is itself a 
brain of that mind {A2.1 +A2.2+A2.4} [[comment: T2.9 and T 2 .10 state that 
there are different ways to tie a brain network together to form a new mind.]]
T 2 .11 Hxy Hxz ~Hx(y - z).
The difference o f  two brain structures o f a mind is not itself a brain o f that mind 
{A2.2}
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T 2 .12 Hxy ->■ Vz(~x ° z >■ Hx(y u z))
A mind in an object is also a mind in any mereological sum including that object, 
provided the sum does not include any parts o f  the mind itself {A2.4}.
T 2 .13 Hxy ► 3z(~x o z ^ Hx(y n z)).
A mind in an object is also a mind in some mereological product involving that 
object, provided the product does not include any parts o f the mind itself {A2.2}.
T 2 .14 Hxy > Vz~Hx(z - y).
The difference between an object and the brain o f  a mind is not a brain o f  that mind 
{A2.2).
T 2 .15 ~H (£z.z = z)
If the universal individual exists, it surely isn’t a mind { Al l  + A 2.1}.
T 2 .16~H (£z.z   ^ z).
The null individual (if it exists) cannot be a mind {A2.6}.
T 2 .17 ~3z.z < y >• ~3xHxy
Atoms are mindless {A 2.2}.
T 2 .18 Hx ^  Hx(J^zHxz).
The fusion o f all brain structures of a mind is a brain o f  that mind {A 2 .1 + A2.4}.
3. Topology 
Notation
Topology constitutes in many ways a natural next step after mereology, although various 
mereological notions could formally be defined in terms o f  topological ones. Particularly 
in a theory o f minds, topological notions are important to account for the fact that every 
mind is encarnalized through-in some structure o f  its brain as well as for taxonomic 
purposes.
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N3.1 X c  y = X is connected with y.
This is a reflexive and symmetric relation capturing the intuitive notion o f touching 
or being co-localized at some point We take it to satisfy the clause that what is 
connected with a part is also connected with the whole, so that x < y implies Vz(z 
c  X ► z c y).
Definitions
D3 1 Cx =df. VyVz(x -  y c  z ► y c  z).
‘C x’ means “x is (self-) connected”; i.e., x does not consist of two or more 
disconnected parts.
D3.2 hx =df. £y(Hxy ^ Cy).
hx' stands for “the principal brain o f  x,” i.e., x’s maximally connected brain (a 
notion that we take to be defined only when x is a mind). We may intuitively 
regard this as the brain o f  the mind, every other brain structure being either a 
topologically scattered mereological aggregate including the principal brain or a 
potential part o f this latter (see above aJ  A2.2).
D3.3 X X y =df. x c  y ^ ~x ° y.
X X y’ means “x is externally connected with y”; i.e., x is connected with y but
does not overlap it. This is an irreflexive and symmetric relation.
D3.4 X < y =df. \  <y Vz(z x  x ► -~z x y).
X < y’ means “x is an interior part o f  y” ; i.e., x is a part o f  y that is externally
connected only with things that are not so connected with y itself. This is a 
transitive relation included in < and closed under both u and n.
D3.5 X « y  =df. x < y ^ ~ 3z .z  < x.
X « y ’ means “x is a superficial part o f y” ; i.e., x is a part o f y that has not interior 
parts o f its own (or, intuitively, that only overlaps those parts of y that are 
externally connected with the geometric complement o f  y). This too is a transitive 
relation closed under u and n.
D3 .6 Sxy =df x •«: y ^ Cx ^ Vz(z «  y Cz (z c  x -► z < x)).
‘Sxy’ means “x is a structure o f y”; i.e., x is a maximally connected superficial part 
o f  y.
Basic Axioms
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A3 . 1 Hx ^  Cx
Minds are self-connected; i.e., there is no scattered mind.
A3.2 Hxy x c y.
Minds are connected with their [respective] brains.
A3.3 Hx >• 3y(Hxy ^ Cy).
Every mind has some self-connected brain.
A3.4 Hx y < X > 3z(z >< x ^ ~z >< y).
No mind can have a proper mind-part that is externally connected with exactly the 
same things as the mind itself.
Some Theorem s
T3 1 Hxy ► X X y
Minds are only externally connected with their brains; i.e., a mind and its brain 
touch each other, but have no parts in common {A2.1 + A3.2}.
T3.2 Hxy -*■ 3z(z y ^ x c  z).
Every mind is connected with some superficial part o f  its brain structures {A2.1 + 
A3 2}. (Minds are superficial entities; they go hand in hand with structures )
T3 .3 Hxy Vz(z <j y  -► ~ x  c  z).
No mind is connected with any interior parts o f  its brain structure {A 2 .1 + A3 2}. 
(Making a mind is transforming interior parts o f  an object into superficial ones.)
T3.4 Hxy ^ z i  x z >< y
The mind-parts o f  a mind are all externally connected with the brain o f  that mind, 
i e., they are all encarnalized along the “boundaries" o f that mind (a2.1 + A2.3 + 
.A3.2}.
T3.5 Hxy z < x ^ w < y (z >< w x >< w).
A mind is externally connected with every part o f  its brain that is so connected
with some mind-part o f  that mind {A2.1 + A3.2}
T3 .6 Hxy ^ z < x ^ Hzw x c  w
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A mind is sure to  be connected (externally or not) with the brain structures o f its 
own mind-parts {A2.1 +A3.2}.
T3.7 Hx ^ Hy (Hx u  y ► x c  y).
Only minds that are connected with each other can join to form a mind {A 3.I}. 
[[comment; multiple personality reintegration]]
T3.8 Hxy 3 z(z < y ^ Hxz Cz).
Encarnalizing a mind is having some proper self-connected part that entirely
encarnates the mind {A2.2 + A3.3}.
T3 .9 Hxy Hxz y <z z.
Any two brain structures o f a mind are connected with each other {A2.2 + A3 .3}.
T 3 .10 Hxy Hxz ~y >< z
Two brain structures o f  a mind cannot be externally connected {A2.2 + A3 .3 }.
T 3 .11 Hxy & Hxz ->• 3w (w  < y n z & Hxz Cz).
Any two brain structures o f  a mind have a common self-connected part that 
entirely encarnates the mind {A2.2 + A3 .3 }
13.12 Hx ^  Chx
Principal brain structures are always sure to be self-connected {A2 1 + A2.2 + 
A2.4 + A3.3}. [[comment, ‘principal’ defined earlier in D3.2]]
T3 .13 Hx -> Hxhx
Every mind is a mind in its principal brain {A 2 .1 +A2.2 + A2.4 +A3.3 }
T3 . 14 Hx '' z < \  >• hx = hz
The principal brain o f  a mind is also the principal brain of any mind-parts o f that 
mind {A2.3 + A 3.3}
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